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Chapter I 
Introduction and Literature Review 
History: Airborne Disease Transmission Theory 
Throughout recorded history, mankind has used concepts of “isolation” as a means 
to protect the larger population from exposure to those with a potentially infectious 
disease. Biblical references in the books of Numbers and Leviticus delineate 
instructions to both cover the mouth and send from the encampment any 
individuals thought to have leprosy or other infectious health “issues” [McMillen and 
Stern 2000]. The instruction to “cover the mouth” appears to guard against some 
form of droplet spread. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) still 
is not certain how leprosy is transmitted, though droplet spread is the most likely 
means [CDC 2003a]. This concept of separating potentially infectious persons from 
the general population has remained a predominant protection mechanism 
throughout much of the world’s history [CDC 2003b], even when knowledge of the 
mechanisms responsible for the spread of disease or infection is lacking.  
In the mid-1800s, the microorganisms responsible for infection were popularly 
believed to spontaneously generate; little thought was given to routes of 
contamination. In 1858, fueled by insight gained during studies of alcohol 
fermentation, Louis Pasteur debunked the spontaneous generation theory. Through 
experiments using his swan-necked flask (Figure 1), he was able to demonstrate 
that it was not the air itself upon which the causative organisms for spoilage and 
putrification rode, but microscopic dust particles within the air [Cohn 2004].  
 
Figure 1. Swan flask. The swan-like neck was open to air, but dust and airborne 
microbes could not navigate the contour to reach the contents. 
Although the focus of Pasteur’s work was the prevention of spoilage of food and 
wine, the discovery had a great impact upon medical practices in Europe, especially 
as they pertained to patient infections due to open wounds or surgery. In the mid-
1860s, Joseph Lister applied Pasteur’s theory to his medical practice in Glasgow, 
Scotland. His first application was in the treatment of compound fractures, where 
Lister decided to apply dressings saturated with a carbolic acid “creosote” to kill the 
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germs in the wound and prevent other germs from entering. Inspired by his 
success, he applied the concept during the postoperative treatment of surgical 
amputations, reducing the mortality rate from 46 to 15 percent [Newsom 2003]. 
Lister’s next assault against airborne microorganisms was the evolution of his 
“antiseptic surgery” technique, a surgical room treatment that aerosolized a 20 
percent carbolic acid spray during the procedure and introduced the use of air 
filtration into medical practice [Meers 1993].  
While Lister’s efforts focused on preventing infectious microorganisms from 
reaching the vulnerable patient, recognition in the literature that air was a potential 
route of infectious transmission began to influence the treatment of contagious 
disease, both in Europe and in the United States. This influence was further 
fostered by Florence Nightingale’s Notes on Nursing, in which she suggests that 
“…to keep the air he [the patient] breathes as pure as the external air, without 
chilling him” is the very first canon of nursing. Nightingale’s instructions were based 
upon her own observations and intuitive epidemiological analysis. They place 
special emphasis on identifying fresh sources of room air and admonish against 
recirculating air from the “infected atmospheres” surrounding other ill patients or 
from other unhealthy sources [Nightingale 1860]. Nightingale was generally 
credited with recommending the use of pavilion-style hospital designs, which 
became popular in the United States and Europe. This design utilized multiple, 
small hospital rooms centered around an open inner courtyard [Larson 1997]. The 
multiple wards reduced the number of individuals exposed to any one patient, and 
the courtyards provided a ready source of fresh outdoor air.  
For the hospital environment, the desire to separate the infirm was countered 
against the need to centrally locate them near the available healthcare providers. 
These competing requirements eventually led to the formation of the Sanatorium 
(a.k.a. Isolation or Infectious Disease Hospital), whereby the patients could be 
sufficiently separated from the population yet adequately clustered to allow access 
to healthcare. In Europe, these hospitals generally treated patients with typhoid, 
cholera, smallpox, and tuberculosis. The sanatoriums began to fully proliferate after 
Robert Koch discovered the tubercle bacillus in 1882 and, because the initial site of 
infection was the respiratory tract, speculated that tuberculosis was spread via 
airborne transmission [Newsom 2006]. However, Brehmer was credited with being 
the first to use a sanatorium, at Goorbersodorf, Germany, in 1859, but there are 
earlier references to a sanatorium in Bodington, England, in 1840 [History of TB 
2004]. Within the United States, the first documented recommendations for 
isolation precautions appeared in a hospital handbook published around 1877. This 
handbook recommended placing infectious disease patients in separate facilities 
away from the main hospital; thus, it too adopted the sanatorium or infectious 
disease hospital approach [Garner 1996]. The first known application of this 
approach in the United States was a facility that opened in 1885 at Saranac Lake, 
NY [History of TB 2004].  
The unfortunate consequence of the sanatorium approach was a dangerous and 
often fatal environment for healthcare workers and patients, due to cross-infections 
resulting from poor hygiene practices and a lack of disease-specific separation 
[Gammon 1998]. As observations of cross-infections increased, some hospitals 
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began instituting disease-specific separation by ward or by floor in addition to 
increasing emphasis on the evolving knowledge associated with aseptic practices 
[Garner 1996]. Despite these developments, the airborne route for potential cross-
infection was not recognized universally by practitioners and medical facilities. 
While some health professionals began to look at airborne dust as the primary 
carrier of most infectious diseases, others in Europe and the United States focused 
on other routes of transmission. In 1843 in Boston, Dr. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., 
was proclaiming the virtues of hand and instrument hygiene among physicians, as a 
preventive measure against contact transmission of puerperal fever and other 
diseases. At the time, the concept of infection being transferred from patient to 
patient via the physician brought him great ridicule, although independent 
confirmation of the theory five years later by Vienna’s Dr. Ignaz Semmelweis 
softened this criticism [Gathright 1995]. The famous epidemiological and 
investigational work by John Snow in the Broad Street Pump Outbreak of 1854 
resulted in the discovery of cholera’s transmission via contaminated water rather 
than an airborne vehicle, as was previously believed [Snow 1855]. In the late 
1800s, malaria and yellow fever were both determined to be transmitted by 
mosquitoes. Thus, for several diseases whose transmission was originally thought 
to occur through the air, alternative explanations were discovered. History reflects 
that the pendulum of belief began to swing away from airborne transmission as a 
route of disease transfer. 
The controversy about the effectiveness of airborne isolation and contact prevention 
continued into the 20th century. In the United States during the early 1900s, there 
were two common methods for aseptic nursing of patients requiring infectious 
isolation: (1) the barrier system, which involved multi-patient rooms and a strict 
emphasis upon contact precautions via the use of barriers such as gloves and 
gowns, and (2) the cubicle system, which adhered to the contact precautions but 
modified the barrier system by placing patients into individual cubicles (four walls, 
with open top) within a large multi-patient room [Garner 1996, Jackson and Lynch 
1985]. It is important to note that neither of these systems placed emphasis upon 
airborne isolation. This near-total focus on contact transmission, to include droplet 
spread, was largely influenced by the writings of Charles Chapin, a Rhode Island 
public health official, who wrote: 
“Bacteriology teaches that former ideas in regard to the manner in which 
diseases may be airborne are entirely erroneous; that most diseases are not 
likely to be dust-borne, and that they are spray-borne only for two or three 
feet, a phenomenon which after all resembles contact infection more than it 
does aerial infection as ordinarily understood.” [Chapin 1912]  
and 
“We are warranted then, in discarding it [airborne infection] as a working 
hypothesis and devoting our chief attention to the prevention of contact 
infection.” [Chapin 1912]  
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Chapin’s position on the limited range of infection transmission by droplets was 
largely driven by the work of microbiologist Carl Flugge, to whom Chapin gives 
credit for the discovery of droplet infection. Flugge (as reported by Chapin) had 
concluded that infection by droplets was much more probable than infection by 
dust-borne agents, and he had documented the generation of droplets originating 
from the mouths of patients engaged in speaking, loud talking, coughing, and 
sneezing [Chapin 1912]. In addition, Chapin described experiments by 
Laschtschenko and Heymann, directed by Flugge, which exposed guinea pigs in 
front of coughing tuberculosis patients and found no resulting infections when the 
guinea pigs were held further from the source than 1 meter [Chapin 1912]. 
Although he had demonstrated the ability of bacteria-laden droplets to travel up to 
nine meters, Flugge’s and subsequently Chapin’s conclusion was that the spread of 
droplets with sufficient infective concentration to cause disease transmission was 
limited to within the arm’s reach of the subject [Chapin 1912, Fitzgerald 2002]. 
Another factor to influence Chapin’s position was the concern that recognition of 
airborne contagion could lead to the decline in other protective behaviors:  
“Infection by air, if it does take place, as is commonly believed, is so difficult 
to avoid or guard against, and so universal in its action, that it discourages 
effort to avoid other sources of danger. If the sick room is filled with floating 
contagium, of what use is it to make much of an effort to guard against 
contact infection?” [Chapin 1912]  
Incidentally, a historical reference to note (though no causal implications are 
claimed) is that the worldwide influenza pandemic of 1918–1919, responsible for 
over 20 million deaths (approximately 0.5 million in the United States) [HHS 2004], 
coincided with this peak period of “airborne apathy” regarding patient isolation.  
As 1925 approached, the emphasis on where to treat patients with communicable 
diseases began to shift from communicable disease hospitals toward general 
hospitals [Jackson and Lynch 1985]. With the exception of tuberculosis 
sanatoriums, which lagged moderately behind this trend, this transition continued 
over the next 25 years. The cubicle and barrier methods continued to be the means 
of isolation used for treating those patients diagnosed with communicable diseases.  
The Development of Droplet Nuclei Theory 
Perhaps the most important 20th century contributor to the issue of airborne 
isolation was William F. Wells, a sanitary engineer whose research at the Harvard 
School of Public Health (1930–1937) and later at the University of Pennsylvania 
Medical School's Laboratory for the Study of Airborne Infection (1937–1944) 
provided the droplet nuclei theory for the airborne spread of contagion. In the early 
1930s, the Massachusetts Department of Public Health was investigating the 
speculation that stagnant water used to suppress dust in textile mills was a source 
of bacterial infection for the exposed workers. Wells developed an air centrifuge 
with which he and a student assistant, Richard Riley, successfully cultured bacteria 
from the air inside a textile mill. Surprisingly, samples collected outside the areas of 
visible suppression spray were also sources of culturable bacteria. This discovery 
led Wells to speculate that these airborne source particles, which he termed 
EPHB Report No. EPHB 301-05f
 
 
Page 5 
“droplet nuclei,” were the remaining residue following in-flight evaporation of the 
suppression spray droplets. After witnessing these surprising results, Wells 
hypothesized that droplet nuclei could also be the mechanism responsible for 
airborne transmission of infectious diseases such as measles and tuberculosis 
[Massachusetts Department of Public Health 2002]. In his 1934 publication On Air-
Borne Infection, Wells provided the theoretical reasoning for the existence of 
“droplet nuclei,” which could remain aloft for a considerable time and distance after 
the water component of an airborne droplet quickly evaporates. In almost direct 
repudiation of Charles Chapin, Wells wrote: 
“It would be incorrect to conclude merely from this [settling calculations 
based upon Stokes’ and Newton’s laws], however, that air receiving infected 
droplets cannot convey such infection long distances. To do so would be to 
neglect a most important characteristic of liquid droplets, namely their 
tendency to evaporate.” [Wells 1934]  
Thus, if the droplet diameter was sufficiently small that the evaporation process 
completes prior to falling from mouth to floor, then the droplet nuclei had the 
potential to spread contagion for considerable time and distance [Wells 1934]. 
Wells used a simplified case, depicted in Figure 2, to demonstrate the concept, 
showing curves of evaporation and falling time over a height of 2 meters (the 
approximate height of a man). For droplets whose diameters were >1 mm, the 
falling time was calculated with Newton’s equations for gravitational settling, as the 
effect of air resistance was negligible for these droplets. For smaller droplets whose 
diameters were <0.1 mm, falling times were determined according to the particles’ 
terminal velocities, as calculated with the Stokes drag formula to account for the air 
resistance upon the falling droplets [Wells 1934]. Settling times for droplets 
between 0.1 mm and 1.0 mm were determined by using log-linear interpolation. 
The falling-time calculations were generated with the assumption of saturated air, 
thus allowing for fixed droplet diameters throughout the fall. The evaporation times 
were computed from the droplet evaporation data published in 1932 by Whytlaw-
Gray and Patterson in Smoke: A Study of Aerial Disperse Systems (as cited by 
Wells) [Wells 1934]. The assumption of pure water droplets in unsaturated air was 
used for the evaporation calculations; thus the theoretical droplets were capable of 
complete evaporation. When plotted onto the same graph, the curves were similar 
yet with opposite trends. The point where the two curves intersected was the 
smallest droplet size that actually reaches the ground (Figure 2). On the basis of 
these calculations, Wells determined:  
“Somewhere between .1 and .2 mm lies the droplet size which identifies 
droplets of mouth spray that reach the ground within the life of the droplet, 
as against droplets that evaporate and remain in the air as droplet nuclei 
with attached infection” [Wells 1934].  
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Figure 2. Falling times and evaporation times of water droplets in air. (Graphic 
created from data published in Epidemiologic Basis of Tuberculosis Control [Rieder 
et al. 1999].) 
To account for the real-life scenario in which the droplet’s diameter decreases due 
to evaporation, Wells proposed to evaluate mouth spray under the following 
parameters: (1) that the aerosol’s falling velocity was directly proportional to its 
surface area (i.e., the falling velocity was driven by Stokes’ law); and (2) the rate 
of change of the surface (the evaporation rate) was constant (as would be the case 
for an environment with constant temperature and humidity). In equation form, 
this is: 
  Falling velocity: Sk
dt
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Since 2DS ⋅= π , 
define another new constant ( ) KK ⋅= 2' π ,  then  4' DKh ⋅=  
where: 
 h = height, 
 t = time 
 S = droplet surface area  
 D = droplet diameter 
c, k, K, and K’ are constants as defined above  
Thus, Wells concluded that for the described scenario of very small droplets and 
constant humidity and pressure, “The distance a droplet will fall before ceasing to 
be a droplet is therefore proportional to the square of the surface or the fourth 
power of the diameter.” [Wells 1934]  
After accounting for environmental factors such as temperature and humidity as 
well as the fact that droplets from humans will contain dissolved substances which 
could alter the evaporation rate, Wells rendered a conclusion regarding the 
mechanisms of infection transmission through air. His conclusion directly 
contradicted the earlier statements by Chapin and is still generally (except for 
droplet size references) accepted in the 21st century. Wells concluded that 
transmission of infection through the air may take one of two forms: (1) droplet 
infection, as it applies to droplets larger than 100 micrometers (µm) in diameter, 
which are rapidly removed from the air by gravity, before evaporation and within a 
short distance of the patient, and (2) airborne infection, which deals with infected 
droplet nuclei, derived directly from droplets less than 100 µm in diameter, which 
because of their buoyancy have the potential to remain suspended in the air for 
considerable distances and time [Wells 1934].  
Wells’ droplet nuclei hypothesis is arguably the most influential contribution to the 
science of airborne disease transfer and efforts to isolate the airborne route of 
transmission. The hypothesis, which was later proven and demonstrated as a 
causative route of disease transfer, gave rise to a flurry of research over the next 
30 years, much of which centered on tuberculosis [Wells and Brown 1936; Ratcliffe 
and Wells 1948; Wells and Ratcliffe 1948; Wells 1955; DeJong and Winkler 1964; 
Riley 2001]. These studies had both successes and failures, as the droplet nuclei 
under research were invisible and easily dispersed and thus difficult to trace 
environmentally and control with certainty.  
The discovery of ultraviolet radiation (UV) as a form of airborne “disinfectant” 
allowed the development of numerous studies between irradiated environments and 
nonirradiated environments in an attempt to prove the airborne transmission route 
as well as the protective effects of UV. However, in the case of naturally occurring 
diseases such as measles, influenza, chickenpox, etc., control of the airborne 
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environment at a school or workplace was generally insufficient if the subjects were 
later exposed in noncontrolled environments. Thus, Wells and the other researchers 
of the time who pursued this investigational approach had mixed results. After 
successfully demonstration of UV’s protective effect against airborne transmission 
of measles in selected Philadelphia grade schools, similar studies in New York, 
London, and a Naval training station bore mixed-to-negative results, possibly due 
to significant periods of subject exposure to nonirradiated atmospheres [Riley 
1980]. The ability to completely control the air to which people were exposed was 
proving to be a difficult task, and the failure to halt the spread of contagious 
disease through the use of UV was seen as proof that the droplet nuclei theory was 
a fallacy. Despite the popularity of airborne contagion theory in the 1930s and 
1940s, the failure to conclusively prove that droplet nuclei were a major 
epidemiologic route of airborne contagion redirected the pendulum of popular belief 
back to the nonairborne advocates by the middle of the 20th century.  
Droplet Nuclei: From Theory to Human Contagion  
In 1954, the opportunity arose to demonstrate the presence of disease that 
resulted from airborne contagion, as opposed to previous efforts that had 
attempted to prevent disease through total elimination of airborne contagion (via 
UV). This research effort, which focused on airborne contagion as it applied to 
tuberculosis, occurred at the Veterans Administration (VA) Hospital in Baltimore, 
MD. After Wells had demonstrated that rabbits could be infected with bovine 
tuberculosis via lab-generated droplet nuclei, the next, obvious step was to 
determine specifically if tuberculosis could be transmitted via human-generated 
droplet nuclei. Richard Riley, who by then was a professor at neighboring Johns 
Hopkins University, was the principal investigator. Wells and his assistant, Cretyl 
Mills, were the nucleus of the research team. The research plan sought to 
determine whether guinea pigs, exposed to air transferred from a 6-bed 
tuberculosis ward, would become infected under conditions that precluded causes 
other than droplet nuclei. (Wells was familiar with work from over sixty years prior 
at Brompton Hospital, in England, where guinea pigs placed in a ventilation shaft 
had contracted tuberculosis.) The first trial covered a two-year period. The guinea 
pigs were skin tested for tuberculosis infection each month, and on an average, 
three guinea pigs per month were discovered to be stricken with tuberculosis. This 
was the same infection rate that Wells had anticipated [Riley 2001]. Subsequent 
animal lung autopsies revealed a single peripheral focus of tuberculosis, resulting 
from the apparent inhalation of just a single infectious droplet nucleus. Critics, 
however, claimed that the cases could have originated from the food, water, or 
perhaps contact. The research study had failed to include a control group, which 
could disprove routes of exposure other than the aerial ones. The researchers 
repeated the study, this time with a control group of 150 guinea pigs with identical 
exposure conditions, except that the transfer air to their exposure cage was 
disinfected with UV. After an additional two years of data collection, the research 
effort was again successful in demonstrating transfer of tuberculosis disease in the 
subject group of guinea pigs; only this time, use of the control group, with no 
infections of tuberculosis, verified the apparent source of infection as droplet nuclei 
in the nonirradiated transfer air [Riley et al. 1959].  
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Another landmark study in the understanding of airborne disease transmission was 
the mid-1960s experiments by Loudin and Roberts that documented generation 
rates for the droplets and droplet nuclei produced by means of talking and 
coughing. The investigators demonstrated that a single cough generated about the 
same number of droplets as thirty seconds of talking and the same number of 
airborne droplet nuclei as five minutes of talking. Perhaps even more important was 
the observation that almost half (49 percent) of the cough-generated droplet nuclei 
remained suspended more than thirty minutes following their generation, as 
opposed to only 6 percent of the talk-generated droplet nuclei over the same time 
period. These findings led the investigators to the conclusion that coughing was an 
important mechanism in the production of droplet nuclei with infective potential 
[Loudin and Roberts 1966]. As will be discussed later in this document, these 
findings are still relevant to modern day approaches for the handling of patients 
with potentially infectious diseases, especially those who are undergoing cough-
inducing procedures.  
Finally, it was not a research discovery but two nosocomial outbreaks of smallpox 
that arguably proved the applicability of airborne contagion theory to human 
health. Both outbreaks occurred in West Germany, the first at Monschau in 1962 
and the second in Meschede in 1970. The World Health Organization (WHO) 
concluded that both of these outbreaks “seem certainly to have been 
airborne”[Fenner et al. 1988]. The Meschede outbreak is probably the most studied 
and thus the better known of the two. In this outbreak, an electrician returning 
from a trip to Pakistan was hospitalized 10 days after his return, with a feverish 
illness suspected to be typhoid. He was confined to his room and developed a rash 
after three days. After an additional two days, he was diagnosed with smallpox and 
consequently transferred to a smallpox hospital. Nineteen additional cases of 
smallpox subsequently occurred on all three floors of the original building in which 
the index patient had been treated. Of these 19 cases, 17 occurred within a single 
incubation period, confirming the index case as the source patient. It is also 
significant to note that several of these cases developed at a significant distance 
from the index patient [Fenner et al. 1988]. Figure 3 is a schematic showing the 
distribution of cases throughout the hospital. The figure also shows the upward 
dispersion observed during smoke tests conducted by WHO researchers following 
the outbreak [CDC 2003c].  
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Figure 3. Schematic detailing airborne transmission of smallpox at a hospital in 
Meschede, Germany (1970), and the similar dispersion of tracer smoke tests 
conducted later by the WHO [graphic: CDC]. 
The Evolution of Standardized Hospital Isolation Criteria 
In 1951, the American Public Health Association (APHA) held a large meeting to 
develop policy recommendations for the care of patients with communicable 
disease. Fueled by at least one U.S. study which indicated infectious disease 
hospitals had personnel and facilities that were inferior to general hospitals, the 
APHA recommended that communicable disease patients be treated at home, 
unless seriously ill, in which case they should be treated in general hospitals 
[Jackson and Lynch 1985]. Thus, as the 1950s progressed and infection control 
policies and procedures improved, the isolation hospitals were dwindling in number 
(with the exception of tuberculosis sanatoriums) and patients with communicable 
diseases were treated in general hospitals or at home. During this same era, 
nosocomial outbreaks of staphylococcal infections occurred in several U.S. 
hospitals, and some facilities began to place infectious patients into specially 
designed isolation rooms [Bjerke 2002; Whitehouse et al. 1998]. These outbreaks 
led the Communicable Diseases Center (the predecessor to the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention [CDC]) to sponsor a meeting on nosocomial transmissions 
of staphylococcal infections in 1958. During that same year, the American Hospital 
Association (AHA) published recommendations on the prevention and control of 
Staphylococcus infections. For the first time, the AHA recommended that (1) 
infection control committees be established in each hospital; (2) a system for 
reporting infections among patients and personnel be developed; (3) hospitals 
distinguish between infections acquired within the hospital versus outside of the 
hospital; (4) aseptic practices for most hospital settings be evaluated; and (5) the 
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use of antibiotics and adrenocorticosteroids be reduced as much as medically 
realistic [Jackson and Lynch 1985].  
As the mid-1960s progressed and knowledge of tuberculosis and its believed 
mechanisms of spread became more established, the tuberculosis sanatoriums also 
began to close and tuberculosis patients were treated in special rooms or wards at 
general hospitals or even at home [Garner 1996]. A formalized approach to 
hospital-associated infections was begun by the AHA in 1962 with the publication of 
its first monograph on hospital infections, a significant portion of which was devoted 
to modes of transmission and methods of control [Larson 1997]. In addition, in 
1969, the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH) published its 
first accrediting standards, which required, among other things, the establishment 
of an infection control committee and availability of patient isolation facilities [JCAH 
1969].  
The CDC Weighs In 
In recognizing that the lack of a consistent prevention system contributed to the 
problem of nosocomial infections, the CDC’s Hospital Infections Program (HIP) 
published Isolation Techniques for Use in Hospitals in 1970 [National Communicable 
Disease Center 1970]. This document introduced a category system of isolation 
within seven color-coded categories: Strict Isolation, Respiratory Isolation, 
Protective Isolation, Enteric Precautions, Wound and Skin Precautions, Discharge 
Precautions, and Blood Precautions. Diseases were categorized according to the 
epidemiological evidence of transmission. Isolation guidance was category specific 
and could be easily recognized through the use of color-coded placards and patient 
charts. However, because the precautions for a particular disease category were 
based upon the worst offender (i.e., the most infectious) in that category, the 
system led to over-isolation (and added expense) for the category’s lesser 
offenders. The focus of CDC’s initial guidance was upon general hospitals. This 
focus was extended to include small community hospitals when the guidance was 
revised in 1975 [CDC 1975]. In addition, the 1975 revision included guidance and 
recommendations regarding the avoidance of contaminations via “sharps” (i.e., 
needles, scalpels, scissors, broken glass), and it introduced a new appendix with a 
disease list that provided additional information on precautions and data for the 
color cards. In 1978, CDC’s guidance was updated once again to address newly 
identified syndromes.  
The first major change/update to the CDC guidance came in 1983. A title change to 
CDC Guideline for Isolation Precautions in Hospitals [Garner and Simmons 1983] 
placed the document into the vague category of being nonregulatory yet offering 
federal guidance that was often adopted by various jurisdictions as state-of-the-art 
practice. One of the most obvious changes in the 1983 guidelines was the 
empowerment of hospitals and individual healthcare providers to make decisions 
regarding the isolation practices required for their patients. Hospital infection 
control committees were allowed to choose from a revised category system, a new 
disease-specific system, or some adaptation of the guidelines to develop a unique 
system specific to the patient needs at their particular hospitals [Garner and 
Simmons 1983]. In addition, in assigning a patient to isolation, individual 
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healthcare providers were empowered to alter the precautions according to specific 
factors (e.g., the patient’s age or mental status) and to make decisions regarding 
their need for personal protective equipment on the basis of their anticipation of 
exposure to infectious material.  
Within the 1983 category-specific approach, the CDC guidelines offered seven 
revised categories of isolation. After elimination of the Protective Isolation category 
because of study findings that challenged its necessity or efficacy, the remaining 
categories were Strict Isolation, Contact Isolation, Respiratory Isolation, TB 
Isolation, Enteric Precautions, Drainage/Secretion Precautions, and Blood and Body 
Fluid Precautions. For those hospitals choosing the disease-specific approach, each 
disease was listed with its epidemiology of transmission, and only those precautions 
required to interrupt the identified transmission routes were required. Although it 
was hoped that the reductions in over-isolation would result in cost savings, the 
increased combinations of possible precautions allowed under this approach 
required more documentation and attention to detail than the previous, color-coded 
category system. Knowledge gaps and competing theories about the epidemiology 
of transmission of certain diseases brought about disagreement and controversy. 
This was especially so for the pendulum of opinions regarding diseases of close-
proximity droplet versus airborne-droplet nuclei transmission [Garner 1996]. 
Airborne isolation and respiratory protection were expensive, and committee 
members may have been hesitant to recommend these precautions unless 
absolutely positive that they were warranted.  
Just as in the earlier version, several revisions to CDC’s 1983 guidance document 
occurred as new data and disease awareness evolved. In 1987 the concept of 
Universal Precautions (UP) was adopted, largely due to the epidemic of human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection and the challenges of treating HIV-infected 
patients. These precautions introduced the approach of treating every patient as if 
he or she had a disease requiring blood and body substance precautions. A 
competing concept, Body Substance Isolation (BSI), was published later that same 
year by infection control personnel in Washington and California [Lynch et al. 
1987]. Similar to UP, BSI precautions were applied to all patients and were based 
on the assumption that all moist and potentially infectious body substances were 
infectious. In addition, BSI incorporated a stop-sign alert to redirect persons about 
to enter a potentially airborne infectious area; the sign directed them to the nurses’ 
station for determination of necessary respiratory protection.  
OSHA Proposes Bloodborne Pathogens Regulation 
As concerns increased regarding the transmission of HIV and hepatitis B virus 
(HBV) within healthcare and health research settings, the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration (OSHA) proposed a rule in 1989 regarding occupational 
exposures to bloodborne pathogens (BBP) [OSHA 1989]. The proposed rule was 
based upon CDC’s UP approach; however, it introduced new terms such as “visibly 
bloody” as a means of identifying potentially hazardous body substances. Within 
the healthcare community, the proposed rule received criticism for its 
disproportionate focus on worker protection (as opposed to patient protection), for 
its adoption of UP without sufficient research data proving its efficacy, and for the 
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increased financial burden to the industry [Garner 1996]. Despite these objections, 
the rule was finalized in December 1991 and became effective in March of the 
following year [56 Fed. Reg. 1030 (1991)]. Although the rule contained instructions 
applicable to direct contact, secondary contact, and droplet spread, there were no 
specific instructions regarding airborne precautions for healthcare workers. At the 
same time, the rule required airborne precautions for institutions engaged in HIV or 
HBV research or production. 
CDC Isolation Precautions for Control of Tuberculosis 
The CDC has also addressed the issue of patient isolation precautions in some 
disease-specific guidance publications. In regards to airborne transmission 
precautions, the most influential of these were the CDC publications on prevention 
of tuberculosis transmission within healthcare settings. The earliest CDC guidance 
document for tuberculosis was published in 1982, followed by a joint publication 
with the American Thoracic Society in early 1983 [CDC 1982; ATS 1983]. Although 
shared-air volumes with infectious patients were acknowledged as a key risk factor, 
these publications placed an emphasis on treatment of tuberculosis patients at 
home, unless other medical conditions warranted their hospitalization. Isolation 
itself was insufficient justification for hospitalization. In those cases where 
hospitalization was warranted, “appropriate infection control practices” were 
encouraged (yet not delineated) to protect healthcare workers and other patients 
from infection.  
By 1990, increased concerns regarding nosocomial transmissions of multi-drug-
resistant tuberculosis led the CDC to update its recommended precautions for 
preventing tuberculosis transmission within hospital settings. This was especially 
relevant to healthcare settings that provided treatment to individuals infected with 
HIV. Within these settings, both patients and healthcare workers were increasingly 
becoming infected through nosocomial transmissions [Jarvis et al. 1995]. The 
updated document, titled Guidelines for Preventing the Transmission of Tuberculosis 
in Health-Care Settings, with Special Focus on HIV-Related Issues, completely 
embraced the concept of airborne precautions, with special emphasis on (1) placing 
patients in private, negative-pressure isolation rooms (NPIR) with a minimum 
mechanical ventilation rate of six air changes per hour (ACH)1 [ASHRAE 1991], two 
of which had to be with outside air; and (2) use of engineered source control during 
high-risk procedures (e.g., specialized booths for sputum induction procedures), to 
capture and remove infectious droplet nuclei before they could be released into 
room air. The use of germicidal UV lamps (wavelengths = 100–290 nm) and High-
Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filtration systems was also discussed as a way of 
reducing airborne contamination within general-use hospital areas (emergency 
rooms, waiting areas). By definition, HEPA filters have a minimum particle-capture 
efficiency of 99.97 percent when challenged with a test aerosol of 0.3-µm diameter 
[USDOE 1997]. The 1990 guidelines also advised that surgical masks may be 
                                       
1 Air changes per hour (ACH) is a term used to describe a room or zone’s ventilation flow rate. It is determined by 
measuring the room airflow in volume units per hour and then dividing that value by the room or zone’s space 
volume (using consistent volume units). The term does not consider air-mixing efficiency.  
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insufficient respiratory protection to protect healthcare workers in some settings, 
and they identified “disposable respirators” as a better alternative.  
In 1993, an updated draft of CDC’s 1990 tuberculosis guidelines was released for 
public comment. Following the review and comment period, the guidelines were 
modified and published in 1994 with the shortened title, Guidelines for Preventing 
the Transmission of Tuberculosis in Health-Care Settings [CDC 1994]. This draft 
was largely motivated by the following concerns: (1) the rising incidence of 
nosocomial transmission of multi-drug-resistant tuberculosis; (2) a rising opinion 
that prior respiratory protection guidance had been insufficient; and (3) early 
research indications whose results endorsed the 1990 guidelines if the 
recommended ventilation and source controls were strictly followed and used in 
tandem with respirators capable of filtering 1-micron (µm) particles with at least 
95 percent efficiency [Jarvis et al. 1995]. Driven by these factors and roughly 
2700 public review comments, the guidelines were finalized in 1994 with a stronger 
emphasis on the hierarchy of controls to prevent transmission of tuberculosis and 
delineated performance criteria for respiratory protection for those situations where 
engineering and administrative controls were insufficient to control the hazard 
[Jarvis et al. 1995]. Specific changes pertinent to the design and operation of 
airborne isolation rooms included addition of a special supplement to the guidelines, 
entirely focused upon the design, operating, and testing parameters associated with 
the engineering control of aerosols with infectious potential. Although many of the 
individual concepts remained the same (i.e., source control, dilution ventilation, 
HEPA augmentation), the level of explanation for each of these dramatically 
increased. The revisions included these changes: 
• Increased minimum ventilation rates within negative-pressure isolation 
rooms, to 12 ACH for new and remodeled rooms; for existing rooms, an 
increase to a minimum of 12 ACH, if possible, or augmentation with 
recirculating HEPA-filtered systems. 
• Increased emphasis on engineering controls for source capture during 
aerosol-producing treatment activities (both enclosing and exterior methods 
of local exhaust were described). 
• Increased emphasis on ventilation delivery within isolation rooms in order to 
maximize mixing and reduce likelihood of ventilation dead spots or short-
circuiting. 
• Recommendation of a minimum pressure differential of 0.001 inches of water 
across the perimeter of the negative-pressure isolation room in order to 
establish necessarily consistent airflow into it. (Note: This was potentially the 
weakest of the recommendations as noted by many of those who 
commented, arguing that such a small differential could be easily reversed 
under normal operating conditions.) 
• Monitoring frequency for negative pressure and airflow into isolation rooms 
increased from “frequently” to daily. 
EPHB Report No. EPHB 301-05f
 
 
Page 15 
The Hospital Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee 
As the 1990s began, the U.S. healthcare industry lacked consistency in its 
knowledge and approach to infection control practices. Despite similar concepts and 
terms, there was inconsistency in their interpretation and uncertainty over which 
precautions were applicable to which body substances. Consequently, CDC’s 
infection control guidance evolved further [Garner 1996]. In 1991, after 
considerable feedback from infection control practitioners that showed an overhaul 
of the 1987 guidance was in order, the CDC requested that the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary issue a charter for a Hospital Infection 
Control Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC). This committee would assist CDC 
in the development of guidance for the prevention of nosocomial infections 
[O'Rourke 1995]. The charter established a 12-person committee of individuals with 
varying infection control backgrounds and interests to serve as technical advisors to 
CDC’s Hospital Infections Program. The charter established that HICPAC members 
would be appointed to 4-year terms by the HHS Secretary. The result of this new 
partnership was a revised draft of CDC’s hospital isolation guidance released in 
1994 and finalized in 1996 [Garner 1996]. The updated document consolidated and 
simplified the pre-existing infection control practices while espousing goals to be 
epidemiologically sound,2 simple, and user-friendly; to introduce new terms to 
alleviate the confusion with previous infection control; and to allow modifications of 
the guidance according to individual hospitals’ needs and circumstances. To this 
effect, the new guidelines introduced two tiers of isolation precautions. In the first 
tier were those precautions designated for all patients, regardless of their presumed 
or confirmed diagnosis. These were termed Standard Precautions and were a 
synthesis of the features in UP and BSI precautions (handwashing, gloves, eye 
protection, etc.). The second tier introduced three Transmission-based Precautions; 
these were applicable only to those patients known or suspected to be infected with 
highly transmissible or epidemiologically important pathogens for which one or 
more precautions, beyond Standard Precautions, were necessary to prevent 
nosocomial transmissions. The three transmission-based precautions were Contact 
Precautions (applicable to infections transmissible via direct or indirect contact), 
Droplet Precautions (applicable to infections transmissible via large [>5 µm] particle 
droplets), and Airborne Precautions (applicable to infections transmissible via small 
[≤5 µm] airborne droplet nuclei or dust particles containing the infectious agent) 
[Garner 1996]. Interestingly, the zone of concern for Droplet Precautions was 
limited to within only three feet of the patient, an apparent carryover from the 
writings of Chapin and Flugge, which had been perpetually cross-referenced 
throughout the 20th century. The guidance for patients requiring Airborne 
Precautions included private rooms, monitored negative pressure, 6 to 12 ACH 
ventilation, and discharge of room exhaust to the outdoors or high-efficiency 
filtration prior to recirculation to other areas of the hospital. 
In June 2004, CDC and HICPAC released for public comment a draft update of their 
1996 hospital isolation guidelines, Guideline for Isolation Precautions: Preventing 
Transmission of Infectious Agents in Healthcare Settings [Siegel 2004]. The five-
                                       
2 Note: The reference to epidemiologic justification reflected the ongoing debate between research scientists and the 
medical community over airborne contagion issues.  
EPHB Report No. EPHB 301-05f
 
 
Page 16 
part draft guideline, which increased in number of pages by a factor of four over the 
1996 two-part version, expanded and updated the guidelines to account for 
changing trends in the healthcare industry. These included (1) transitions in 
healthcare settings from hospital environments to other healthcare settings 
(ambulatory, specialty care, home care, long-term care, etc.); (2) the emergence 
of new pathogens, multi-drug-resistant variations of old pathogens, new therapies, 
and the threat of biowarfare; and (3) new research findings regarding various 
healthcare isolation practices. The 2004 draft described two tiers of precautions, 
identified as Standard Precautions and Expanded Precautions (a resynthesis of the 
former transmission-based precautions). In addition to reaffirming the concept of 
Standard Precautions, the draft expanded it to include “Respiratory Hygiene/Cough 
Etiquette,” which was intended to prevent potential disease transmissions beginning 
from the patient’s first point of contact with the healthcare setting. This 
recommendation arose out of the global outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS), a viral respiratory illness caused by a coronavirus now identified 
as SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) [CDC 2004a]. The SARS outbreak 
began in Asia in February 2003 and spread to over two dozen countries on four 
continents, eventually infecting as many as 8,098 persons and causing 774 deaths, 
according to the WHO. Lastly, the 2004 draft resurrected the concept of protective 
isolation with the description of Protective Environment patient rooms, designed to 
decrease the risk of life-threatening fungal infections in immunocompromised 
patients. In June 2007, the 2004 draft isolation guidelines were finalized as a four-
part document, without a previous discussion on performance indicators and with 
an added appendix that included a large tabular listing of the type and duration of 
precautions recommended for selected infections and conditions [Siegel et al. 
2007].  
Pathogens of Interest for Airborne Isolation 
Pathogens are defined as any agents that cause disease [Webster's II New 
Riverside University Dictionary 1988]. Those pathogens that affect the respiratory 
tract are termed respiratory pathogens and can be classified into three categories: 
bacteria, fungi, and viruses. Of these, the fungi and some of the bacteria are spore-
forming, and it is the spores, not the secretions or droplets from a sick patient, 
which have the potential for airborne transfer. Thus, airborne infection isolation 
(AII) is generally not a concern for patients with these infections. When patients are 
externally contaminated with spore-containing material (e.g., following a 
bioterrorism incident) or when patients require protective environments, the ability 
to control exposure to such spores is desired. In addition to the protective benefits 
provided by patient decontamination, spores are comparatively much larger than 
bacteria or viruses and are thus much easier to filter out of the air (Figure 4) [Hinds 
1982]. Consequently, the more challenging scenarios are generally those requiring 
protection from airborne bacteria or viruses.  
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Figure 4. Common air contaminants and their relative sizes (graphic: CDC/NIOSH). 
Another way to consider airborne pathogens is in terms of whether they are 
communicable (i.e., contagious) or noncommunicable. Communicable diseases 
generally originate from other humans, though sometimes from animals, whereas 
noncommunicable diseases come mainly from the environment. However, in the 
hospital environment, immunosuppressed patients can be susceptible to microbes 
from either humans or the environment that normally would not result in disease. 
Hence, for the healthcare environment, airborne pathogens can be placed into one 
of three classes: (1) communicable, (2) noncommunicable, and (3) primarily 
nosocomial [Kowalski and Bahnfleth 1998]. If the need arises to establish surge 
capacity for expedient patient isolation, control of communicable airborne 
pathogens would require infection isolation techniques (negative pressure). A surge 
of potentially immunosuppressed patients (such as what might occur following 
widescale exposure to radioactive material) would necessitate protective isolation 
(positive pressure) from airborne pathogens that fall into the noncommunicable and 
primarily nosocomial classes [Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education 2004].  
Appendix A of CDC’s 2007 Guidelines for Isolation Precautions in Hospitals includes 
an updated list of selected infections and diseases and the associated HICPAC 
precautions for handling patients with these diseases. In the 1996 version of the 
same guidelines, only 4 of 200 conditions listed were associated with airborne 
precautions [Garner 1996]. These included varicella (chicken pox), pulmonary 
tuberculosis, measles, and herpes zoster (varicella-zoster/shingles). Since 
publication of the 1996 guidelines, public health events have added monkey pox 
(until a smallpox diagnosis can be definitely eliminated) and SARS to the list of 
diseases for which airborne precautions are recommended [Siegel et al. 2007; CDC 
2004; CDC 2007]. In addition to known diseases, emerging diseases such as the 
H5N1 or H1N1 emerging influenza strains may also require various applications of 
airborne isolation precautions [CDC 2004].  
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Lastly, among the Category A bioterrorism agents, defined as agents which can be 
easily disseminated or transmitted person to person, can cause high mortality with 
potential for major public health impact, might cause public panic and social 
disruption, or require special action for public health preparedness) are a handful 
that could result in a surge requirement for AII [Nolte et al. 2004]. The Category A 
agents include Variola major (smallpox); Bacillus anthracis (anthrax); Yersinia 
pestis (plague); Clostridium botulinum toxin (botulism); Francisella tularensis 
(tularemia); filoviruses (Ebola hemorrhagic fever, Marburg hemorrhagic fever); and 
arenaviruses (Lassa [fever], Junin [Argentine hemorrhagic fever], and related 
viruses). Of these, only pneumonic plague, smallpox, filoviruses, and arenaviruses 
are indicators for airborne precautions [Nolte et al. 2004; Khan et al. 2000].  
Engineering Design Standards for Hospital Isolation 
In 1946, Congress passed the Hospital Survey and Construction Act (a.k.a. Hill-
Burton Act), which established a major hospital facility construction and renovation 
program and was sponsored by Senators Lister Hill and Harold Burton [Public Law 
79-725, 60 Stat.1040]. In 1947, the first General Standards (for hospital design) 
were published in the Federal Register as part of the implementation of Hill-Burton 
[American Institute of Architects 1987]. These standards, which were regularly 
updated by the federal government, required hospitals that received federal funds 
via Hill-Burton to adhere to certain design, equipment, and operational standards. 
In 1973, the standards were retitled as Minimum Requirements of Construction and 
Equipment for Hospital and Medical Facilities. Maintenance, updates, and 
publication of the standard were accomplished by the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (DHEW) and subsequently the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS). Thus, the standard fulfilled congressional mandates to 
prescribe by regulation the minimum standards for construction, renovation, and 
equipment for hospital projects funded under certain federal grant and loan 
provisions. As the act providing the specific federal funding provisions expired, the 
regulatory aspect of the standard became moot, and in 1984 the publication was 
retitled as Guidelines for Construction and Equipment of Hospital and Medical 
Facilities to reflect the nonregulatory status [HHS 1984].  
In regards to the design and operation of hospital isolation rooms, the 1984 
hospital guidelines were consistent with the criteria published in the 1976 and 1979 
versions of its predecessor, Minimum Requirements of Construction and Equipment 
for Hospital and Medical Facilities [U.S. Bureau of Health Facilities Financing, 
Compliance, and Conversion 1976, 1979]. Namely, these requirements were for 
• negative pressure (magnitude not specified) 
• total airflow of 6 ACH (the 1974 and 1979 documents also required 2 ACH of 
outdoor air)  
• 100 percent exhaust to outdoors 
• no recirculating room-conditioning units 
• positive-pressure anterooms with 10 ACH, as enhanced protection. 
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The 1984 guidelines were the last to be published by the federal government. 
Despite the expiration of regulatory authorization, the regulatory language 
remained, as the guidelines were used by HHS as evaluation criteria for hospital 
mortgage insurance applicants and by the Indian Health Service for hospital 
construction projects. In addition, other groups or jurisdictions such as JCAH (which 
in 1987 became known as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations, or JCAHO) and individual state licensure agencies were welcome to 
use the criteria. Beginning with the 1987 edition, maintenance and publication of 
the guidelines was handled by the American Institute of Architects (AIA) Committee 
on Architecture for Health. The change in publishers did not have an overwhelming 
impact upon the philosophy of the guidelines, however, as 12 of 36 committee 
members were from the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS) and several 
nonmember contributors from USPHS were acknowledged in the 1987 edition. Once 
again, the design criteria for hospital isolation rooms were consistent and did not 
vary from the 1984 edition [American Institute of Architects 1987].  
The AIA used the occasion of the 1992–1993 edition of the guidelines to launch its 
first significant update. Although the general format and content of the 1992–1993 
edition followed that of its 1987 predecessor, the new edition added new material 
to account for developing healthcare trends, while updating and clarifying the intent 
of sections carried over from prior editions [American Institute of Architects 1993]. 
Five new sections were added, describing minimum standards for specialized 
services within general hospitals as well as dedicated treatment facilities such as 
birthing centers. For new construction, regular patient rooms were limited to a 
maximum of two patients and central ventilation filtration systems were increased 
from one filtration bed to two, with the highest filtration efficiency increasing from 
80 to 90 percent (Standard 52-1976, “Dust Spot Efficiency Test Method,” published 
by the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-Conditioning Engineers 
[ASHRAE]). Patient isolation was an important focus for the 1992–1993 guidelines 
as well. The term Isolation Room was replaced by Infectious Isolation Rooms and 
Protective Isolation Rooms, reflecting negative-pressure and positive-pressure 
isolation rooms, respectively. 
While trying to maintain a 3- to 4-year renewal schedule, the AIA has released 
three additional updates to the hospital design guidelines, namely, the 1996–1997 
Guidelines for the Design and Construction of Hospital and Healthcare Facilities, the 
2001 edition of the same title, and the 2006 edition, Guidelines for the Design and 
Construction of Healthcare Facilities. The 2006 edition incorporated a major 
reorganization of the guidelines in an effort to improve the format, readability, and 
indexing of the document and make it a more useful and user-friendly tool 
[American Institute of Architects et al. 2006]. A summary of AIA’s ventilation 
guidance for hospital isolation rooms (under various titles), as prescribed in the 
multiple editions of the hospital design guidelines since 1987, is shown in Table 1. 
These values apply to newly remodeled or constructed rooms; existing isolation 
rooms were allowed to remain at the designed ventilation rate applicable at the 
time of their construction or latest remodel.  
In the 1987 and 1992–1993 editions of the guidelines, the minimum ratio of 
infectious isolation rooms (single patient) to acute patient beds was 1:30, with all 
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fractions rounded up. No minimum number of protective isolation rooms was 
prescribed. Beginning with the 1996–1997 edition, the minimum number of 
airborne infection isolation (slight terminology change) rooms was changed to 
simply one, with any additional bed requirements (infection isolation or protective 
isolation) to be determined on the basis of an Infection Control Risk Assessment 
(ICRA) of the needs of the specific community and the patient population served. 
This recommendation continued in both the 2001 and 2006 editions; however, the 
2006 edition also included, for the first time, advisory language (as an Appendix) 
regarding surge capacity in preparation for potential highly infectious emergencies. 
This language encourages hospitals to have the capacity to handle a surge of up to 
ten patients or a fourfold increase above the current emergency department 
capacity for such patients. One quote of interest from this appendix states, “If 
100 percent of exhaust (from the surge isolation area) cannot be achieved, 
appropriate proven technology should be utilized to reduce airborne particles by 
>95 percent.” [American Institute of Architects et al. 2006]  
Table 1. Ventilation requirements for variously termed isolation rooms (remodeled 
or new construction), as prescribed by American Institute of Architects guidelines 
(1987–2001) [American Institute of Architects 1987, 1993, 1996, 2001]. 
Type of 
Room 
(Edition) 
Air 
Movement 
Minimum 
Outdoor 
Air 
(ACH)1 
 
 
Minimum 
Supply 
Air 
(ACH)1 
100% 
Exhaust 
Outdoors? 
Anteroom 
Required / 
Optional 
Anteroom 
Air 
Movement 
Isolation 
(1987) In2 --- 6 Yes Optional Out 
Infectious 
Isolation 
(1992–1993) In 1  6 Yes Optional
6 In/Out3 
Protective2 
Isolation 
(1992–1993) Out 1  6 --- Optional
6 In/Out3 
Airborne 
Infection 
Isolation 
(1996–1997) 
In 2  12 Yes5 Optional In/Out3 
Protective4 
Environment 
(1996–1997) Out 2 12 --- Optional In/Out
3 
Airborne 
Infection 
Isolation 
(2001) 
In 2 12 Yes7 Optional8 In/Out3,8 
Protective4 
Environment 
(2001) 
Out 2 12 --- Optional8 In/Out3,8 
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Type of 
Room 
(Edition) 
Air 
Movement 
Minimum 
Outdoor 
Air 
(ACH)1 
 
 
Minimum 
Supply 
Air 
(ACH)1 
100% 
Exhaust 
Outdoors? 
Anteroom 
Required / 
Optional 
Anteroom 
Air 
Movement 
Airborne 
Infection 
Isolation 
(2006) 
In 2 12 Yes7 Optional8 In/Out8, 9 
Protective4 
Environment 
(2001) Out 2 12 --- Optional
8 In/Out8, 9 
1. Air changes per hour (ACH) is a term used to describe a room or zone’s ventilation flow rate. It is 
determined by measuring the room airflow in volume units per hour and then dividing that value by 
the room or zone’s space volume (using consistent volume units). The term does not consider air-
mixing efficiency. 
2. Reverse isolation with outward airflow is mentioned in the footnotes. 
3. Anteroom should be negative to corridor, negative to Protective Isolation rooms, and positive to 
Infectious Isolation rooms. 
4. Reversible airflow switches are not allowed, starting with the 1996–1997 edition. 
5. Partial room recirculation via freestanding units or return air was allowed as long as air was HEPA 
filtered.  
6. Anteroom required if program determines “strict isolation” (not defined) is necessary. 
7. If not practical to exhaust outdoors, AIA allows recirculation back to main HVAC system if 
exclusively serving the isolation room.  
8. An anteroom is required if an AII patient is also immunosuppressed. In this situation, anteroom 
must be negative to both corridor and patient room or positive (preferred) to both corridor and 
patient room. 
9. The anteroom can be (1) under positive pressure to both the corridor and the patient room or (2) 
under negative pressure to both the corridor and the patient room. A noted advantage of option 1 is 
the ability to use it as a clean zone for storing and donning personal protective equipment.  
ASHRAE provides design guidance specific to the mechanical design of buildings, 
including heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) and exhaust ventilation 
systems. For hospitals and other medical facilities, this information appears in the 
Healthcare Facilities chapter (Chapter 7) of the ASHRAE handbook on HVAC 
Applications, one of four ASHRAE handbooks that are updated on a rotating basis 
(one handbook per year) [ASHRAE 2003a]. In regard to isolation rooms, historically 
there has been good agreement between the ASHRAE recommendations and those 
found in the AIA guidelines, as several members of the AIA guidelines committee 
also serve on or support the ASHRAE committee responsible for developing the 
Healthcare Facilities chapter. Discrepancies, when they have occurred, have 
generally been associated with the different publication cycles between the two 
documents or with different terminologies preferred by the two organizations. 
These discrepancies often required healthcare engineers to identify and follow the 
most stringent of the two sets of recommendations. However, at the time of the 
release of the 2003 edition of the ASHRAE Applications Handbook (June 2003), the 
recommendations (airflows, pressures, filtration, and design temperature) and 
terminologies for hospital isolation rooms (both PE and AII rooms) were identical 
with the 2001 AIA guidance shown above in Table 1 [American Institute of 
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Architects 2001; ASHRAE 2003a]. In addition, CDC’s 2003 version of the Guidelines 
for Environmental Infection Control in Health-Care Facilities potentially resolved the 
issue of any further discrepancies by prescribing the AIA guidelines as the minimum 
standards whenever state or local regulations are not in place for design and 
construction of ventilation systems in new or renovated healthcare facilities 
[Sehulster et al. 2003].  
In 1997, ASHRAE began developing an HVAC design manual (as opposed to a 
standard or guideline) for hospitals and clinics. This publication was released in 
2003 as ASHRAE Special Project 91, the HVAC Design Manual for Hospitals and 
Clinics [ASHRAE 2003b]. In it, ASHRAE identifies design strategies known to meet 
the current standards and guidelines and in some cases offers recommendations 
beyond these minimum criteria, such as minimum airflow rates in anterooms or the 
supplemental use of UV air disinfection, which on the basis of recent research or the 
engineering experience of committee members were considered to be good 
engineering practice. In addition, the ASHRAE design manual serves as a reference 
to facilitate the operation and maintenance of healthcare facilities. In January 2003, 
ASHRAE announced its intention to develop its own healthcare ventilation standard, 
in collaboration with the American Society of Healthcare Engineering (ASHE) 
[Hermans 2003]. The subsequent standard was published by ASHRAE (co-
sponsored by The American Society of Healthcare Engineering (ASHE) and 
approved by The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in 2008 as 
ANSI/ASHRAE/ASHE Standard 170-2008, Ventilation of Health Care Facilities 
[ASHRAE 2008]. With the addition of yet another design standard, it was uncertain 
at first whether the new standard would contribute to consolidating the issues 
surrounding airborne isolation room design. This uncertainty was short-lived when 
Standard 170-2008 was adopted in its entirety, into The Guidelines for Design and 
Construction of Health Care Facilities, during the 2010 update to the Guidelines 
which is now managed and published by Facilities Guidelines Institute (FGI) instead 
of the AIA [FGI 2010].  
Potential Lessons from Industrial Contaminant Control Theory 
Airborne infection isolation and protective isolation within healthcare facilities may 
be thought of as a combination of traditional indoor air quality (IAQ) and industrial 
ventilation challenges, though perhaps outcomes due to a failure to control hold 
greater health implications on average. For airborne infection control, the aerosol 
size range of concern was defined by the CDC as <5 µm [Sehulster et al. 2003]. 
This was somewhat consistent with research by Riley and Wells that showed the 
particle size of respiratory infectious aerosols to be in the range of 1–3 µm [Riley 
1974]. The important point was that both of these size ranges describe particles 
whose terminal settling velocities are very small, allowing room air currents to 
easily keep them aloft for long periods. By definition, a particle’s terminal settling 
velocity is a constant velocity condition wherein the gravitational acceleration forces 
(Fg) are equally countered by the drag forces (Fd) and buoyancy forces of the air on 
the particle [Hinds 1982]. For a 2-µm sphere of unit density floating in air, this 
relationship can be shown by the following equation: 
Dg FF =  
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where: 
gVolgmF ssg ××=×= ρ  
and 
c
TS
D C
DVF πη3=        
where: m = mass of microsphere = density (ρs) × Volume (Vols) 
  ρs = 1.00 gm/cm3  
  g = gravitational constant = 981 cm/sec2 
  η = fluid (air) viscosity = 1.83 × 10-4 gm/cm-sec 
  VTS = terminal settling velocity 
  D = microsphere diameter = 2.0 × 10-4 cm 
 Cc = Cunningham slip correction factor = 1 + (2.52 × λ)/D 
where λ = mean free path = 0.066 µm (for air) 
Setting Fg = Fd and solving for VTS yields this equation: 
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Compared with typical room air currents of 20 feet per minute (fpm) (10 cm/sec) or 
higher velocity, it is easy to see how such particles could stay airborne for extended 
periods of time. Thus, their behavior will be predominantly influenced by the air 
currents within the room in which they are suspended and follow the room’s 
predominant air streams [Baron and Willeke 2001].  
Historical control approaches for AII rooms have used air filtration and zone 
pressurization as the primary means to prevent unwanted contaminant transfer 
between zones. Within the patient isolation room itself, the predominant control 
mechanism historically used to reduce airborne contaminant levels is through the 
introduction of large amounts of “clean” supply air in an effort to dilute existing 
contaminants while also exhausting air to remove the diluted aerosol from the 
room. The exhaust air stream is slightly oversized compared to the supply air 
stream, in order to produce a negative pressure gradient and consequent migration 
of air into the patient room from adjacent areas. As indicated in the previous 
discussion, design standards and guidance have historically identified the 
ventilation rate for this type of control in terms of a minimum number of ACH. 
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Whereas use of UV disinfection and portable recirculating filtration units are 
mentioned as potential supplements, the specified minimum ACH is the design 
ventilation rate within the isolation room which must be met and thus becomes the 
focus of both design and compliance. In practice, the presence of unexpected 
stagnant air regions due to poor HVAC design and/or placement of furniture and 
equipment means that the dilution ventilation approach of delivering specified 
ventilation rates of “clean” air to the entire room for purposes of diluting unwanted 
contaminants provides no guarantee of good control of infectious airborne 
contagion [Memarzadeh and Jiang 2000].  
Even under the rare circumstance of very good mixing, the dilution ventilation 
approach is limited in that to achieve the very high removal efficiencies appropriate 
for a serious infectious disease, a substantial number of ACHs are required. In 
addition, as the desired removal efficiency increases, additional small increments in 
efficiency require increasingly larger increases in the ventilation rate due to the 
logarithmic nature of contaminant decay. For example, if an infectious patient 
undergoes a coughing spell, which generates a given level of respirable 
contaminant floating throughout the room, one can calculate the time required 
(based on a given ventilation rate) for the concentration of respirable aerosol to 
reduce to some desired fraction of the original concentration (once the coughing 
spell has ceased). In equation form, this can be determined through a slight 
manipulation of the purging equation used in industrial ventilation to reduce 
contaminant concentrations below some desired exposure level [ACGIH 2004]: 










−
∆
=
V
tQ
eCC 12  
where: 
2C  = Reduced concentration  
1C  = Original concentration (assumed uniformly 
dispersed)  
Q = Ventilation rate 
V = Room volume 
t∆ = Elapsed time 
Dividing both sides by C1, taking the natural logarithm, and solving for t∆  yields 
)/ln()( 12 CCQ
Vt −=∆   
The V/Q term is the inverse of the room’s ACH. For a given C2 and C1, the removal 
efficiency can be calculated by: 
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Removal efficiency (%) = ( )[ ] 1001 12 ×÷− CC  
Table 2 shows the required time in minutes for removal efficiencies of 90 percent, 
99 percent, and 99.9 percent for the given ACHs. However, the times reported in 
the table assume a mixing factor (K) of 1.0 (perfect mixing throughout the room 
that maximizes the dilution effect). In reality, we know that most ventilation 
systems are unable to provide such perfect mixing, and we must multiply the 
required time identified in the table by the actual mixing factor. (Mixing factors for 
dilution ventilation can vary from one, for ideal mixing, to over ten for poor mixing. 
As a rule of thumb, a mixing factor of three can be assumed for a room with 12 
ACH and good air movement [ACGIH 2004, Francis] Curry National Tuberculosis 
Center 2004].)  
Table 2. Air changes per hour (ACH) and elapsed time required to achieve a desired 
removal efficiency* 
ACH 
Minutes Required for the Desired Removal Efficiency 
90% 99% 99.9% 
2 69 138 207 
6 23 46 69 
12 12 23 35 
16 9 17 26 
24 6 12 17 
48 3 6 9 
Using the values from Table 2, we can see that for a patient room with 12 ACH, 
which we assume is designed with good air movement (K = 3), it will take 36 (3 × 
12) minutes to remove 90 percent of the infectious aerosol and over an hour to 
remove 99 percent, assuming that the patient generates no additional airborne 
infectious aerosols during this decay period.  
Potential approaches to improve the performance of dilution ventilation include 
enclosing the source within a smaller containment zone volume, thus achieving a 
higher number of ACHs for the same exhaust flow rate, and incorporating 
strategically directed airflows that capture and remove a large percentage of the 
source contaminant before it has a chance to mix and dilute with room air. For a 
given flow rate, the smaller the containment zone, the higher the resulting ACH 
within this zone and thus the shorter the time required to achieve a desired 
removal efficiency (assuming equivalent mixing factors). The directed airflows 
reduce the contaminant’s ability to spread into the outer perimeters of the room 
and thus reduce the required time for the overall room to achieve a desired removal 
efficiency.  
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The American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH), a 
professional organization whose focus is on the recognition, evaluation, and control 
of occupational exposures, recommends four limiting factors before proceeding with 
a dilution ventilation for health approach. These factors include: (1) the quantity of 
contaminant generated must not be too great, or the airflow rate required for 
dilution will be excessive; (2) workers must be far enough away from the 
contaminant source or the source must be released in sufficiently low 
concentrations to maintain worker exposures below desired levels; (3) the toxicity 
of the contaminant must be low; and (4) the evolution of the contaminant must be 
uniform [ACGIH 2004]. One could easily argue that in the case of the infectious 
patient requiring airborne isolation, at least two of these factors (worker distance 
and contaminant toxicity) are probably not met.  
The above discussion demonstrates why local exhaust ventilation (LEV) systems, 
i.e., systems designed to capture and remove source contaminants prior to their 
escape into the room environment, are the preferred ventilation technique for many 
contaminants, especially those whose toxicity (or infectiousness in this case) 
requires higher levels of control. There are three broad types of hoods used in LEV 
systems: enclosing hoods, which completely or partly enclose the contaminant 
generation point; exterior hoods, which are positioned adjacent to the contaminant 
source without physically enclosing it; and receiving hoods, which take advantage 
of contaminant momentum formed during the contaminant-generation process to 
receive and remove the contaminant from the working environment [ACGIH 
2007a]. The performance of enclosing and exterior hoods depends upon the ability 
of the induced flow rate to capture and remove the source contaminant before it 
has a chance to mix with the overall room air. The ACGIH recommends ranges of 
design capture velocities for airborne contaminants on the basis of their physical 
properties and toxicity. For airborne droplet nuclei, which are released into 
relatively still room air at minimal velocity (their small size causes them to lose 
particle momentum very quickly), the recommended range is 50–100 feet per 
minute (fpm); the upper end of the range is indicated for higher-toxicity 
contaminants [ACGIH 2007b]. Once the design capture velocity is selected, the 
required flow rate and pressure requirements for the LEV hood can be determined 
with use of design equations specific to the hood geometry and distance from the 
source.  
For patients in a hospital isolation room, their mouths and noses are the sources of 
airborne contaminant that must be controlled; however, the 100-fpm capture 
velocity prescribed above will likely cause discomfort for many patients. ASHRAE 
Standard 55, Thermal Environmental Conditions for Human Occupancy, provides 
guidance on acceptable environmental conditions, including wind velocity, which are 
anticipated to be acceptable to a majority of room occupants (85 percent or 
greater, or 80 percent or greater, depending upon edition) [ASHRAE 1992, 2004]. 
Up through 2010, which covers the period within which this research was 
conducted, Standard 55 provided a design equation for determining whether room 
currents will be perceived as acceptable or unacceptable (unwanted drafts): 
PD = (93.2- ta) × (ϖ -10) 0.62 × (4.0 × 10-5 × ϖ × Tu + 0.066) 
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Where: PD = Percent dissatisfied (generally acceptable if  
   <15–20 percent) 
 ta = mean air temp (°F) 
 ϖ = mean air speed (fpm) 
 Tu = Turbulent intensity (%) = (SDω ÷ ϖ) × 100 
and  SDω = Standard deviation of air speed. 
Note that for conventionally ventilated spaces with Tu around 50 percent and a 
design air temperature of 75 degree (°) F, this equation, solved to achieve a PD just 
below 15 percent, results in a design air speed of 30 fpm; solved to achieve a PD 
just below 20 percent (the current recommended threshold), it results in a design 
air speed of 37 fpm. In the 2010 edition of the same standard, ASHRAE eliminated 
the PD equation shown above and replaced it with a much more detailed set of 
criteria that allows for a greater diversity of environmental conditions. From the 
allowable air speed perspective, the most restrictive of these criteria, applicable 
when operative temperatures are below 72.5°F, prescribes an upper air speed limit 
of 30 fpm. 
Clearly, for an adaptation of industrial ventilation techniques to be found acceptable 
to the patient population, it will need to function at a much lower capture velocity 
than that recommended for industrial environments. One method to increase the 
effective capture of contaminant at lower capture velocities is to increase the level 
of enclosure around the source. Increased enclosure helps to eliminate interfering 
cross-drafts at the source generation point, and the enclosure boundaries (if 
properly allocated) help to direct the capture velocity streamlines in a more uniform 
pattern towards the hood. Thus, one method to applying LEV control approaches to 
AII rooms could be through the use of an external exhaust hood, such as a 
ventilated headboard, with an increased level of enclosure containing the 
contaminant source, the patient’s head. The enclosure design could attach directly 
to the top and two sides of the ventilated headboard and extend forward over the 
head of the bed, acting, in effect, as a hood forming a three-sided enclosure over 
the source. The bed would form the fourth side of the enclosure. In this manner, air 
that flowed into the LEV would first have to flow over/around the source, thus 
pulling any contaminant with it into the ventilated headboard, after which it could 
be passed through a HEPA filter and returned to the room.  
A limiting factor to the success of any ventilation control approach to reduce 
potentially infectious airborne contaminants will be the level of mobility 
demonstrated by the patient. If the patient is sufficiently mobile to move beyond 
the controlled zone of aerosol capture, then the ventilation control will have lost its 
ability to directly capture the contaminant and any protective factor will result 
solely from the dilution ventilation in the general room environment.  
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Summary of Background Issues and Recent Events 
The history of AII theory and control reveals a persistent tug of war between the 
research community and healthcare practitioners. Aerosol scientists and health 
researchers have historically advocated the concepts of airborne isolation and 
respiratory protection when laboratory and/or animal research indicates the ability 
of a disease to spread via the air. The medical community has historically been 
reluctant to accept the airborne contagion theory for any disease without 
overwhelming human epidemiological evidence supporting airborne transmission 
and an absence of any other plausible means of transmission. Rules governing 
human subjects research make such incontrovertible human epidemiology difficult 
to obtain, and when diseases spread naturally, it is very difficult to exclude every 
possible opportunity for shared or secondary contact with a source case. This 
difficulty could partially explain the paucity of diseases requiring airborne 
precautions. The reluctance to adequately consider airborne transmission was 
evident in the response by the WHO to the 2003 SARS epidemic, when WHO 
announced a lack of evidence that SARS was in fact airborne and also described 
incidents of apparent airborne spread to be due to “super-spreaders” [WHO 2003]. 
This was in contrast to public statements made months earlier by both Canadian 
Health Officials and the CDC that “…you need to probably be 100-percent adherent 
to the recommendations about airway precautions or airborne precautions, and 
that's because we know that there are certain patients that appear to be very 
highly infectious” [Gerberding 2003]. Perhaps, if affordable and effective airborne 
isolation capability were available, the medical community might be more prepared 
to err on the side of caution earlier in the process.  
History might be prepared to repeat itself in regards to the desire to dampen 
consideration of the airborne transmission theory. As planning efforts have 
increased in preparation for a potential human-to-human outbreak of avian 
influenza, some public health planners seem to be distancing themselves from the 
airborne theory. The CDC’s 2003 Guidelines for Environmental Infection Control in 
Healthcare Facilities clearly identifies influenza viruses in the table of 
microorganisms associated with airborne infection transmission [Sehulster et al. 
2003]. However, infection control guidance available from the CDC topic page on 
influenza (www.cdc.gov/flu) does not acknowledge the airborne route [CDC 2007]. 
The HHS Pandemic Flu Preparedness Plan (available at www.pandemicflu.gov) 
appears to acknowledge the airborne route as a possible mode of inhalational 
transmission, at least over short distances. It then recommends the use of AII 
rooms, if they are available, and only during “special procedures” that may have an 
increased risk of aerosol generation. This guidance appears to imply a belief that 
the AII rooms will provide a meaningful and real-time protective effect against 
short-range transmission of cough-induced aerosol. Given the repetitive nature of 
the source, the immediate proximity of the attending healthcare workers, and the 
time delay required to achieve meaningful concentration reductions, this implied 
belief appears to contradict what is known about dilution ventilation theory. For 
day-to-day treatment, as of mid-2007 the pandemic flu guidance prescribed regular 
patient rooms, to include patient cohorting, combined with standard and droplet 
precautions [HHS 2007].  
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The healthcare burden during an infectious disease outbreak, such as the 2003 
SARS experience or a large bioterrorism event, will fall disproportionately upon 
healthcare providers at the local level. Hospital emergency departments, outpatient 
clinics, even physician offices could be required to handle a surge of patients, many 
potentially infectious, others motivated by fear to seek medical care for their 
nonspecific “flu-like” or respiratory symptoms. In addition to providing patient care, 
healthcare facilities must also protect their patients, staff, and visitors from 
exposure to potentially infectious patients. During the period between April 15 and 
June 9, 2003, 74 SARS cases were reported to Toronto Public Health. Of these, 
29/74 (39 percent) occurred among healthcare workers, 28/34 (38 percent) 
occurred as a result of exposure during hospitalization, and 17/74 (23 percent) 
occurred among hospital visitors [Health Canada 2003]. Under such scenarios, 
staffing shortages are probable, appropriate respiratory protection supplies will be 
in high demand, and the need to isolate potentially infectious patients will exceed 
the availability of AII rooms.  
Although the U.S. government has been working to address shortcomings in the 
nation’s emergency medical response plan for extraordinary incidents, viable 
solutions that are applicable across multiple demographics have been slow to 
develop, are costly to implement, and often offer only a small-to-moderate 
improvement in isolation capacity. For example, a 2006 medical response plan 
developed by the Nevada Hospital Association reported a functioning AII capacity of 
only 216 beds across the entire state, with a surge capacity of 91 additional beds 
[Nevada Hospital Association 2006]. In total, there were 307 “available” AII beds to 
serve roughly 2.5 million residents plus an average of over 4 million visitors over 
any given month [U.S. Census Bureau 2007; Nevada Commission on Tourism 
2007]. Recent federal government reports indicate that the Nevada example was 
not unique and that the U.S. healthcare system as a whole generally lacks the 
patient isolation capacity to handle a significant airborne infectious epidemic or 
bioterrorism event [Dames 2004; Heinrich 2003; U.S. General Accounting Office 
2003]. In addition, the American Hospital Association reports that the U.S. 
managed care system has dramatically reduced the availability of open inpatient 
hospital beds, to an average proportion of 4 to 6 percent of total bed capacity, a 
number destined to be overwhelmed in the event of a pandemic [Marghella 2005].  
Government estimates indicate that the costs to prepare healthcare capabilities for 
a large biological emergency could reach $500 million for a major city [Dames 
2004; Heinrich 2003; U.S. General Accounting Office 2003]. Attempts to identify 
alternative isolation approaches have been short on details and long on 
controversy, attracting substantial criticism from within the medical community 
[Yee 2003; Evans 2002]. Recommendations prepared by the CDC for community-
level preparedness and response to SARS recognize that surge demand for AII 
rooms may easily overwhelm hospital capacity. When an insufficient number of AII 
rooms is available, CDC recommends placing patients in private rooms (non-AII 
rooms) and/or cohorting patients with other known SARS cases [HHS 2007; Kanof 
2003; CDC 2004b]. The CDC guidance includes a few nonspecific references to the 
use of portable filtration units and other engineering controls to assist in addressing 
surge patient isolation requirements; however, more guidance is needed regarding 
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their selection and effective use [CDC 2004b]. Individual hospitals and researchers 
who have identified their own surge response strategies also tend to identify 
response plans that incorporate large-area cohorting, often within nontraditional 
treatment areas and sometimes augmented with negative-pressure filtration 
equipment, or the approach relies upon using portable ventilation units to convert 
traditional patient rooms into negative-pressure rooms, with little to no 
consideration of the strategy’s impact upon pressure relationships within adjacent 
areas or the adverse demands placed upon the facility’s HVAC systems [Rebmann 
2005; Rosenbaum et al. 2004; University of Minnesota 2006]. One general 
commonality with the aforementioned surge isolation strategies is a minimally 
apparent consideration of direct methods (beyond respiratory protection) to reduce 
potential airborne infectious exposures to the healthcare providers who would have 
to enter these areas. 
Problem Statement  
Given the identified shortage in airborne isolation capacity within the U.S. 
healthcare system and the limited funding available to develop engineered isolation 
capacity on a national level, an affordable alternative to engineered isolation rooms 
is needed. This alternative must 
(1) utilize a “universal design” capable of providing surge airborne isolation 
capacity for epidemic and bioterrorism events in a variety of healthcare 
environments; and  
(2) reduce the potential exposures to healthcare providers and other facility 
occupants to airborne infectious aerosol.  
Purpose and Scope 
The purpose of this research was to evaluate portable filtration technology 
combined with increased levels of containment (as opposed to general room 
dilution) and directed airflows to provide expedient airborne isolation capability to a 
variety of healthcare settings not currently equipped for such isolation. The 
selection of this technology was fueled by its compatibility with existing ventilation 
systems, its affordability, and its recognition in published literature as an available 
engineering control to assist in patient isolation [Marier and Nelson 1993]. The 
research scope included (1) identifying uniform design parameters (configuration, 
flow rates, operational parameters, etc.) for at least two approaches to expedient 
airborne isolation applicable to real-world healthcare environments, the first using a 
zone-within-zone dilution filtration approach and the second using a local exhaust 
ventilation approach; (2) development of test protocols to challenge the 
containment and exposure reduction effectiveness of the evaluated configurations, 
using airborne infectious-sized surrogate contaminants; and (3) the documentation, 
evaluation, and interpretation of the performance that each expedient isolation 
approach can be expected to provide.  
These primary questions were answered by the research: 
1. Can “generic” expedient isolation enclosures be developed that are capable of 
rapid deployment (installed, qualitatively checked, and patient-ready in 
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under 3–4 hours) and isolation containment of airborne droplet nuclei within 
a designated patient area/room?  
2. In addition to providing containment within the isolation zone, do the generic 
expedient isolation enclosures reduce exposures for attending healthcare 
workers or other room occupants?  
3. For real-time concentration reductions due to source control provided by the 
expedient isolation configuration (as opposed to an engineered AII room’s 
diluted removal), what is the protective time equivalent (PTE) (equivalent 
time delay to achieve the same level of reduction using 12 ACH dilution 
ventilation only) provided by the engineering control intervention? 
4. What are the key design and performance factors (physical design 
parameters and configuration, entry gap widths, interpretation of qualitative 
testing, etc.) which should be incorporated into the design of an expedient 
airborne isolation area regardless of set-up location? 
5. Does the portable filtration equipment and enclosure negatively affect 
environmental comfort parameters (temperature, cross-draft velocity)? If so, 
what installation precautions are necessary to mitigate identified adverse 
impacts? 
Chapter II 
Methods and Materials 
The research was performed in multiple healthcare settings not currently 
engineered for AII. Selected locations were an even distribution of two urban 
hospitals and two smaller, rural hospitals, all located within the states of Oklahoma 
and Kansas. The exact rooms, corresponding dimensions, or design features were 
not known prior to testing and were determined by facility availability. The aim was 
to identify a diverse set of locations with varying physical and HVAC operational 
designs. Each facility received repetitive evaluations of two expedient isolation 
design variations, one of which was a two-patient configuration using a 
freestanding filtration unit and the other a single-patient configuration using a 
ducted filtration unit. Figure 5 shows the two types of portable filtration equipment 
used to establish the two expedient isolation configurations evaluated in this study. 
Results from early feasibility research had identified these two configurations as 
likely candidates for additional testing. A peer-reviewed journal article, published in 
the Annals of Emergency Medicine, discussed a portion of the preliminary research 
and findings [Mead and Johnson 2004]. A copy of this article is provided in 
Appendix A. In an effort to assist in the healthcare industry’s acceptance of an 
expedient airborne isolation configuration as an alternative design under emergency 
circumstances, the current research sought consistency with three key design and 
operational criteria currently applied to engineered airborne isolation rooms:  
- Patient area: Minimum of 100–120 square feet per patient bed [American 
Institute of Architects 2001].  
- Volumetric flow rate: Flow rate (Q) sized to provide a minimum of 12 ACH 
within patient room (regardless of any smaller containment zone) [American 
Institute of Architects 2001].  
EPHB Report No. EPHB 301-05f
 
 
Page 32 
- Airflow velocities: Within the vicinity of the patient’s head, maximum 
airflow velocities (V) were limited to levels consistent with those published in 
ASHRAE Standard 55, Thermal Environmental Conditions for Human 
Occupancy [ASHRAE 1992, 2004]. Thus, physical hood parameters were 
adjusted accordingly to target velocities across the patient’s head to 
approximately 30-35 fpm.   
  
Figure 5. Photographs of some of the portable HEPA filtration equipment used 
during the expedient isolation research. A portable freestanding unit with 
nonducted inlet (left) and a portable dust-control unit, capable of ducted or 
freestanding operation (right). 
Other design and operational parameters were to be experimentally identified from 
the investigative process. The two isolation approaches identified for investigation 
were the zone-within-zone approach, which utilized a smaller containment zone 
within the overall patient room, and the ventilated headboard approach, which used 
a local exhaust ventilation design with semi-enclosing hood to control patient-
originated contaminants.  
Expedient Isolation Configuration Descriptions 
In ventilation system design, a “zone” is the space served by a ventilation system. 
The zone-within-zone isolation approach involved establishing a high-ventilation-
rate inner isolation zone within a larger ventilated zone, by enclosing and 
ventilating the space immediately around an infectious patient’s bed within a 
ventilated room. The approach relied upon a high dilution ventilation rate within the 
smaller contained inner isolation zone to rapidly dilute airborne contaminant levels 
within that space. This smaller inner zone was defined using a floor-to-ceiling 
retractable curtain with a designated curtain gap as the entrance point. The inner 
zone was located within a larger outer zone, which was defined by the overall 
patient room boundary. Air was exhausted from the inner zone through the use of a 
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freestanding HEPA filtration system that utilized a nonducted air inlet. The HEPA 
system was positioned to serve two patient inner-zones simultaneously, with no 
exchange of contaminated air between the inner zones. (A more thorough 
description and diagram [Figure 12] of this setup are discussed later, in this 
chapter’s Field Equipment and Methodology section.) The goal was to not only 
contain the contaminant within the inner zone but also direct the airflow within it to 
capture the contaminant and pull it into the filtration unit. Such directed airflow 
limited the mixing of contaminated air into the worker-occupied areas of the inner 
zone. Combining this protective effect with the higher air exchange/ACH rate of the 
inner volume (in comparison with the total room) was intended to yield a more 
rapid dilution of airborne contaminant. The containment aspects were also 
anticipated to reduce contaminant migration throughout the patient room, thus 
reducing the opportunity for surface contact and fomite exposures.  
For design purposes, three predetermined parameters of importance were as 
follows: (1) overall room floor areas of selected patient rooms would be consistent 
with the AIA recommended guidelines; (2) the inner isolation zone would be based 
upon the area demarcated by the existing privacy curtain; and (3) the volumetric 
flow rate provided by the HEPA filtration system would be greater than or equal to 
12 ACH, based on the overall patient room volume. Experimentally defined design 
parameters were to include (1) the width and height of the curtain gap into the 
inner isolation zone, which, when multiplied by the gap height, determined the 
entrance open area into inner zone and (for a given ventilation flow rate) the 
resulting makeup air velocity through this opening, and (2) whether to seal or 
“blank-off” HVAC supply terminals located within the inner isolation zone.  
All other routes of makeup air to the inner zone were minimized. The velocity of the 
makeup air through the curtain gap entrance largely impacts the flow streamlines 
between the entrance and exhaust points; thus, in order to direct these streamlines 
over the point of contaminant generation (i.e., the patient), the curtain gap setting 
was identified with a hand-held smoke generator and flow visualization techniques 
that were intended to optimize the flow streamline path across the patient source 
and into the HEPA inlet with a minimal amount of turbulent mixing.  
An important operating parameter for the zone-within-zone isolation approach was 
its ability to interact with existing HVAC supply louvers or exhaust grilles. Exhaust 
grilles whose locations were within the confines or adjacent to the entrance of the 
inner containment zone were sealed with tape and plastic. For purposes of the 
experimental protocol, exhaust grilles were also blocked if they were located near 
the room’s entry door. This was done to limit the inflow of ambient aerosol from 
outside the patient room that could potentially be counted by the aerosol monitors 
and adversely impact the reduction performance ratios. This was only done during 
the control-on conditions, as the influence of ambient aerosol would have a greater 
impact (on a percentage basis) during these test scenarios and the contribution of 
the exhaust systems to overall room airflow during control-off conditions was seen 
as too significant to ignore. 
For each zone-within-zone field study, three HVAC conditions were targeted for 
evaluation, with the objective to identify the impact of HVAC supply louvers upon 
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the containment performance and environmental comfort conditions within the 
inner zone. These conditions were (1) a “no-control” condition without HEPA 
filtration or HVAC manipulation, (2) a “control-on” condition with the HEPA system 
activated and the HVAC supply louvers left open, and (3) another “control-on” 
condition with the HEPA system activated and the HVAC supply louvers sealed 
closed. After initial results were observed at the first field site, the second condition 
was altered to deflect the incoming HVAC supply air away from the patient and 
toward the HEPA filtration unit. This was done to accommodate the benefits of the 
tempered supply air while reducing the potential for HVAC supply air to disturb the 
directed streamlines carrying patient-generated contaminant into the HEPA filtration 
unit.  
The ventilated headboard expedient isolation approach relied upon an LEV 
configuration to create localized capture of patient-generated contaminant before 
the contaminant had an opportunity to dilute throughout the overall patient room. 
A semi-enclosing hood (retractable when required for extensive hands-on patient 
care) extended over and along both sides of the pillow area of the patient bed and 
assisted in establishing parallel flow streamlines across the contaminant generation 
point (the patient’s head) and into the ventilated headboard, without requiring 
excessive capture velocities to overcome potential room cross-currents. The 
ventilated headboard was ducted to a small, portable HEPA filtration unit, similar to 
those used to contain dust and other aerosol contaminants during construction 
renovation activities in healthcare facilities. For design purposes, the minimum 
patient area, volumetric flow rate, and airflow velocity parameters for this approach 
were selected on the basis of the previously mentioned criteria (100–120 ft2, Q > 
12 ACH, V ~ 30 fpm). With these parameters predetermined, the remaining design 
parameters related to the size of the ventilated headboard, the hood depth, and 
any manipulation of the room HVAC. 
The ventilated headboard’s width was selected to be slightly larger than the width 
of the bed to enable the hood’s side curtains to drop straight down to the floor. The 
headboard’s leading edge was positioned slightly above mattress height, effectively 
allowing the mattress itself to act as the fourth side of the enclosure. The top height 
of the headboard was determined on the basis of that needed to continue enclosing 
the head position when the bed was in an inclined position. Headboard height was 
also selected to be compatible with existing wall-mounted equipment (lights, 
oxygen supply, electrical outlets, etc.). Overall, the face area of the ventilated 
headboard was selected so as not to exceed the maximum allowable airflow velocity 
near the patient’s head position at the volumetric flow rate used.  
The headboard design parameter to be determined experimentally was the depth 
required for the hood to extend out, away from the ventilated headboard. Within 
the field of industrial ventilation, the recommended minimum hood depth was 
75  percent of the largest vertical dimension (width or height) of the LEV without 
the hood in place [ACGIH 2004]. The hospital room is not an industrial 
environment, so one might expect less interference from cross-currents: however, 
given the reduced capture velocities that resulted from requirements to 
accommodate patient comfort conditions, the selected hood depth played a critical 
role in ensuring consistent source capture without interference from room cross-
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currents. At the same time, a hood that extended too far may leave the patient 
with the feeling of being placed within a tunnel and may also limit patient access or 
interaction with healthcare providers. Thus, qualitative smoke tests were used to 
identify a minimum effective hood depth (Do) and a slightly larger hood depth 
(Do  +  8 in) as the two “control-on” conditions for quantitative evaluation. Based on 
the preliminary field testing, the 8-in additional hood depth was anticipated to 
approximate the previously discussed “75 percent of largest dimension” rule of 
thumb.  
For purposes of the ventilated headboard configuration, exhaust grilles whose 
locations were adjacent to the patient bed were sealed with tape and plastic. 
Supply registers whose induced airflows were shown through qualitative smoke 
tests to interfere with the unidirectional in-flow of air into the ventilated 
headboard’s hood were deflected. As with the zone-within-zone configuration, 
exhaust grilles were also blocked if they were located near the room’s entry door. 
In a real-world scenario, as long as the HVAC operation did not interfere with the 
ventilated headboard operation, decisions regarding the need to seal off supply or 
exhaust louvers could be made on the basis of facility-specific policies or 
capabilities.  
Combining the two hood depth conditions and the control-off condition intended for 
comparison, evaluation of the ventilated headboard expedient isolation approach 
resulted in three test conditions: (1) a control-off condition with HEPA off and no 
hood in position; (2) a control-on condition with HEPA activated and the hood 
enclosure extended to provide a hood depth of Do; and (3) a second control-on 
condition with HEPA activated and the hood extended to provide a hood depth of 
Do  + 8 in.  
For both the zone-within-zone and ventilated headboard test configurations, the 
doors to adjacent restrooms remained closed throughout the test runs. A life-sized 
mannequin was placed into the patient bed within the isolation zone and covered 
with a hospital blanket to simulate the source patient. The patient mannequin 
remained in a flat bed posture for all of the test scenarios. The source release 
points, shown in Figure 6, were adjacent to the mannequin’s mouth.  
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Figure 6. Photo of patient mannequin positioned in front of a ventilated headboard 
shows source generators (nebulizers) positioned next to the mannequin’s mouth 
and an aerosol sampler positioned in the center of the mannequin’s chest. 
Surrogate Aerosol Source Generation—Protocol Development 
The research effort supported by the droplet nuclei generation protocol was 
designed to evaluate the effectiveness of engineering control interventions to 
contain surrogate infectious aerosol and to reduce potential exposures to healthcare 
providers and other room occupants. Performance was determined by measuring 
the airborne concentration of droplet nuclei of known size at key locations within a 
hospital treatment room. The success of an intervention was evaluated by the 
intervention’s ability to reduce airborne concentrations at the various measurement 
points, relative to those observed during the “control-off” conditions. A randomized 
complete block experimental design was selected for the intervention evaluation. 
However, in order to get a meaningful comparison between the “control-on” and 
“control-off” test conditions within a particular block, repeatable aerosol generation 
rates were required. Thus, the objective of this substudy was to identify a 
generation protocol capable of producing consistent concentrations of airborne 
droplet nuclei within the targeted size range.  
Testing Platform and Set-up Description 
An Open-Jet Wind Tunnel (Airflow™, Part No: 9020066[29-06-1999], 
Buckinghamshire, England; modified as described) was the basis of the controlled 
testing platform used for development of the aerosol generation protocol (Figure 7). 
The wind tunnel’s variable air supply system was replaced with a portable filtration 
unit equipped with a variable-speed fan and HEPA filtration (Abatement 
Technologies Inc., Model PAS1000, Suwanee, Georgia). This fan unit provided the 
ability to positively pressurize the system with a variable supply of highly filtered 
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air. A 4-in-wide slip collar connected the fan’s 10-in diameter discharge to a 10-in 
by 8-in reducing collar. Attached to the reducing collar was an 8-ft-long testing 
segment. To avoid permanent modification to the wind tunnel apparatus, the 
leading 4-ft segment of the wind tunnel’s 8-in diameter duct was replaced with this 
temporary 8-ft testing segment of 8-in-diameter galvanized spiral duct.  
A Pari LC Star nebulizer with ProNeb Ultra compressor (Model 85B 0000, PARI 
Innovative Manufacturing Inc., Midlothian, VA) was selected for evaluation. Within 
the testing segment, locations were chosen for introducing the nebulizer output into 
the moving air stream, for measuring airflow parameters within the duct, and for 
measuring aerosol concentrations within the moving air stream. Beginning 10 in 
downstream of the start of the testing segment, a ¾-in by 8-in copper pipe was 
permanently inserted into the side of the spiral duct and oriented downstream at an 
approximate 45-degree angle to the duct axis. The copper pipe allowed introduction 
of the nebulizer output into the center of the HEPA-filtered air stream. The 
proximity of this introduction point to the fan and reduction collar facilitated mixing 
of nebulizer output within the moving air stream. Moderate sanding of the copper 
pipe’s inside diameter resulted in a tight-fitting connection between the nebulizer 
output nozzle and the copper pipe’s inside diameter. Seven feet downstream of the 
start of the testing segment, two 1/8-in diameter holes, offset by 90 degrees, were 
drilled into the top and side of the duct to allow a 1/8-in by 12-in pitot tube (Dwyer, 
Michigan City, IN) access for perpendicular velocity-pressure traverse 
measurements. The pitot tube was connected via tubing to a handheld 
micromanometer (TSI, Inc., Airflow Meter 8386A, Shoreview, MN) for actual 
pressure measurements. This pitot traverse measurement location was sufficiently 
downstream of duct-segment fittings to be consistent with the 7 to 10 duct 
diameters recommended by the ACGIH Industrial Ventilation Committee [ACGIH 
2007b] and well beyond the 3-duct-diameter minimum recommended by Guffey 
and Booth [1999] for two perpendicular pitot traverses. Six inches downstream 
from the pitot tube sampling location, a 3/16-in hole was drilled into the bottom of 
the duct to allow positioning of the omni-directional inlet of an aerosol spectrometer 
(Grimm Dust Monitors, Models 1.10x, Labortechnik GmbH and CoKG, Ainring, 
Germany) within the midstream of the duct airflow. The testing segment concluded 
roughly 6 in beyond the spectrometer sampling hole and was attached to the 
remainder of the wind tunnel with a slip-collar duct fitting.  
The remainder of the airflow wind tunnel included 4 ft of straight 8-in duct, followed 
by a quick-release clamping arrangement for changing of the orifice plates used to 
measure airflow rates. This was followed by an additional 4 ft of straight 8-in duct 
and an expansion “smoothing chamber” equipped with perforated screens and a 
honeycomb flow-straightener that provided a uniform flow into the wind tunnel’s 
contraction section and exit nozzle.  
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Figure 7. Schematic (7a) and photograph (7b) showing the testing platform used 
for development of the aerosol generation protocol. 
Aerosol Generation Technique 
Uniformly sized polystyrene latex (PSL) microspheres (Catalog No. 4016A, Duke 
Scientific, Palo Alto, CA) were aerosolized from water suspension as encapsulated 
aerosol whose water component quickly evaporated to leave the droplet nuclei (the 
PSL microspheres) afloat. The manufacturer’s literature described the microspheres 
as uniformly spherical, with a nominal diameter of 1.6 µm (1.587 µm ± 0.025 µm) 
and a density of 1.05 grams per cubic centimeter (g/cm3). The microspheres were 
insoluble and were supplied in a suspension of 1 percent solids. The liquid 
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component of the suspension was primarily deionized water, with trace amounts of 
surfactant and preservative. Since the PSL sphere density (ρp) was very close to 
unit density (ρo = 1.0 g/cm3) and the particle diameter (dp) was greater than 1 µm 
(i.e. minimal slip correction), the aerodynamic equivalent diameter (da) of these 
spheres could be calculated as follows: 
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which resulted in an aerodynamic particle size of 1.64 µm [Baron and Willeke 
2001]. Thus, this particle size was consistent with the 1-to-3-µm size particles 
typical of tuberculosis bacteria, spores (including anthrax spores), and other 
infectious bioaerosols that remain airborne for long periods, are readily inhaled, and 
penetrate deep into the lung [Riley 1974].  
The air-jet nebulizer operated at a pressure of 20 psi (138 kPa). At this operating 
pressure, a BIOS DryCal Primary Flow Meter (BIOS Model DCL-M, BIOS 
International Corp., Butler, NJ) was used to measure an air delivery rate of 
1.7  liters per minute (Lpm) with the nebulizer attached.  
A series of experiments were conducted to evaluate particle generation rates 
associated with combinations of one to three PSL microsphere suspension droplets 
per 8 ml or 10 ml of ultrapure water. Selection of these ratios as a starting point 
was based upon the success of the ratio demonstrated during the concept 
development phase of the dissertation research (3 drops per 10 ml).  
During each trial, the nebulizer output was inserted into a ¾-in by 8-in copper pipe, 
which was mounted into the testing segment of the duct. By design, the nebulizer 
output was a mist of aerosol predominantly within the 1–5-µm size range, because 
these particles are ideal for pulmonary drug delivery [Leung et al. 2004; Geller 
2006]. The nebulizer output traversed the copper pipe and entered the moving 
airstream within the testing segment, where the water component of the aerosol 
rapidly evaporated, resulting in the production of droplet nuclei that consisted of 
PSL spheres and/or whatever other residue may have originated in the nebulizer 
fluid or its compressed air source. Rapid mixing and dilution with the HEPA-filtered 
air stream helped to minimize agglomeration of the droplet nuclei [Friedman and 
Horstman 1974]. After flowing downstream, the airborne particles in the moving air 
stream were sized and counted with a Grimm real-time light-scattering aerosol 
spectrometer (Model 1.108 or 1.106, Grimm Dust Monitors, Labortechnik GmbH 
and CoKG, Ainring, Germany). These instruments were designed for real-time 
particle counting with particle size discrimination into 8 or 15 (depending upon 
model) size ranges from 0.3 µm to 20 µm. The Grimm was programmed to operate 
in normal mode, which integrated and recorded particle counts within each size 
range over 1-minute intervals. These data were sequentially stored onto an internal 
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data storage card and subsequently downloaded onto a laptop computer for further 
analysis. Start and stop times for important events were manually recorded for 
later comparison with the data.  
The downloaded data were imported into Microsoft Excel® for further evaluation. 
Since the PSL particles were 1.6 µm in diameter (da = 1.64 µm) and the ultrapure 
water in which they were suspended was minimally contaminated and therefore not 
expected to significantly affect condensation nucleus size, the variable of primary 
interest was the particle count between 1 µm and 2 µm.  
Preliminary Work to Develop the Generation Protocol 
Medical nebulizers of the type used in this research were generally designed for a 
drug delivery period of between 15 and 30 minutes [Le Brun et al. 2000]. For the 
Pari LC Star, a qualitative test was conducted to identify a duration between 15 and 
30 minutes to use as the nebulization period in the droplet nuclei generation 
protocol. Nebulizer suspensions of 2 drops/10 ml and 1 drop/10 ml (PSL 
microsphere suspension/ultrapure water) were created and allowed to nebulize into 
the test apparatus until the suspension remaining in the reservoir volume was less 
than that required for aerosol nebulization. Graphic results (Figure 8) from these 
runs revealed that for both dilution ratios, a general slope transition appeared to 
occur roughly between 20 and 30 minutes of elapsed nebulization time. This was 
evaluated through an analysis of linear trend lines for the first 20 minutes vs. 
minutes 31–65 for each of the dosing concentrations. For a given dosing 
concentration, the intersection of the two trend lines approximates a slope 
transition point. Previously, the concept-development phase of this research had 
demonstrated that a 20-minute nebulization period was sufficient to allow aerosol 
migration throughout a multi-patient hospital room. Since the 20-minute period 
was consistent with the nebulizer’s design intent and preceded the generation rate 
transition points identified on the graph, a 20-minute dosing period was selected for 
this protocol.  
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Figure 8. Variation with nebulization time of aerosol particle counts, per liter of air 
sampled, for the 1–2-µm size range. Extended nebulizer runs using two PSL 
microsphere suspension concentrations revealed an apparent aerosol generation 
rate inflexion point between 20 and 30 minutes of elapsed nebulization time. 
Because the performance of the expedient isolation trials were to be evaluated in 
terms of “control-on” vs. “control-off” particle count ratios, the number of aerosol 
particles generated during the compared trials required consistency. Graphic results 
(Figure 9) from initial aerosol generation test runs revealed particle count 
concentrations with lower magnitude, followed by a large increase over 
approximately the first 10 minutes of nebulizer operation, before transitioning into 
a more consistent, slowly increasing concentration over time. Once the 
concentration jump occurs, the slowly increasing count/liter was consistent with 
prior research findings that revealed the concentration of solute within the nebulizer 
solution increased as nebulizer run time progressed, resulting in higher output 
concentrations [Rau 2002; Mercer et al. 1968].  
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Figure 9. Graph of early nebulizer output, showing initial instability followed by an 
apparently steady concentration increase. 
The exact cause of the initial reduced response and increased variability was 
uncertain; however, over a period of weeks, several steps were initiated through a 
series of sequential experiments in an effort to minimize the initial spike in 
concentration, to reduce variability, and to increase repeatability between test runs. 
The most important of these were (1) a 60 percent increase in the orifice plate 
diameter, which reduced static pressure within the testing platform and relieved the 
back pressure that was believed to be working against the nebulizer and retarding 
flow through the copper pipe, and (2) the use of dosing blends that combined 
ultrapure water and microspheres into a single batch of large enough volume to 
supply a block of up to four test runs. Figure 10 graphically demonstrates the 
changed output characteristics after implementation of these changes. 
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Figure 10. Droplet nuclei generation rates after reducing testing platform back-
pressure and revising the PSL suspension formulation. 
Although there was still a brief delay before the graph in Figure 10 reached “full 
response,” the initial delay of 2–3 minutes was much shorter than the 10+ minutes 
observed in the earlier trials and reflected in Figure 9. In addition, the variability 
was greatly reduced (Figure 10: CV = 10.0 percent; Figure 9: CV = 29.4 percent). 
Also worth noting was that the improved variability was not due solely to the 
dramatic reduction in the delayed response between dosing start and elevated 
count observations. A comparison of the coefficients of variation calculated for 
minutes 11–20 (CV11–20) of the two dosing scenarios revealed the following values: 
CV11–20 = 4.7 percent (Figure 10) and CV11–20 = 10.0 percent (Figure 9). 
Another issue that affected the droplet nuclei generation protocol was one of 
apparent instrument “noise” or lack of precision in the reporting of particle counts 
for aerosol below 2.0 µm. Although the manufacturer’s literature claimed a 
precision of only 1 particle per liter of sampled air, actual aerosol counts between 
1 and 2 µm were logged solely as factors of five, appearing to indicate some sort of 
truncation error. Discussions with the manufacturer’s representative revealed it was 
unaware of the issue, and it did not have an immediate solution. To reduce the 
potential adverse impact of noise for near-zero counts, the higher end of the 
evaluated dose options (3 drops microsphere solution per 10 mL of ultrapure water) 
was selected out of preference for its corresponding higher magnitude of droplet 
nuclei generation. In addition, for purposes of validating the droplet nuclei 
generation protocol, the Grimm spectrometer was switched from model 1.108 to an 
older model (1.106), which did not exhibit the lack of precision issue.  
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To reduce confounding of a consistent droplet nuclei generation rate by the 
generation of doublets or other agglomerates, it was important to nebulize a 
predominant percentage of aerosol droplets that contained no more than a single 
PSL sphere. Aerosol droplets that contained a single 1.6-µm sphere (i.e., singlets), 
after desiccation, appeared in the 1- to 2-µm-size bin of the aerosol spectrometer’s 
data output file. In the 1960s, Otto Raabe developed formulae to identify the 
dilution of a concentrated suspension of monodispersed particles that was 
necessary to result in a desired singlet generation rate of monodispersed aerosol 
[Raabe 1968]. However, the use of these formulae required knowledge of the 
aerosol produced by the specific nebulizer, including the count median diameter 
(CMD) or mass median diameter (MMD) and the distribution of aerosol sizes 
(assumed to be geometric) that surround that estimate. When the dilution ratio was 
above 90 percent and the geometric standard deviation of the aerosol produced, σg 
was < 2.1, the relationship between the dilution ratio and the singlet generation 
rate could be represented as follows: 
    
𝑦 ≅  𝐹(𝑀𝑀𝐷)3×𝑒4.5𝑙𝑛2𝜎𝑔(1−𝑅)𝐷3 [1 − 𝑒𝑙𝑛2𝜎𝑔2 ]              Raabe Equation 
Where: 
y = dilution ratio (new volume/old volume) after suspension was diluted with pure 
liquid 
R = singlet ratio 
F = fraction by volume of particles in the original stock solution 
D = diameter of the monodispersed spheres  
The rapid dehydration of aerosol leaving the nebulizer made the accurate 
measurement of aerosol size distribution a challenging task. Fast, minimally 
invasive techniques that do not alter the flow or back pressure of the nebulizer 
were required. The Pari LC Star nebulizer has been evaluated for its output 
characteristics, as measured through the use of laser diffraction [Standaert et al. 
2001; Kwong et al. 2000; Ho et al. 2001]. Although the output from the Pari LC 
Star was a function of both its design and the solute being nebulized, the previous 
researchers have shown the Pari LC Star to be consistent with an MMD under 5 µm 
and a σg <2.1 [Standaert et al. 2001; Kwong et al. 2000; Ho et al. 2001]. For the 
purpose of using the Raabe equation shown above, an estimated MMD of 5 µm was 
selected, representing a worst-case (for doublet generation) selection within the 
Pari LC Star’s range of expected aerosol size generation. The Raabe equation was 
mathematically rearranged and solved for R to reveal an estimated singlet ratio: 
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𝑅 ≅ 1 − 𝐹(𝑀𝑀𝐷)3 ∙ 𝑒4.5𝑙𝑛2𝜎𝑔
𝑦 ∙ 𝐷3
∙ (1 − 𝑒𝑙𝑛2𝜎𝑔2 ) 
For an old volume = 1/12 ml per drop × 3 drops = 0.25 ml, new volume = 10 ml + 
old volume = 10.25 ml, y = 10.25 ml / (0.25 ml) = 41.0, MMD = 5 µm, σg = 2.0, D 
= 1.6 µm, and F = 0.01, the estimated R was approximately 99 percent. Thus, 
confounding or variability due to production of non-singlet PSL microspheres was 
not predicted to be a problem under the generation protocol used.  
Validation of the Generation Protocol 
On the basis of the previously discussed discovery process, a generation protocol 
was identified and submitted to evaluation for its ability to provide consistent 
concentrations of airborne particles between 1 and 2 µm. The steps of the 
generation and evaluation process using the previously identified equipment, 
supplies, and testing platform are identified below.  
Preliminary Steps 
1. The HEPA filter was activated for 10+ minutes to “clean out” the system (not 
applicable for repeat trials). 
2. The electronic manometer was zeroed and then activated to log the pressure 
differential across the 163.82-mm orifice plate, with use of 2-sec averaging 
on 1-min intervals. 
3. The HEPA’s fan regulator was set at ~ 4:00 position; this resulted in a 
corresponding Delta P ~ .29” water gauge (w.g.) across the selected orifice 
plate. 
4. The Grimms were activated for equipment warm-up. 
5. The nebulizer was activated for 10+ minutes with only deionized, Type I, 
ultrapure water in the nebulizer cup. This was intended to “condition” the 
system and to monitor background (BG) counts.  
6. Horizontal and vertical log-linear 8-pt velocity pressure (VP) measurements 
were conducted at the designated sample position, slightly upstream of the 
Grimm sample position within the duct, with use of a zeroed electronic 
manometer and pitot tube. These values were converted to velocities with 
the equation VPV 4005= . Calculated velocities were averaged and 
multiplied by the duct area (A 8” duct = 0.35 sq ft) to determine the airflow 
rate (Q) in cubic feet per minute (cfm). 
Test Run Scenario 
7. To initiate a test run, the HEPA was left running from the preliminary setup 
and the Grimm was placed on standby mode.  
8. A nebulizer cup was filled with 10 ml of ultrapure water and connected to the 
compressor’s air supply tubing. The nebulizer cup (the “conditioning cup”) 
was placed into position on the copper dosing tube and the air compressor 
was activated. 
9. The Grimm memory was cleared, and logging was begun for BG counts (1 
sample/minute) with the conditioning cup in place. 
EPHB Report No. EPHB 301-05f
 
 
Page 46 
10. A dosing blend was created: 24 drops of 1.6-µm polystyrene microsphere 
suspension with 80 ml of the Type I, ultrapure water. 
11. The dosing blend was swirled to mix thoroughly, and then 10 ml of the 
dosing blend was carefully transferred into a clean, graduated cylinder that 
had been pre-rinsed with the ultrapure water. 
12. The graduated cylinder contents were poured into a clean nebulizer cup that 
was pre-rinsed with the ultrapure water. The nebulizer baffle/cap was 
replaced to create the “dosing cup.”  
13. Horizontal and vertical 8-pt log-linear VP measurements were conducted with 
a zeroed manometer and pitot tube to determine pretest duct flow rate. 
14. After 3–5 minutes of Grimm measurements showing BG counts of zero in the 
size range of interest (1–2 µm), the conditioning cup was replaced with the 
dosing cup and the dosing start time was noted. 
15. The nebulizer dosing cup was run for approximately 25 minutes and then 
switched back to the conditioning cup, and the dosing stop time was noted. 
16. Additional VP measurements were collected as in Step 13 to calculate a post-
test duct flow rate. 
17. The Grimm was run for 5 additional minutes or until consistent zeroes 
appeared in the 1–2-µm range. 
18. The Grimm was stopped/restarted to keep it conditioned and running. 
19. The data file was saved and exported to a notebook computer. 
20. The HEPA unit and nebulizer with conditioning cup were left on during 
preparations for the next run. 
21. Steps 7–20 were repeated as desired.  
Validation Results 
Figure 11 shows a bar chart of aerosol counts according to size distribution for a 
data run conducted with the final droplet nuclei generation protocol.  
EPHB Report No. EPHB 301-05f
 
 
Page 47 
 
Figure 11. Total count distribution by size bin (microns) over a 25-minute 
nebulization period with use of 1.6-µm PSL microspheres and the described 
protocol. 
Note that the aerosol particle sizes greater than 1 µm and less than or equal to 
2 µm in Figure 11 were the predominant aerosol size fractions generated, 
constituting over 75 percent of all counts. Overall, aerosol particles 2 µm and 
smaller constituted greater than 99 percent of the observed particles, with fewer 
than 1 percent of observations between 2 and 3.5 µm and zero greater than 
3.5 µm. The latter two points demonstrate the accuracy of Raabe’s predictive 
equation and confirm that the creation of agglomerates of two or more PSL beads 
was less than 1 percent. Observed particles below the 1-µm size were probably due 
to residuals originating from the liquid PSL suspension (surfactant, water, 
preservative) or from nonfiltered room air used by the compressor to drive the 
nebulizer’s output. Counts less than 1.0 µm were not included in this protocol 
evaluation or in future field studies that adopted the protocol.  
During the protocol development and validation activity, a quick test was required 
to evaluate the consistency of the aerosol generation counts. To accomplish this, a 
control band approach was developed to monitor the particle counts between 1 and 
2 µm associated with individual runs, within a 4-run block. Each block corresponded 
to an individual batch of diluted microsphere suspension. To determine the total 
particle count for an individual test run, the volumetric flow determinations 
collected in steps 13 and 16 of the protocol were averaged. This flow rate was 
multiplied by the elapsed run time (20 minutes) to get a total volume of flow for the 
20-minute run. This volume was then multiplied by the average particle count 
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concentration observed between 1 and 2 µm over the first complete 20 minutes of 
Grimm sample time that followed the start of nebulization, resulting in the overall 
number of particles counted. The total count was determined for each of the four 
runs in an individual block, and a mean total count for the block was also 
calculated. Control boundaries were selected such that the total count for each of 
the individual runs within a block should not deviate from the mean total count for 
the block by more than 5 percent. In this manner, performance feedback was 
quickly collected and subsequent blocks could be initiated without protocol 
modification. Once the generation method was identified, this validation activity 
was repeated for a total of 8 blocks, though one of the blocks had to be disregarded 
because of an experimental error. Of the remaining 28 test runs (7 blocks × 4 
runs/block), only one test run of one block reached, but did not exceed, the control 
limit. 
The same seven blocks of test runs were then evaluated for the protocol’s ability to 
repetitively produce consistent particle counts within each block (Table 3). Since 
only within-block consistency was required to establish meaningful performance 
ratios in the experimental design, all the data were normalized by dividing each test 
run’s total count by the mean total count for the respective block. In this manner, 
the data were transformed into 28 data points normally distributed around an 
expected value of 1.0. Analysis of these 28 sample points revealed a mean of 1.0 
(as expected) and minimal variance, resulting in 95 percent confidence limits that 
fell within +1 percent of the mean. 
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Table 3. Validation of the aerosol generation protocol’s ability to repetitively produce consistent particle counts 
within each block. 
Block/Run 20-min ave Q ave (l/min) 20-min count Block Mean Normalized Count
8a 46.6 11188 10427216 10354700 1.01
8b 46.6 11237 10472884 1.01
8c 45.8 11286 10337976 1.00  Mean (28 normalized counts) = 1.00
8d 45.3 11237 10180722 0.98
7a 49.2 11163 10984392 11082260 0.99 Standard Deviation (SD) = 0.0259
7b 49.95 11138 11126862 1.00
7c 49.05 11212 10998972 0.99 Standard Error (SE) = 0.0049
7d 50.25 11163 11218815 1.01
6a 59.75 11212 13398340 12701190 1.05 t.025 = 2.0520
6b 57 11163 12725820 1.00
6c 53.5 11237 12023590 0.95 Precision Error = 0.0100
6d 55.95 11311 12657009 1.00
5a 124.5 11238 27982620 28798809 0.97 95% LCL = 0.99
5b 131.2 11263 29554112 1.03 95% UCL = 1.01
5c 124 11287 27991760 0.97
5d 131.7 11263 29666742 1.03
4a 94.7 11164 21144616 21807347 0.97
4b 95.35 11287 21524309 0.99
4c 99.35 11213 22280231 1.02
4d 99.35 11213 22280231 1.02
3a 112.7 11189 25220006 26132064 0.97
3b 113.75 11164 25398100 0.97
3c 119.9 11287 27066226 1.04
3d 119.7 11213 26843922 1.03
1a 113.25 11164 25286460 25754761 0.98
1b 113.85 11164 25420428 0.99
1c 113.25 11263 25510695 0.99
1d 119.5 11214 26801460 1.04
NOTE:  Block 2 was discarded due to error in PSL suspension preparation
Collective Statistics
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Validation Conclusion 
Given the high degree of precision in the results shown in Table 3, the benefit to be 
derived by additional test runs was determined to be minimal. For example, if one 
assumed that the standard error term remained consistent and 41 test runs were 
conducted, as opposed to the actual 28, then the resulting 40 degrees of freedom 
would yield a t.025 statistic of 2.021 [Walpole and Myers 1993]. When multiplied by 
the standard error term, the resulting 95 percent confidence limits would have 
narrowed only from 0.990–1.010 to 0.991–1.010. Thus, the existing number of 
repetitions was considered to be sufficient and the aerosol generation protocol was 
deemed validated for the intended research purposes. 
Field Equipment and Methodology 
Upon hospital room selection, the room geometry, ventilation design, and 
ventilation parameters (volumetric flow rate, pertinent flow velocities) associated 
with the containment design were documented and a room schematic was drawn 
for each room environment, before any experiments were conducted. Two general 
expedient isolation configurations were evaluated: (1) the zone-within-zone total 
enclosure configuration used for multi-patient rooms and (2) the ventilated 
headboard with semi-enclosing hood configuration for single-patient rooms.  
Configuration Setup  
Zone-Within-Zone: This was configured to serve two patients simultaneously 
(Figure 12). Although inner zones were established for both patient positions, only 
one of these was challenged with surrogate contaminant aerosol. A life-size 
mannequin was placed in the bed at this position and covered with a hospital 
blanket to simulate the source patient. The inner zones required a physical 
containment perimeter encircling each patient bed and its surrounding work area, 
with a designated opening for makeup air and worker entry. Inner isolation zone 
boundaries were based upon the existing patient areas, defined by their cloth 
privacy curtains, as well as compatibility with HEPA filter placement within the 
overall room geometry. For some locations, this resulted in inner zone boundaries 
where the makeup air entrance and exhaust points were located at diagonally 
opposite corners of the inner zone. At other locations, the airflow entered near one 
corner and flowed directly across the pillow end of the bed to an exhaust point at 
the adjacent corner.  
To construct the inner zone boundary, the existing cloth curtain was replaced with a 
floor-to-ceiling plastic curtain that followed the same curtain track. The plastic 
curtains were constructed with medium-weight (3.5- to 4-mil) plastic sheeting, sold 
in hardware stores as painting drop cloth. The top of the plastic curtain was double-
folded, taped into place, and hole-punched to allow it to hang on the existing 
curtain hooks and track and thus be opened and closed. The curtain extended down 
to the floor, leaving an approximate ½-inch gap at the top due to the curtain 
hooks. This gap was sealed with tape and plastic or covered by a loose-fitting 12-
in-long piece of plastic sheeting secured to the outer side of the curtain track, thus 
inhibiting airflow through the gap without interfering with curtain operation. This 
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resulted in greater dependence on the curtain entrance gap itself as the source of 
makeup air into the inner isolation zone. 
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Figure 12. Example schematic of configuration setup and equipment locations for 
zone-within-zone expedient isolation. 
The nonoperable portion of the curtain was sealed into place with tape and plastic, 
closing all gaps and thus making this portion of the curtain nonretractable. For the 
retractable portion of the curtain, a pocket fold was incorporated into the bottom of 
the curtain and a lightweight utility chain was inserted along the length of this fold 
to act as ballast. This feature allowed the curtain to be retracted for compatibility 
with real-world scenarios involving patient/equipment movement. During 
occupancy, the ballast held the bottom of the curtain snug to the floor and 
prevented it from being pulled inward when the inner zone was under negative 
pressure. 
A freestanding portable HEPA filter with nonducted inlet was positioned equidistant 
between the two patient beds. The suction side of the HEPA filter served the inner 
containment zone, placing it under negative pressure relative to room pressure, 
filtering the captured air and returning the clean air to the outer zone surrounding 
the inner containment zone. The patient bed heights were adjusted so that the 
mattress height was consistent with the HEPA inlet height. A plastic sheeting 
vertical partition was built between the center of the HEPA inlet and the adjacent 
wall in order to separate the two inner isolation zones. In addition, a plastic-
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sheeting baffle was positioned like a “dust ruffle” to restrict the airflow path from 
beneath the bed toward the HEPA unit. For each isolation zone, the nonoperable 
section of curtain from each inner isolation zone was taped to the sides of the HEPA 
filtration unit, and any remaining gaps were sealed with tape and plastic sheeting.  
The HEPA system’s variable speed control was adjusted to achieve a targeted 12 
ACH based upon the overall room volume. Regardless of the capture/containment 
results within the inner zone, this criterion provided a minimum aerosol 
dilution/removal performance for the entire patient room equivalent to that 
required for a newly constructed AII room. The filtration equipment was placed to 
avoid intrusion upon patient care activities. To enable remote activation without 
room entry, the power to the HEPA unit was supplied by an extension cord that led 
out to the corridor.  
During control-on test conditions, HVAC exhaust grilles were sealed with tape and 
plastic in accordance with the previously described strategy. Supply louvers within 
the inner isolation zone were either sealed or deflected on the basis of the test 
condition. For the control-off test condition (Condition 1), the HEPA unit was not 
activated and the room HVAC supply and exhaust were unaltered. Time constraints 
prevented switching between the original cloth and plastic curtains for the 
respective control conditions. Since the original curtains had excess open area 
relative to the floor-to-ceiling plastic curtains, the plastic curtains were retracted to 
a gap of approximately 3 feet (which varied by room and inner zone geometry) in 
an attempt to simulate the open area conditions between the patient and the 
remainder of the patient room under the control-off test condition. 
To facilitate controlled airflow into the inner isolation zones for the control-on test 
conditions, each curtain was retracted to create an entrance gap into the inner 
isolation zone. This gap provided a path of least resistance to pull clean air into the 
inner isolation zone and toward the space occupied by a bedside healthcare worker. 
A qualitative “Curtain Gap Determination Protocol” was conducted, using a 
handheld smoke generator (Cumulus Air Flow Indicator, Draeger Safety Inc., 
Pittsburgh, PA, or Wizard Stick, Zero Toys, Inc., Concord, MA) to verify directional 
airflow into and within the inner isolation zone. For this test, smoke was released 
outside the full height of the gap to verify consistent (from floor-to-ceiling) negative 
airflow into the inner isolation zone. A second component to the smoke test 
included an evaluation of the smoke streamlines after it entered the inner zone. 
Curtain gap width and height were adjusted for each control-on test condition until 
smoke streamlines revealed an inward airflow path across the upstream healthcare 
worker position, across the patient’s head position, and into the HEPA filtration 
unit’s inlet.  
A medical compressor and discharge tubing were placed on or near the patient bed 
to facilitate nebulizer (source) placement. Power to the compressor was provided by 
an extension cord leading out to the corridor to allow remote starting/stopping of 
the nebulizer. Nebulizer cup(s) were prepared according to the previously identified 
aerosol generation protocol and placed on the patient bed, adjacent to the 
mannequin mouth position, and connected to the compressor discharge tubing. 
After the first field survey, the source was increased from one to two nebulizers 
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operating simultaneously in order to increase room concentrations and decrease the 
impact of potential background aerosol. 
Grimm aerosol spectrometers were programmed to record aerosol counts on a one-
minute average and placed at the following positions: (1) patient chest vicinity; (2) 
healthcare worker positions at approximate breathing zone height (BZH) along both 
sides of bed; (3) directly outside the entrance to the inner containment zone; and 
(4) additional sample points, representing the center of the patient room and the 
adjacent patient area. Depending upon equipment availability and zone 
configuration, a sample position near the patient’s feet was also collected. The 
zone-within-zone configuration schematic in Figure 12 indicates the dosing and 
sampling positions.  
Ventilated Headboard: This was configured to serve a single patient bed within a 
single-patient room (Figure 13). As with the zone-within-zone configuration, the 
“patient” was represented by a life-size mannequin placed in the bed and covered 
with a hospital blanket.   
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Figure 13. Example schematic of LEV positioning and equipment locations for a 
ventilated headboard expedient isolation configuration. 
The ventilated headboard configuration used a semi-enclosing containment zone 
that consisted of the ventilated headboard LEV system and a retractable hood with 
open front. The hood extended away from the ventilated headboard and out over 
the patient’s head and upper torso region. The hood frame was constructed with 1-
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in-diameter schedule 40 water pipe and elbow fittings obtained at a home 
improvement store. The hood itself was made of medium weight (3.5- to 4-mil) 
plastic sheeting, such as that used for a paint drop cloth. The HEPA filtration unit 
was a portable model with a ducted inlet design. This unit was consistent with the 
type used during asbestos abatement or for dust control during 
construction/remodeling activities within healthcare settings. The HEPA unit was 
connected via a metallic-faced flexible 6-in-diameter duct to the LEV hood that 
served as a ventilated headboard. By design, the ventilated headboard was 
intended to pull room air uniformly into the hood, across the patient’s head (the 
source) and into the exhaust/filtration system for cleaning and subsequent return to 
the patient room.  
The ventilated headboard and hood required compatibility with the size and 
operation of the hospital bed. The hospital beds encountered in this study were 
consistently sized, measuring 42–44 inches in width, depending upon rail design. 
Some required an additional 2 inches of width (1 inch per side) in order to move 
the rails between the raised and lowered positions. Operational incline tests 
revealed that a hood height of 2 ft was consistently sufficient to allow adjustment of 
the bed incline up to approximately 45 degrees and was sufficiently high so as not 
to obstruct visual access to the television or to the faces of bedside visitors. 
Because of the similarity in bed dimensions and operation across the individual 
testing locations, the same headboard dimensions were used at each location. 
The ventilated headboard measured 2 ft by 4 ft, and its frame was constructed with 
either 2- by 4-in or 1- by 4-in pine lumber. The back was made of ¼-in hardboard. 
Two air conditioning filters (2 ft by 2 ft by 1 in) were mounted to the front of the 
hood by a retaining track made of vinyl siding j-channel trim. A piece of 2-in-wide 
duct tape sealed the center seam shared by the two filters. In addition to 
performing as prefilters to extend the life of the HEPA filter, the inlet filters served 
to distribute the pressure differential across the hood face, promoting evenly 
distributed flow velocities.  
A sheet metal (4-in by 10-in) residential HVAC register boot that transitioned into a 
6-in-round duct take-off was mounted into the center bottom of the hood frame. 
This enabled connection to the 6-in flexible duct leading to the HEPA unit. This duct 
was routed along the room perimeter to avoid tripping hazards. All duct connections 
were further supported with duct tape. Two stilts, made with 1-in by 4-in lumber 
and attached to the sides of the headboard frame, were used to support the weight 
of the headboard and to determine its height. The back of the headboard was 
tethered to the wall to prevent tipping or lateral movement.  
The bed height was set so that the top of the mattress was about 3 ft above the 
floor. The original bed headboard was easily removed to reduce interruptions to the 
desired airflow patterns. The bottom of the ventilated headboard was set just above 
the bed mattress. The hood frame was attached to the top of the ventilated 
headboard and extended outward over the upper torso region of the mannequin, 
with the bed making up the fourth plane of the enclosure. This design allowed the 
HEPA unit to draw air into the partial enclosure at mid-torso, across the 
mannequin’s breathing zone (and the source), into the ventilated headboard, and 
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through the duct and HEPA filtration unit for air cleaning, all while maintaining 
healthcare provider access to the patient. The plastic sheeting, with its perimeter 
edges secured with packing tape, was draped over the frame and hood 
combination. Figure 14 shows a photograph of the ventilated headboard 
configuration with hood, mannequin, and sampling equipment in place at one of the 
field locations. 
 
Figure 14. Photograph of ventilated headboard configuration as constructed for field 
research at the INTEGRIS Baptist Medical Center, in Oklahoma City, OK. 
The flow rate through the HEPA filtration unit was adjusted with the HEPA unit’s 
variable-fan-speed controller. The criteria used to identify a desired flow rate were 
(1) a targeted minimum flow rate of 12 ACH based on the overall room volume and 
(2) a minimum average velocity into the hood of 30 fpm in order to reduce the 
interruption potential of room air currents. To facilitate remote activation without 
room entry, the power to the HEPA unit was supplied by an extension cord that led 
out to the corridor.  
In order for the hood to work effectively at the lower flow velocities, a critical 
design feature was the depth of the hood. These depth settings were determined 
with a handheld smoke generator (Cumulus Air Flow Indicator, Draeger Safety Inc., 
Pittsburgh, PA, or Wizard Stick, Zero Toys, Inc., Concord, MA) and a Hood Depth 
Determination Protocol. For this protocol, the HEPA unit was activated at the 
previously determined flow rate and smoke was released within the vicinity of the 
patient’s breathing zone, across the entire hood cross-sectional area. During the 
smoke release, the hood depth was slowly shortened until the first evidence of 
smoke escape occurred, and then it was slowly lengthened until no more escape 
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was visible. This was repeated three times until a minimum hood depth (D0) equal 
to the minimum hood depth where smoke escape was not visible could be 
determined. For purposes of the experimental protocol, two hood depths were 
selected, D0 and D0 + 8 in. To facilitate the evaluated research conditions, the 
hood’s upper side rails were constructed with removable inserts to enable quick and 
consistent switching between the D0 and D0 + 8-in hood depths.  
During control-on test conditions, HVAC exhaust grilles were sealed with tape and 
plastic in accordance with the previously described strategy. Supply louvers within 
the inner isolation zone were partially deflected if smoke tests revealed interrupting 
airflow in the vicinity of the hood. For the control-off test condition (Condition 1), 
the HEPA unit was not activated, the room HVAC supply and exhaust were 
unaltered, and the hood was rolled back off of the hood frame.  
Medical compressors and nebulizers were used for surrogate source generation in 
the same manner as that described for the zone-within-zone configuration. Power 
to the compressors was provided by an extension cord leading out to the corridor to 
allow remote starting of the nebulizer. Grimm aerosol spectrometers were 
programmed to record aerosol counts on a one-minute average and placed at the 
following positions: (1) patient chest vicinity; (2) healthcare worker positions 
(approximate BZH) along both sides of bed; (3) open center of patient room; and 
(4) at the mannequin’s feet, near the foot of the bed. Aerosol sampling and dosing 
positions are shown in the ventilated headboard configuration schematic in Figure 
13. 
Experimental Procedure 
Both the zone-within-zone and ventilated headboard test configurations were 
evaluated for one control-off and two control-on conditions. For each configuration, 
this group of three conditions constituted one “block” of conditions. The conditions 
were randomly applied within each block. The randomization order was determined 
with use of an online random number generator developed by Dr. Mads Haahr 
(Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland) and located at www.random.org. Two rules applied 
to the random number output: (1) within a block, a condition may only appear 
once, and (2) once an order of test conditions was selected, that same order could 
not be used a second time. An initial study was conducted in which six blocks were 
conducted within the same room at a hospital test site. The data from this study 
provided important information regarding block-to-block sample variability. This 
information was used to assist in planning the follow-on field studies, namely by 
identifying the number of blocks required (based on sample variability) to obtain 
reasonable confidence limits around the estimated airborne concentration 
reductions at the various sampling positions. 
Grimm aerosol spectrometers were activated and allowed to operate for a warm-up 
period of at least 30 minutes prior to the initiation of data collection. Calibrated air 
sampling pumps, with 25-mm mixed cellulose ester (MCE) filters/cassettes, were 
positioned adjacent to aerosol spectrometer sampling positions. (This step evolved 
following the first two field studies and will be discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter.) The filters allowed average particle concentrations to be calculated from 
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the sampled air volume and the number of particles collected on the filter, as 
determined by microscopy, for comparison with Grimm concentration estimates. 
Temperature/humidity loggers were placed within the patient room, in the corridor 
near the patient room entry, and in an adjacent patient room on the same HVAC 
supply system (if possible). 
Patient Source Generation (Order of Operation)  
• The HEPA systems were activated during room setup.  
• The test configuration was set up according to the randomly ordered test 
condition appropriate for the experimental block. In addition to control-on 
test conditions, control-off test conditions were run to allow comparison of 
particle counts at the monitored positions with the same location 
measurements observed during the room’s control-on condition(s). For all 
test runs, the patient room door was closed and the gap at the door’s bottom 
was sealed with painting tape. For control-off test conditions, the 
containment boundaries were removed and the filtration equipment was 
deactivated. 
• All aerosol spectrometers were placed on pause, internal memory was 
cleared, date/time settings were synchronized, and the machines were set 
for sampling at 1-min averages and placed on standby.  
• The nebulizer cups were prepared according to the aerosol generation 
protocol and positioned with their output near the mannequin mouth 
position.  
• Aerosol spectrometers and air sampling pumps were activated, the patient 
room was quickly exited, and the patient room door was closed and sealed 
along its perimeter with tape. 
• The HEPAs were allowed to run for a period of 15–25 minutes (longer periods 
were selected following “control-off” test conditions), to reduce aerosol 
counts generated during setup activities.  
• If the block condition was a control-off test condition, then the HEPA was 
deactivated by unplugging its extension cord in the adjacent corridor and 
allowing 10 additional minutes for background count stabilization. 
• The nebulizers were activated and source generation was initiated by 
plugging in the appropriate extension cord (in corridor). 
• After 25 minutes of source generation the nebulization was stopped, and 5 to 
10 minutes of post-nebulization sampling was conducted to monitor decay 
trends. 
• With the HEPA unit still activated, the patient room was reentered and the 
aerosol spectrometers and air sampling pumps were stopped.  
Data Collection and Management 
Physical parameters (room dimensions, HVAC supply, and exhaust locations) were 
logged for each test site and a room schematic was developed. A flow-capture hood 
(AccuBalance Air Capture Hood, Model 8371, or Alnor Electronic Balometer, Model 
APM 150, both from TSI Incorporated, Shoreview, MN) was used to establish room 
HVAC supply and exhaust volumes both before and after any modifications and to 
verify flow rate through the HEPA filtration systems. A hotwire anemometer (Airflow 
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Meter 8386A, TSI, Inc., Shoreview, MN) was used to measure air velocity into the 
inner containment zone. An electronic manometer feature on the same instrument 
was used to measure the pressure difference across the curtain boundary at the 
first survey site. Documentation of start and stop times and other experimental 
observations were manually recorded for each trial.  
The predominant data evaluated for containment performance were particle count 
data from real-time light-scattering aerosol spectrometers (Grimm Dust Monitors, 
Models 1.10x, Labortechnik GmbH and CoKG, Ainring, Germany). For the purposes 
of this research, the size range of interest was that which encompassed the size of 
the source microspheres used in the nebulizer. The spectrometers logged the count 
data on an internal memory card in an American Standard Code for Information 
Interchange (ASCII) text tabularized format. The logged data were downloaded 
from the Grimms onto a portable computer using Grimm proprietary software and 
imported into Microsoft Excel for storage and cleaning (elimination of unwanted size 
ranges and extraneous data points logged during periods before/after actual test 
period).  
Temperature and humidity data were collected using HOBO H8 Pro Series loggers 
(MicroDAQ.com Ltd, Warner, NH) programmed to log temperature and humidity 
measurements once every 5 minutes (sample frequency was once every minute at 
the first field site). In this setting, they could be positioned and allowed to collect 
data throughout the entire experimental period. Upon conclusion of each field 
study, the loggers were downloaded to a notebook computer. The temperature 
measurements within the patient room were subsequently evaluated to determine if 
the operation of the HEPA filtration units appeared to affect overall room comfort 
conditions and, if so, to compare the altered conditions with ASHRAE’s 
environmental design recommendations (temperature range of 70–75°F) for human 
comfort in hospital patient rooms [ASHRAE 2003c]. When patient room 
temperatures were elevated, analysis of corridor and adjacent room temperatures 
provided insight as to whether the elevated temperatures were HEPA-related or 
perhaps related to the building/HVAC system operations.   
Data Analysis 
For a block of test runs, the objective was to compare the generated aerosol 
concentration counts observed during the control-on test conditions with those 
observed under control-off test conditions. The control-on test condition (conditions 
#2 and #3) data held much smaller particle count values than those observed 
during the control-off condition (condition #1), and the control-on conditions 
tended to result in data that were right-skewed. Since the control-on data were to 
be compared (using ratios) with control-off data, all the particle counts observed at 
the various test positions were log-transformed and the geometric means 
determined for the respective trials. The control-on conditions #2 and #3 were then 
compared with the uncontrolled condition #1 through a ratio of geometric means 
(gmean), which were presented in this form: 
Geometric Mean Reduction Ratio = (gmean1 – gmeanx)/gmean1 for x = 2, 3.  
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Additional statistical analysis was conducted with use of SAS Proc Mixed (SAS 
Version 9.13, SAS Institute Inc., Cary, NC) to determine the 90 percent confidence 
limits on the geometric mean reduction ratio (GMRR). This model provided the 
standard error value, based upon the combined variance from the random effects, 
to be multiplied by the appropriate t-statistic (based on the model’s assigned 
degrees of freedom) and resulting in a reduction ratio lower limit at α = 0.10. The 
decision not to investigate/report lower limits for α < 0.10 was deemed reasonable 
on the basis of compounding variability associated with aerosol generation, aerosol 
measurement, and sample placement, as well as the inherent variability associated 
with ventilation control systems that contain a human interaction component. On 
the other hand, the severity of the potential contaminant necessitates some rigor in 
the performance estimates of a selected design; thus, lower bound limits for α > 
0.10 were not evaluated.  
For a given block of data at a given sample location, 26 data points were evaluated 
for analysis in the following manner: 
1. The mean of the five minutes (5 counts) of data preceding the minute in 
which nebulization began was calculated as a background correction value 
(BCV). 
2. The minute logged as the beginning of nebulization (t0) was not used for 
analysis because it was uncertain how much of this minute’s sample period 
actually included source nebulization time. 
3. Data associated with the five minutes following t0 were considered 
“transitional data” and ignored to allow time for noncontrolled aerosol to 
distribute throughout the room. 
4. The BCV from step one was subtracted from each of the next 15 particle 
counts (minutes 6–20 following t0) observed following the transitional data 
period. Resulting values below zero were reset to zero. These 15 values were 
the background (BG)-corrected data values used for subsequent analysis. 
5. A small baseline shift of 0.03 was added to each of the BG-corrected values 
to remove any computational problems associated with log-transformation of 
zero values. 
6. The natural logarithm was taken for each of the 15 values identified in step 5 
and the mean of these values was calculated, resulting in a single BG-
corrected, baseline-shifted, log-transformed data point representing the 
estimated particle count associated with the individual test run. 
7. The data from step 6 were coded according to position, block, and test 
condition, and a single average was determined for each condition-position 
pairing. For each sample position, the reduction determined to result from 
each of the control-on conditions (#2 and #3) was calculated with the GMRR 
formula as described above.  
8. Additional statistical analysis, using the representative data points from step 
6, was conducted with SAS Proc Mixed to identify the predictive model 
providing the lower 90 percent confidence limit reduction ratios for the 
examined test conditions. Thus, the reduction could be said, with 90 percent 
confidence, to be at least as great as the lower confidence limit.  
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Once data from an initial test site were evaluated to determine the minimum 
number of blocks desired, the approach described above was repeated for the 
defined number of block repetitions at three additional healthcare facility locations 
of differing physical and HVAC operational design. Following completion of the field 
studies, the test conditions were evaluated for their performance in (1) containing 
airborne contaminant within the designated inner zone and (2) reducing healthcare 
worker exposures relative to that experienced under the no-control test condition.  
Air Filter Sampling and Particle Counting 
Following the first zone-within-zone field evaluation, suspicion arose that low levels 
of background aerosol originating from sources other than the nebulizer might have 
affected some of the observed particle counts. In most circumstances, and 
especially for sampling positions more proximate to the nebulizer source, these 
counts would be expected to be too low to impact the overall results. For sample 
locations more distant from the source and under control-on test conditions, even 
low-level contamination could impact the ability to document the highest levels of 
source aerosol containment. At the second field survey site, filter samples were 
collected for subsequent analysis with scanning electron microscopy (SEM). 
Unfortunately, results from this sampling effort were unobtainable when the 
preparation method used by the microscopist to fix and clear the filter media onto 
the slide appeared to have destroyed the PSL beads captured on the filter. 
Conversations with Drs. David Johnson and Robert Lynch at OUHSC revealed they 
were having similar problems with background aerosol and with greater impact due 
to the relatively dirty warehouse-based test environment used in their own 
research. Thus, they had opted to pursue an optical particle counting method 
instead of using the aerosol spectrometers. Initially, a 25-mm nonconductive 
styrene cassette with 0.8-µm–pore-size mixed cellulose ester (MCE) filter 
(Catalogue No. 225-3100, SKC Inc., Eighty Four, PA) was used to conduct the air 
sampling for this method; however, subsequent field tests used 25-mm-diameter, 
0.8-µm-pore-size MCE filters preloaded in carbon-filled conductive polypropylene 
cassettes (Catalogue No. 225-321, SKC Inc., Eighty Four, PA), typical of those used 
for asbestos sampling. Through ongoing conversations and method development 
experiments by Johnson and Lynch, an eventual aerosol optical counting method 
was developed using a green fluorescent microsphere suspension with PSL 
microspheres of 1.9 µm mean diameter (Catalog No. G0200, Duke Scientific, Palo 
Alto, CA). With use of fluorescent microspheres of a known size in the source 
suspension, an optical filter could be employed with the optical microscope, which 
should limit the visible aerosol to primarily those that originated from the nebulizer. 
Thus, beginning with the third field survey, the source suspension formula for the 
hospital expedient isolation research was slightly modified by substituting the 1.9-
µm (da = 1.95 µm) fluorescent PSL microspheres for the previously identified 1.6-
µm PSL microspheres. The slightly larger test aerosol was still within the 1- to 3-µm 
size range of interest, and the 0.3-µm increase in aerosol diameter was sufficiently 
small that changes in airborne behavior were negligible (increased VTS of only 0.33 
cm/sec) and the Raabe-predicted singlet generation remained at 99 percent. 
Because any slight deviations in either behavior or generation would occur in both 
controlled and noncontrolled test conditions, there was no determined need to 
revalidate the aerosol generation protocol.  
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Personal air sampling pumps (Model 224-PCXR8, SKC Inc., Eighty Four, PA) with 
filter cassettes attached were co-located with aerosol spectrometer sampling 
locations; however, since this method was evolving as the field studies transpired, 
the number and locations of the filter sampling positions often varied by field study. 
The filter samples were analyzed by Dr. Lynch at OUHSC using a fluorescent 
microscope and an optical counting method recently discussed in another 
publication [Johnson and Lynch 2008]. In this method, each low count filter was 
analyzed via a total scan and manual count of the entire filter. For more densely 
loaded filters, the total count was estimated by a random field manual count 
technique.  
For a given field study, the filter count results were organized according to sample 
position, block, and test condition. Though the actual dosing periods were 
consistent, the nature of the protocol resulted in some sample periods in which air 
was drawn through the filter for longer periods than in others. This was primarily 
true for the no-control test conditions. To address the discrepancy, the raw particle 
counts were divided by their corresponding airflow that was sampled only during 
the dosing period, in order to get a “dosing concentration.” The “dosing 
concentration” was the value subjected to performance analysis. The resulting 
concentration values were log-transformed and the geometric mean values were 
calculated for each test condition, as was done with the Grimm data. Since some of 
the field study results included filter counts of zero fluorescent spheres, the 
baseline was once again shifted by 0.03 to avoid difficulties with the log 
transformation of zero values. For each sample position and test condition, the 
mean of the log-transformed values was determined and the exponentiation of that 
value was used to obtain the geometric mean of the baseline-shifted data. Similar 
to the aerosol spectrometer data, the exposure reduction determined to result from 
each of the control-on conditions (#2 and #3) was determined by the GMRR.  
Chapter III 
Results 
Two expedient AII configurations were evaluated in each of four hospitals for a total 
of eight field studies. The field testing procedures followed those identified in 
Chapter II, with occasional modifications to accommodate facility and HVAC design 
issues. Site-specific details and corresponding results are described below, 
organized by location. 
Oklahoma City Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center  
The Oklahoma City Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center (VAMC) was a 
169-bed facility with authorization to expand up to 245 beds. Located on the 
University of Oklahoma Health Sciences Center Campus in Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma, this was a Clinical Referral Level III facility and a teaching hospital, 
capable of providing a full range of medical, psychological, and related services to 
eligible veterans.  
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Zone-within-Zone, Two-Patient Configuration 
The zone-within-zone configuration study at VAMC was the first of the expedient 
isolation field studies. The patient room had a floor area of approximately 320 ft2 
and an approximate room volume of 2,570 ft3. The original room design 
accommodated three patients, with no provisions for airborne isolation. For the 
expedient isolation research, the room was converted (Figure 15) to hold just two 
expedient isolation patients. 
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Figure 15. Schematic of zone-within-zone expedient isolation configuration at the 
VA Medical Center in Oklahoma City. 
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Configuration Setup: The zone-within-zone configuration was established according 
to the methodology prescribed in Chapter II. The freestanding HEPA filtration unit 
(Model NU-114, NuAire Inc., Plymouth, MN) was positioned equidistant between the 
footboards of the two patient beds, diagonally across from the respective entrances 
into the two inner zones. A photograph of the inlet side of the HEPA unit, with the 
vertical partition that separated the two inner zones, is shown in Figure 16.  
 
Figure 16. Photograph showing the freestanding HEPA filtration unit positioned 
between the two inner isolation zones. The edge of the curtain was sealed to the 
HEPA unit, and a vertical partition equally divided the inlet to prevent migration 
between the two inner isolation zones.  
HEPA Flow Rate Determination: Given an overall room volume of 2,570 ft3, a HEPA 
filtration flow rate of 515 cfm was required to achieve the desired 12 ACH. Flow 
rate through the HEPA unit was adjusted with a variable-fan-speed controller, and a 
filtration rate of 550 cfm was obtained for the control-on test conditions. 
Curtain gap determination: The Curtain Gap Determination Protocol was conducted 
to establish the entrance gap widths under the two control-on test conditions. The 
protocol revealed a consistent airflow into the inner isolation zone for curtain gaps 
up to 15 inches. When the gap approached 8 inches or smaller, the streamlines 
shot rapidly inward along the wall, resulting in turbulent mixing near the patient 
head and at the far side of the bed, away from the gap. When the gap approached 
15 inches, the streamlines turned quickly toward the HEPA unit without passing 
over the healthcare worker position and the patient. On the basis of streamline 
observations, a gap of 10–12 inches was selected for the test conditions, with the 
wider gap selected under condition #3, when the inner zone’s HVAC supply was 
sealed.  
Center-line velocity measurements along the height of the curtain gap were 
collected for each of the control-on conditions. The 12-inch gap corresponding to 
test condition #3, with the inner isolation zone HVAC supply sealed, resulted in a 
mean inward velocity of 37.8 fpm (range, 25–48 fpm; n = 5). The 10-inch gap 
corresponding to condition #2, with the inner isolation zone HVAC supply open, 
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resulted in a mean inward velocity of 30 fpm (range, 7–45 fpm; n = 5). In addition, 
the electronic manometer function of the TSI VelociCalc was used to measure the 
pressure differential beneath the curtain for both the 10-inch and 12-inch gap 
positions. In both cases, the pressure differential was less than the detection limit 
(0.001 in w.g.) of the manometer.  
Experimental Procedure: Initial plans called for the preliminary completion of three 
blocks of test runs, with the three test conditions randomly applied within each 
block. Block-to-block sample variability from these blocks was to assist in 
determining the total number of blocks to conduct for this and subsequent field 
studies. However, results from an initial test run revealed widely erratic reporting of 
aerosol counts, especially among the newest aerosol spectrometer models. A 
detailed series of troubleshooting investigations was initiated with interaction from 
the equipment representative in Georgia and the instrument design engineers in 
Germany. After several days of troubleshooting experiments and examination of 
data output, an upgrade was made to the manufacturer’s equipment operations 
software. Five new Grimm aerosol spectrometers were obtained on loan, resulting 
in a total of eight spectrometers of the same model (1.108ss) available for the 
experimental setup. All of the units were operated with the manufacturer’s updated 
software (1.177 version 3.1, Grimm Technologies, Inc.). Two additional changes 
were made to the field evaluation protocol. The first was due to higher-than-
expected background aerosol counts within the 1- to 2-µm size range. Thus, the 
number of nebulizers used to generate the source aerosol was increased to two. 
One nebulizer was placed on each side of the mannequin’s mouth, with their output 
nozzles oriented at an angle to intersect at an imaginary point just beyond the 
mannequin’s jaw. The second change resulted from concerns about potentially 
disrupting air currents originating from the HVAC supply louver. To address this 
concern, one of the “control-on” test conditions was modified from an HVAC-open 
setup to an HVAC-open-but-deflected setup, as described previously in Chapter II. 
Following the loss of four days of experimental time due to instrument 
troubleshooting, the hospital unexpectedly requested to regain use of the ward 
where the experiments were being conducted. As a result of this request, 
conducting a preliminary block-to-block variability study was no longer possible. 
The decision was made to work as fast as possible within the remaining time 
allotted to complete a series of six experimental blocks for just the zone-within-
zone configuration. The use of six blocks allowed each possible permutation of the 
applied order of the three test conditions to receive a single evaluation. Thus, if 
there were any order-specific influences upon performance results, it would be 
equally represented within the data. Each block took between four and five hours to 
conduct. The sequence of operations for the blocks followed that previously 
identified in the protocol; however, the Grimm instruments were rotated to new 
position assignments to reduce potential instrument-associated bias upon a single 
sample location. There were no air filter samples collected at this site for 
subsequent optical analyses.  
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Table 3. Geometric mean reduction ratios (GMRRs), by sample position and test 
condition code, from Grimm aerosol spectrometer results in the zone-within-zone 
expedient isolation field study at the Oklahoma City VA Medical Center. 
Position 
Description Location Label N 
GMRR Test 
Condition 2 
GMRR Test 
Condition 3 
Outside inlet 1 
(source patient) A 6 0.998 0.999 
HCW position 
(upstream) B 6 0.134 0.163 
Patient’s chest* C 6 n/a n/a 
HCW position 
(downstream) D 6 -0.767 -0.800 
Center of outer 
zone F 6 0.999 0.999 
Outside inlet 2 
(nonsource) G 6 0.993 0.997 
Center of Bed 2 
(nonsource) H 6 0.987 0.997 
* Position C, patient’s chest, was not evaluated because of its position within the 
path of the captured contaminant streamline toward the HEPA unit.  
Note: 
HCW = health care worker; location labels are shown in Fig. 15. 
Performance Ratio: Table 4 shows the number of performance ratio determinations 
that were available at each sample position, as well as the GMRRs based upon the 
Grimm particle count data. Sample positions are described in Table 4 and shown in 
Figure 15.   
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Table 4. Geometric mean reduction ratios (GMRRs) for Grimm aerosol spectrometer 
data (black values) and filter sampling/optical counting data (red values) collected 
in the ventilated headboard expedient isolation field study at the Oklahoma City VA 
Medical Center. 
Position 
Description Location Label n 
GMRR Test 
Condition 2 
GMRR Test 
Condition 3 
HCW at right of 
source A 
6 
6 
0.997 
0.999 
0.996 
0.999 
HCW at left of 
source B 
6 
6 
0.997 
0.999 
0.996 
0.999 
Patient’s chest C 6 1.0 1.0 
Foot of bed D 6 6 
0.995 
0.999 
0.997 
0.999 
Center of room E 6 6 
0.997 
0.999 
0.996 
0.999 
 
Temperature Measurements: Temperature/humidity loggers were placed at each of 
the two bed positions, in the center of the patient room and in the hall corridor. A 
downloading error limited the recoverable data from these loggers to a single day’s 
worth of data, recorded at one-minute intervals and covering a single block of test 
runs. A review of the three patient room temperature data logs revealed all 
temperatures within or below ASHRAE design temperature guidance; thus, only the 
patient room temperature log was evaluated. All three mean temperatures fell 
within 69±1°F and had a combined range of 67–72°F. A graph of temperature data 
logged at the source bed position is shown in Figure 17. The hatched area identifies 
the ASHRAE recommended design temperature range of 70–75°F. The three 
columns represent known fan/door conditions corresponding to the three test trials 
evaluated during an individual block of test data. Though the door was generally 
left open and the HEPA fan was operating during the setup portion of the day, the 
precise timing of door position and HEPA fan status was not reported for these 
periods. However, the door positions were known to remain closed during the three 
test trials, so combined with the HEPA status logs from the individual test 
conditions, these periods can be evaluated. The slope during the first trial remains 
flat, revealing either no affect upon room temperature or one that was coincidently 
offset by the room HVAC system. The downward slope during the HEPA Off 
condition, immediately followed by an upward slope during the subsequent HEPA 
On condition, could possibly reflect a slight influence of the HEPA fan operations; 
however, even here, the fluctuations are within a narrow 2-degree window, and 
room temperatures stayed well within the ASHRAE recommended guidance. 
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Figure 17. Graph of temperatures logged during one day of the zone-within-zone 
field study at the VA Medical Center in Oklahoma City. 
Ventilated Headboard, One-Patient Configuration 
The ventilated headboard configuration study at VAMC was conducted about 15 
months after the zone-within-zone study. The available patient room was a single-
patient room, with an anteroom, that was designed to be placed into negative-
pressure isolation mode on an as-needed basis. For the purposes of this research, 
the negative-pressure mode was not used; the door to the corridor remained closed 
and the door between the anteroom and patient area remained open to neutralize 
any small pressure differentials between the patient room and the anteroom. The 
patient room (Figure 18) had an approximate floor area of 120 ft2 and an 
approximate room volume of 970 ft3.  
Configuration Setup: The ventilated headboard configuration was established 
according to the methodology prescribed in Chapter II. To minimize disrupting 
supply air currents at the hood inlet, the HVAC supply louver immediately above 
the patient bed was deflected, with plastic sheeting as a baffle, toward the wall 
furthest from the head of the bed. The HEPA filtration unit (Model PAS600, 
Abatement Technologies Inc., Suwanee, GA) used for this isolation configuration 
was of a ducted inlet design. With the rails locked into the upward (safety) position, 
the bed (width, 3 ft 8 in) fit effectively within the 4-ft-wide hood. The ventilated 
headboard and hood frame, with the hood removed, are shown in Figure 19. 
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Figure 18. Schematic of ventilated headboard single-patient configuration evaluated 
at the VA Medical Center in Oklahoma City. 
 
Figure 19. Photograph of ventilated headboard and hood frame as constructed for 
research at the Oklahoma City VA Medical Center. 
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HEPA Flow Rate Determination: Given an overall room volume of 970 ft3, a HEPA 
filtration flow rate of 195 cfm was required to achieve the desired 12 ACH. 
However, a desired minimum airflow rate through the HEPA filter unit of 240 cfm 
was targeted in order to provide a 30-fpm average flow velocity into the 8-sq-ft 
open area of the hood. The flow rate through the HEPA filtration was adjusted with 
a variable–fan-speed controller, and a filtration flow rate of 240 cfm was achieved, 
resulting in a HEPA-filtered airflow of just under 15 ACH. 
Hood Depth Determination: The Hood Depth Determination Protocol was used to 
establish the two hood depths (D0 and D0 + 8 in) to be evaluated under the two test 
conditions. At the Oklahoma City VA Medical Center, these values were 2 ft 4 in and 
3 ft, respectively, and the appropriately sized hood side rail inserts were made to 
facilitate quick and consistent switching between the two hood depths.  
Experimental Procedure:  The VAMC was the third field study location to evaluate 
the ventilated headboard expedient isolation approach. At this point in the field 
research activities, the determination had been made to conduct six blocks of three 
test conditions, with each of the three conditions randomly applied within each 
block. 
Five aerosol spectrometers were used for sample collection and distributed as 
shown in Figure 18. All five spectrometers were of the same model (Grimm 
Technologies Model 1.108), and all were set up and downloaded with Grimm’s 
1.177 version 3.1 software. The experimental sequence of events for the blocks 
followed that previously identified in the protocol, to include the placement of 
industrial hygiene (IH) sampling trains fitted with 25-mm MCE filters (0.8-µm pore 
size) and calibrated to a flow of 1.5 Lpm. The IH sampling trains were co-located 
with Grimm spectrometer sampling positions A, B, D, and E (Figure 18), and 
sufficient filter medium was available to allow sampling for each trial run within 
each block. Both Grimm spectrometers and the IH sampling trains were rotated to a 
new sample position prior to initiation of each new block. This helped to evenly 
distribute any unknown instrument error or bias.  
Performance Ratios: Table 5 shows the number of performance ratio determinations 
that were available for each sample position, as well as the GMRRs for the 
evaluated conditions. Data from both the aerosol spectrometers and the IH filter 
samples are included in the table.  
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Table 5. Geometric mean reduction ratios (GMRRs) for Grimm aerosol spectrometer 
data (black values) and filter sampling/optical counting data (red values) collected 
in the ventilated headboard expedient isolation field study at the Oklahoma City VA 
Medical Center. 
Position 
Description Location Label n 
GMRR Test 
Condition 2 
GMRR Test 
Condition 3 
HCW at right of 
source A 
6 
6 
0.997 
0.999 
0.996 
0.999 
HCW at left of 
source B 
6 
6 
0.997 
0.999 
0.996 
0.999 
Patient’s chest C 6 1.0 1.0 
Foot of bed D 6 6 
0.995 
0.999 
0.997 
0.999 
Center of room E 6 6 
0.997 
0.999 
0.996 
0.999 
 
Temperature Measurements: Temperature/humidity loggers were placed on the 
patient bed, in the anteroom, and in an adjacent patient room, and measurements 
were logged at 5-minute intervals over the six-day field survey. This particular field 
survey was conducted in mid-August, when outdoor temperatures in Oklahoma 
consistently exceeded 100°F. The high outdoor temperatures sometimes challenged 
the HVAC system’s ability to keep the patient rooms within ASHRAE’s 70–75°F 
design temperature range, as reflected in the temperature data summary shown in 
Table 6. No patients were in this wing during the field study, so the temperatures 
do not necessarily reflect actual operating conditions for patient areas. The lower 
temperatures observed within the anteroom were believed to result from this area’s 
lack of solar load from exterior walls and window surfaces.  
Table 6. Summary of temperature data logged during ventilated headboard 
expedient isolation field study at the VA Medical Center, Oklahoma City, OK. 
Temperature in °F Mean Min Max 
Patient room (n = 1520) 75.89 71.96 79.16 
Anteroom (n = 1522) 72.66 70.88 75.74 
Adjacent room (n = 1522) 75.50 71.60 79.16 
 
A line graph of temperature data logged at the source bed position during one day 
of the field study is shown in Figure 20. The hatched area identifies the ASHRAE 
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recommended design temperature range of 70–75°F. The six color-shaded columns 
represent periods of known fan/door conditions that correspond to the six test trials 
(two blocks) evaluated that day. The six test trials generally occurred during the 
hottest portion of the day, when room temperatures exceeded the 75°F upper limit 
of the ASHRAE design guidance; however, the slope of the line graph was 
downward in all four of the test trials in which the HEPA was operated. This 
indicates that any added heat originating from the HEPA fan was negligible in 
comparison to the room’s HVAC temperature controls. 
  
Figure 20. Graph of temperatures logged in the patient room during one day of the 
ventilated headboard field study at VA Medical Center in Oklahoma City. 
Central Kansas Medical Center, Great Bend, KS  
Central Kansas Medical Center (CKMC) is in Great Bend, Kansas, which has a 
population of roughly 15,000 and is 120 miles northwest of Wichita. At the time of 
the study, CKMC was a 74-bed, regional acute care hospital serving an overall 
population of 60,000. The main footprint of the current facility was a six-story 
cloverleaf design executed in 1964. Additional construction has since provided office 
space, laboratories, and dining facilities. The CKMC was the primary facility of a 
two-campus operation, with the second campus located 20 miles away in Larned, 
KS. The CKMC facility included an intensive care unit, emergency room, Level II 
Nursery, full laparoscopic system, and fixed-site MRI and CT equipment. There were 
no engineered AII rooms within this facility. Procedures for AII involved the use of a 
portable freestanding HEPA filtration unit, which was placed near the window within 
the patient room and whose discharge was directed outdoors via a special window 
fitting.   
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Zone-within-Zone, Two-Patient Configuration 
The zone-within-zone configuration study at CKMC was the second of the expedient 
isolation field studies. The multi-patient room had a floor area of approximately 345 
ft2 and a volume of roughly 2,760 ft3. The room’s floor space resembled a truncated 
pie shape, with the exterior windows located along the outer arc length and the 
entry door located within a narrower wall opposite the arc length. The room was 
designed to accommodate three patient beds, with no provisions for AII. For the 
expedient isolation research, the room was converted (Figure 21) to hold just two 
expedient isolation patients.  
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Figure 21. Schematic of zone-within-zone expedient isolation configuration at the 
Central Kansas Medical Center, in Great Bend, KS. 
The patient room’s HVAC design utilized induction air units supplied by a low-
volume, single-pass air supply that originated from a central HVAC unit. Within 
each induction unit, the supply air was released through a multi-nozzle supply 
plenum to induce recirculatory airflow into the bottom of the wall cabinet and past a 
heat exchanger, before the combined airflows exited through the top of the cabinet. 
The induced airflow into the cabinetry resulted in the entire kickboard along the 
outer wall serving as an inlet for recirculating airflow. For the expedient isolation 
configurations, the kickboard space within the inner isolation zones was treated like 
a return air grille in regards to the field protocol and sealed with tape and plastic. 
This forced the induction units to obtain all of their recirculatory air from the outer 
zone. Similarly, during test condition 3, when the inner zone HVAC supply was 
supposed to be closed, closure was not realistically feasible, so the HVAC supply air 
was routed to a release point outside of the inner isolation zone. In addition, there 
were two large double-hung windows built into the exterior wall. Both windows 
were also sealed with plastic and tape so as not to be a source of air pressure or 
ambient aerosol.  
Configuration Setup: The zone-within-zone configuration was established according 
to the methodology prescribed in Chapter II. With the pie-shaped room and the use 
of the existing curtain tracks to establish inner isolation zones, the patient 
orientation was such that the head was positioned away from the outer wall. The 
curtain entrance gap and the freestanding HEPA filtration unit (HEPA-Care Model 
HC800F) were positioned on the same end of the isolation zone, away from the 
exterior wall, resulting in a side-to-side airflow across the mannequin’s upper torso. 
The HEPA inlet on this unit was smaller and lower than that on the NuAire unit; 
thus, the bed height was adjusted so that the mattress height was consistent with 
the HEPA inlet (approximately 28 inches from floor to top of mattress).  
For the inner isolation zone closest to the wall (containing sample position H), the 
side draft orientation required the installation of a floor-to-ceiling partition to “turn” 
the air as it entered the inner zone. Qualitative smoke tests conducted with a 
handheld smoke generator confirmed the effectiveness of this approach.  
Figure 22 shows the interface between the HEPA filter and the plastic curtains, 
including the plastic curtain that bisected the HEPA inlet between the two inner 
isolation zones. A smoke test, underway at the time of the photograph, 
demonstrated that smoke released near the pillow area was pulled toward the HEPA 
inlet.  
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Figure 22. A photograph showing the HEPA filter unit’s inlet relative to the source 
bed pillow position, during a qualitative smoke test at Central Kansas Medical 
Center, Great Bend. 
HEPA Flow Rate Determination: Given an overall room volume of 2760 ft3, a HEPA 
filtration flow rate of 550 cfm was required to achieve the desired 12 ACH. Flow 
rate through the HEPA unit was adjustable with a variable-fan-speed controller, and 
a filtration rate of 550 cfm was achieved for the control-on test conditions. This was 
the maximum flow rate achievable through this HEPA unit in this configuration.  
Curtain gap determination: The Curtain Gap Determination Protocol was conducted 
to establish the entrance gap widths under the two control-on test conditions. Gaps 
of 10–12 inches were again selected for the test conditions, with the wider gap 
selected for condition 3, when the inner zone’s HVAC supply was routed to a release 
point outside of the inner zone.  
Center-line velocity measurements into both of these gap widths were inadvertently 
not recorded in the log book. On the basis of a mathematical (Q = V × A) 
examination of the HEPA flow rates and the entrance gap open area, if one 
assumed that virtually all the 275 cfm of makeup air entering the inner isolation 
flowed through the curtain gap, then the velocity through the curtain 12-inch gap 
would be expected to average about 34 fpm. For the 10-inch gap associated with 
Condition 2, the HVAC grille inside the inner isolation was open. This provided about 
25 cfm of supply air into the inner isolation zone that did not have to flow through 
the curtain gap. The resulting calculated velocity through the 10-inch curtain gap 
was expected to average about 37 fpm. 
Experimental Procedure:  Delays in receiving all of the necessary equipment 
resulted in six blocks of experiments for the zone-within-zone configuration being 
conducted at this location. This allowed each possible permutation of the applied 
order of test conditions to receive a representative evaluation. The plan was for 
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analysis to be performed on the data from these blocks, and if additional blocks 
were deemed necessary for statistical power, they could be performed the following 
month, upon the researchers’ return to CKMC for the ventilated headboard 
experiments. The sequence of operations for the blocks followed that previously 
identified in the protocol; however, individual Grimm instruments were rotated to 
new, unique position assignment after blocks one and four to reduce potential 
instrument-associated bias upon a single sample location.  
Eight model 1.108 Grimm aerosol spectrometers were used in the experiments. 
Sample position E (not shown in Figure 21) was positioned at the HEPA filter inlet 
for potential use as a trouble-shooting sample. These data were not analyzed once 
it was determined that the experiments had proceeded successfully. This field study 
was the first location that included an attempt to collect IH filter samples for 
subsequent analyses. In this attempt, the anticipated analysis method was the use 
of scanning electron microscopy (SEM), and IH sampling trains were co-located at 
sample positions A and G for this purpose.  
Performance Ratios. Table 7 shows the number of performance ratio determinations 
that were available at each sample position as well as the GMRRs based upon the 
Grimm particle count data. Sample positions are described in Table 7 and were 
previously shown in Figure 21. Results from the filter samples collected for SEM 
analysis were unobtainable. The preparation method used to fix and clear the filter 
media onto the slide appeared to have destroyed the PSL beads captured on the 
filter. Thus, there are no optical filter count results reported for this field study.   
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Table 7. Geometric mean reduction ratios (GMRRs), by sample position and control-
on condition code, from Grimm aerosol spectrometer data obtained at Central 
Kansas Medical Center in the zone-within-zone expedient isolation field study. 
Position 
Description 
Location 
Label n 
GMRR Test 
Condition 2 
GMRR Test 
Condition 3 
Outside inlet 1 
(source patient) A 6 0.998 0.993 
HCW 
(upstream) B 6 0.998 0.988 
Patient’s chest C 6 0.761 1.00 
HCW 
(downstream) D 6 0.928 0.993 
Center of outer 
zone F 6 0.999 0.998 
 
Outside inlet 2 
(nonsource) 
G 6 0.999 0.999 
Center of Bed 2 
(nonsource) H 6 0.999 0.996 
 
Sample Size Discussion: The data from the CKMC zone-within-zone field study were 
evaluated for determination of benefits derived from conducting additional test 
blocks. This analysis was completed as part of the planned overall data analysis 
with use of SAS Proc Mixed, which will be discussed in further detail in the next 
chapter. To evaluate the benefit of additional blocks, the potential impact of those 
blocks upon calculation of the model’s standard error term was evaluated. In 
looking at the model’s variance calculations (with an assumed end goal of 
determining simultaneous confidence limits), the estimate was based on a 
difference of two statistically independent terms (the difference became a ratio 
when it was exponentiated). Though independent, each term had a common 
variance, which was subsequently multiplied by 2 (since two terms). For the 
evaluated data set, the estimated variance (residual plus that associated with 
control variability over blocks) was 0.965. Multiplying by 2, dividing by the number 
of blocks (6), and taking the square root resulted in the standard error term of 
0.567, associated with the difference of two means (control and no-control) at the 
same location, which was applied to the t-statistic quantile for each of the sample 
positions. If it was assumed that subsequent blocks would demonstrate the same 
variance as the previous six, then the benefits of additional blocks could be 
calculated. For example, adding a seventh block would result in a standard error 
term of only ([0.965 × 2]/7)0.5 = 0.525. Thus, to get a substantial reduction (i.e. 
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25% or greater) in standard error, several more blocks (at ½ day of field time per 
block) would have to be added. This was considered to be both time-restrictive and 
fiscally restrictive. In addition, because it was thought that the reduction due to the 
controls would be substantial relative to the observed standard errors, the use of 
six blocks, given the permutation advantages previously discussed, was deemed to 
be adequate, and the decision was made to continue forward with the goal of six 
blocks per field study. 
Temperature Measurements: Temperature/humidity loggers were placed on the 
source patient bed (position C), on the nonsource patient bed (position H), in the 
center of the patient room (position F), and on the corridor wall outside of the 
patient room (position not labeled). Temperatures were logged at 5-minute 
intervals over the three days of data collection. Elevated outdoor summer 
temperatures appeared to challenge the HVAC system’s ability to keep the patient 
room within ASHRAE’s 70–75°F design temperature range, as reflected in the 
temperature data summary shown in Table 8. (No patients were in this wing during 
the field study, so the temperatures did not necessarily reflect actual operating 
conditions for patient areas.) The lower temperatures observed within the corridor 
were believed to result from this area’s nonobstructed air pathway to actively 
occupied (and potentially better conditioned) areas of the hospital, plus the absence 
of a solar load originating from exterior walls and window surfaces.  
Table 8. Summary of temperature data logged during zone-within-zone expedient 
isolation field study at Central Kansas Medical Center, Great Bend, KS. 
Temperature in °F Mean Min Max 
 
Source patient bed (n = 666) 75.17 72.68 77.72 
Nonsource patient bed (n = 667) 77.61 74.12 82.04 
Center of patient room (n = 667) 74.81 73.22 76.82 
On corridor wall (n = 666) 73.55 73.04 74.12 
 
A line graph of temperature data logged at the source bed position during one day 
of the field study is shown in Figure 23. The hatched area identifies the ASHRAE-
recommended design temperature range. The nine color-shaded columns represent 
periods of known fan/door conditions corresponding to nine test trials (3 blocks). 
The HEPA fan status and door positions were known during the nine test trials, so 
these periods could be evaluated. Six of the nine test trials generally occurred 
during the hottest portion of the day, when room temperatures exceeded the 75°F 
upper limit of the ASHRAE design guidance. The slope of the line graph was 
inconsistent during the six HEPA-On trials, with increasing, decreasing, and flat 
slopes all represented. The same observation was made for the three HEPA-Off trial 
runs. This lack of a conclusive trend based upon the HEPA fan’s operable status 
appeared to indicate that any added heat originating from the HEPA fan motor was 
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negligible in comparison with other environmental conditions that affected the room 
temperature.  
 
Figure 23. Graph of temperatures logged in the patient room during one day of the 
zone-within-zone field study at Central Kansas Medical Center, Great Bend, KS. 
Ventilated Headboard, One-Patient Configuration 
The ventilated headboard configuration study at CKMC was the first evaluation of 
such a configuration following the initial feasibility study. The patient room available 
for this research was a single-patient room, without an anteroom, and was not 
intended for airborne isolation patients. Similar to the multi-patient room, the 
single-patient room (Figure 24) also resembled a truncated pie-shape with an 
approximate floor area of 112 ft2 and an approximate volume of 900 ft3.  
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Figure 24. Schematic of ventilated headboard single-patient configuration evaluated 
at the Central Kansas Medical Center, in Great Bend, KS. 
Configuration Setup: The ventilated headboard configuration was established 
according to the methodology prescribed in Chapter II. Though the single-patient 
room utilized a wall-mounted induction cabinet HVAC design similar to that reported 
for the multi-patient room, qualitative smoke tests did not indicate a need to deflect 
or seal either the supply louver or the kick-panel return air inlet. The HEPA filtration 
unit (Abatement Technologies Inc., Model PAS500, Suwanee, GA) used for this 
isolation configuration was of a ducted inlet design. With the rails locked into the 
upward (safety) position, the bed width was 42.5 in, and the width of the chosen 
ventilated headboard was 48 in. The CKMC ventilated headboard and hood frame, 
with the hood removed, are shown in Figure 25.  
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Figure 25. Photograph of ventilated headboard and hood frame as constructed for 
research at the Central Kansas Medical Center, in Great Bend, KS. 
HEPA Flow Rate Determination: Given an overall room volume of 900 ft3, a HEPA 
filtration flow rate of 180 cfm was required to achieve the desired 12 ACH. 
However, a desired minimum airflow rate through the HEPA filter unit of 240 cfm 
was targeted in order to provide a 30-fpm average flow velocity into the ventilated 
headboard’s 8 ft2 of open area. The flow rate through the HEPA filtration unit was 
adjustable with the variable-fan-speed controller, and a filtration flow rate of 
240  cfm was achieved, resulting in a HEPA-filtered airflow of 16 ACH. 
Hood Depth Determination: The Hood Depth Determination Protocol was used to 
establish the two hood depths (D0 and D0 + 8 in) to be evaluated under the two test 
conditions. At the CKMC, these values were 32 in and 40 in, respectively. With use 
of this information, two sets of inserts were made for the hood’s upper side rails to 
facilitate quick and consistent switching between the two hood depths.  
Sample Size Discussion: At this point in the field research activities, the opportunity 
had occurred to evaluate the data from the CKMC zone-within-zone field study for 
determining whether additional blocks (beyond six) would benefit the data analysis. 
As previously discussed, it was determined that additional blocks would be of 
limited benefit, and the decision was made to continue with just six blocks for each 
of the zone-within-zone research studies. Following the first three blocks of test 
runs for the CKMC ventilated headboard field study, the aerosol spectrometer data 
were sent back to a NIOSH statistician in Cincinnati for preliminary analysis. Since 
precision determinations were consistent with those seen in the zone-within-zone 
data, the benefit of conducting additional blocks was again seen as limited, and the 
decision was made for each of the ventilated headboard research studies to include 
six blocks of test runs, with the conditions randomly applied, in unique sequence, 
within the blocks. 
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Experimental Procedure: Five aerosol spectrometers were used for sample 
collection and distributed according to Figure 24. All five spectrometers were of the 
same model (Grimm Technologies Model 1.108) and all were set up and 
downloaded with Grimm’s 1.177 version 3.1 software. The experimental sequence 
of events for the blocks followed that previously identified in the protocol, with the 
exception that the source aerosol was switched to 1.9-µm fluorescent beads. No 
other change was made to the aerosol generation protocol. Aerosol spectrometers 
were rotated to new, unique sampling positions after every block except block one 
(unintentional error) in an effort to evenly distribute potential instrument bias 
among the various sample positions.  
The CKMC ventilated headboard field study was the first field study to use 
fluorescent PSL beads for subsequent filter sampling and optical counting. The 
sampling trains used at CKMC included 25-mm nonconductive styrene cassettes 
with 0.8-µm-pore MCE filters connected to IH sampling pumps with a calibrated 
volumetric airflow rate of 2.0 Lpm. Because of the limited availability of media, not 
every sample location could be filter-sampled for every block and test run. Thus, 
only two blocks had filter samples collected at each of the five sample positions for 
each of the three test conditions. Two additional blocks collected filter samples only 
at worker position A and room sample position E, and a fifth block included filter 
samples at room position E only. The sixth block did not include filter sample.  
Table 9. Geometric mean reduction ratios (GMRRs) for Grimm aerosol spectrometer 
data (black values) and filter sampling/optical counting data (red values) collected 
at Central Kansas Medical Center in the ventilated headboard expedient isolation 
field study. 
Position 
Description 
Location 
Label 
 
n 
GMRR Test 
Condition 2 
GMRR Test 
Condition 3 
HCW at right of 
source  
A 6 
4 
0.999 
0.991 
0.997 
0.990 
HCW at left of 
source 
B 6 
2 
0.998 
0.995 
0.998 
0.997 
Patient’s chest C 6 
2 
0.967 
0.939 
0.920 
0.888 
Foot of bed D 6 
2 
0.996 
0.995 
0.993 
0.992 
Center of room E 6 
5 
0.997 
0.981 
0.996 
0.989 
 
Performance Ratios: Table 9 shows the number of performance ratio determinations 
that were available at each sample position as well as the calculated GMRRs for 
both the aerosol spectrometer and optical counting sample methods.  
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Temperature Measurements: Temperature/humidity loggers were placed on the 
source patient bed (position C), in the center of the patient room (Position E), and 
on the corridor wall outside of the patient room (position not labeled). 
Temperatures were logged at 5-minute intervals over the three days of data 
collection. This particular field survey was conducted in mid-August.  
For the first two days of data collection, outdoor high temperatures were in the 80s 
and low 90s (°F). On the third day, the high temperature increased to 98°F, and as 
the afternoon progressed, the high outdoor temperature appeared to moderately 
challenge the HVAC system’s ability to keep the patient room within ASHRAE’s 70–
75°F design temperature. Overall, for the days upon which temperature data were 
collected, the HVAC system was successful in keeping environmental temperatures 
within the ASHRAE recommended design range (Table 10). As was the case with 
the zone-within-zone field study, the slightly lower temperatures observed within 
the corridor were believed to result from this area’s nonobstructed air pathway to 
actively occupied (and potentially better conditioned) areas in adjacent wings of the 
hospital, plus the absence of a solar load from exterior walls and window surfaces.  
Table 10. Summary of temperature data logged during ventilated headboard 
expedient isolation field study at Central Kansas Medical Center, Great Bend, KS. 
Temperature in °F Mean Min Max 
Source patient bed (n = 649) 73.53 70.70 75.38 
Center of patient room (n = 646) 73.43 70.88 75.92 
On corridor wall (n = 649) 71.42 70.7 75.38 
 
A line graph of temperature data logged at the patient bed position during one day 
of the field study is shown in Figure 26. The hatched area identifies the ASHRAE 
recommended design temperature range. The nine color-shaded columns represent 
periods of known fan/door conditions during the nine test trials (3 blocks) evaluated 
that day. Although the slope of the line graph was generally upward during all six of 
the HEPA-On fan conditions, it was also slightly upward during two of the three 
HEPA-Off fan conditions. This may be more closely related to the time of day and 
hot outdoor temperatures (above 90°F) during which the tests were conducted. In 
all cases, starting and ending temperatures were within 1°F of each other. Despite 
these trends and their possible causes, the temperature within the patient room 
remained within the ASHRAE recommended design criteria throughout the day of 
field testing.  
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Figure 26. Graph of temperatures logged in the patient room during one day of the 
ventilated headboard field study at Central Kansas Medical Center, Great Bend, KS. 
St Joseph Memorial Hospital, Larned, Kansas  
St Joseph Memorial Hospital (SJMH) is located in Larned, Kansas (population, 
4200). At the time the research was conducted, this hospital had 25 critical access 
beds and a 30-bed long-term-care unit. Built in 1951, the two-story facility was 
operated in conjunction with the CKMC in Great Bend, KS. There were no 
engineered AII rooms within this facility. Current practice for AII relied upon the 
use of a portable freestanding HEPA filtration unit until the patient could be 
transferred to the CKMC facility.   
Zone-within-Zone, Two-Patient Configuration 
The field study at SJMH was the third of the zone-within-zone expedient isolation 
field studies. The patient room had a floor area of approximately 210 ft2 and an 
approximate volume of 1650 ft3. The room’s floor space was designed to 
accommodate two patient beds. For the zone-within-zone patient isolation research, 
the room was maintained in its two-patient configuration, as shown in Figure 27.  
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Figure 27. Schematic of zone-within-zone expedient isolation configuration at the 
Saint Joseph Memorial Hospital, in Larned, Kansas. 
The patient room’s HVAC design utilized a single 6-in by 6-in HVAC louver to supply 
a small amount of tempered air (primarily outdoor air plus recirculated air from the 
main hall) to the patient room. A 60-in by 34-in (width by height) wall-mounted 
recirculating fan coil unit (FCU) was the primary source of heating and cooling for 
the room. The SJMH field study was conducted in December, so the FCUs were in 
heat mode. The recirculated airflow into the FCU entered from the bottom of the 
unit, passed through a coarse air-conditioning filter, across the heat-exchanger 
coils, and out through a 5-in by 44-in supply vent.  
Configuration Setup: The zone-within-zone configuration was established according 
to the methodology prescribed in Chapter II. The room shape and positioning of the 
curtain tracks required a diagonal corner-to-corner relationship between the curtain 
entrance gap and the HEPA inlet as shown in Figure 27. The source position was 
located near the HEPA inlet, consistent with the traditional bed orientation for this 
patient room. The freestanding HEPA filtration unit (HEPA-Care Model HC800F) was 
positioned equidistant between the two patient beds, such that the inlet to the 
HEPA unit was in line with the head position of the two patient beds. The bed height 
was adjusted so that the mattress height was consistent with the HEPA inlet height 
(approximately 28 inches from floor to top of mattress). A plastic sheeting vertical 
partition was built between the center of the HEPA inlet and the adjacent wall in 
order to separate the two inner isolation zones. The HEPA exhaust created a narrow 
corridor between the two patient areas. Frictional drag and induced air forces 
adjacent to the curtain surfaces tended to pull the curtains outward into this 
exhaust corridor. An adjustable-height tray table was positioned within the exhaust 
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corridor to resist this inward pull without obstructing the exhaust airflow 
(Figure  28).  
 
Figure 28. Photograph showing HEPA exhaust corridor, with tray table in place to 
resist curtain pull into the corridor. 
At previous field test locations, one of the evaluated test conditions had been an 
HVAC-sealed condition inside the inner isolation zone. This was possible because 
the room had other HVAC supplies to provide some tempering to the overall room. 
At the SJMH location, the FCU was the principle source of room air tempering. 
During the December field study, with its very cold weather conditions, it was 
quickly obvious that an HVAC-Off test condition was an unrealistic test scenario for 
this facility. 
The FCU mounting location on the exterior wall coincided with the entrance points 
for that patient’s inner isolation zone. This was not preferable, but it did represent a 
real-world implementation hurdle that could be faced by others in an emergency. 
Thus, this was the chosen patient position from which the source release would 
occur. For both of the control-on test conditions, a tunnel was created at the 
bottom of the FCU with plastic sheeting and packing tape. This tunnel was intended 
to prevent air from inside the inner isolation zone from being recirculated through 
the FCU during a control-on test condition. Similarly, one of the control-on test 
conditions (condition #3) used a similar tunnel to redirect the tempered air supply 
outside of the inner isolation zone during its test runs. Neither of the tunnels was 
used for the control-off test condition.  
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Figure 29. Photograph of the fan coil unit at St Joseph Memorial Hospital with 
expedient supply (shaded green) and exhaust (shaded red) tunnels installed. 
Figure 29 shows a photograph of the FCU, the plastic tunnels, and their position 
relative to the inner isolation zone’s entrance point. The position of the FCU relative 
to the plastic curtain required the curtain gap for this inner isolation zone to have 
an irregular shape, though the gap between the lower curtain and the FCU was 
consistent with the gap between the upper curtain and the exterior wall. The 
exterior window was a sliding window with an apparently snug fit throughout its 
operable perimeter; thus, no attempt was made to further restrict air leaks with 
tape and plastic. 
 A photograph showing the inlet position of the HEPA unit relative to the source 
patient pillow position is shown in Figure 30. A smoke test, underway at the time of 
the photograph, demonstrated that smoke released near the pillow area was pulled 
toward the HEPA inlet.  
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Figure 30. A photograph showing the HEPA filter unit’s inlet position relative to that 
of the source patient’s pillow position during a qualitative smoke capture test. 
HEPA Flow Rate Determination: Given an overall room volume of 1650 ft3, a 
minimum filtration flow rate of 330 cfm was required to achieve the desired 
12  ACH. Flow rate through the HEPA unit was adjustable with a variable-fan-speed 
controller, and a filtration rate of 355 cfm was obtained for the control-on test 
conditions. 
Curtain Gap Determination: The Curtain Gap Determination Protocol was conducted 
to establish the entrance gap widths under the two test conditions. At SJMH, the 
positioning of the curtain gap, the healthcare worker, the source, and the HEPA 
inlet required the smoke to shoot further into the isolation area before turning 
toward the HEPA inlet. For this reason, the entrance gap height was made smaller 
(7 ft) in order to increase the velocity through the remaining gap. Presence of the 
FCU made smoke tests difficult to conduct near the curtain gap. Multiple release 
points near the entrance and immediately inside the entrance were used to 
estimate streamline patterns. Based upon observation of the source smoke 
streamlines, a gap of 8 in by 7 ft between the curtain and the FCU and the curtain 
and the wall was selected for condition 3, where the FCU was on but partially 
deflected to a release point outside of the isolation curtain. Interrupting currents 
from the FCU prohibited the ability to conduct a meaningful smoke test under 
condition 2, and the decision was made to use the same curtain gap for this test 
condition as that used for condition 3. In addition, the interrupting discharge 
velocities from the FCU prohibited the ability to use the hotwire anemometer to 
measure incoming velocities through the curtain gap. On the basis of a 
mathematical (V = Q/A) examination of the HEPA flow rates and the entrance gap 
open area, if one assumed that virtually all the 178 cfm of makeup air entering the 
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inner isolation zone flowed through the curtain gap, then the velocity through the 
8-in curtain gap would average about 38 fpm.  
Experimental Procedure: At this point in the research effort, the decision had been 
finalized to conduct six blocks per field study of each configuration. Eight Grimm 
aerosol spectrometers (model 1.108) were used in the experimental setup. Source 
and sample locations were as shown in Figure 27. The three evaluated test 
conditions were as previously described. Unfortunately, equipment reliability issues 
with some of the aerosol spectrometers required a slight modification to the 
instrument rotation protocol. As a result, the instrument at position C remained the 
same throughout the experiment, and the instrument at position G remained the 
same for five of the six experiments. These decisions were based on the theory that 
results obtained at these locations were less important on account of their position 
(C: immediately adjacent to source) or the presence of adjacent spectrometers 
(position G) that would also indicate if contaminant had reached this sample 
position. In the end, all of the data from position C was retrievable, but only two 
blocks of data were retrievable from position G.  
IH sampling trains were also set up at positions A, B, E, F, G, and H. These 
sampling trains incorporated 25-mm, 0.8-µm-pore MCE filters loaded into 
conductive black cowlings and connected to IH sampling pumps with a calibrated 
volumetric airflow rate of 1.5 Lpm. Pumps were rotated between blocks, similar to 
the Grimm spectrometer rotations. Sufficient filter medium was available to allow 
sampling at these positions for all six blocks of the field trial.  
Performance Ratios: Table 11 shows the number of performance ratio 
determinations that were available at each sample position as well as the GMRRs 
for both the aerosol spectrometer and the IH filter sample data under the evaluated 
test conditions.   
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Table 11. Geometric mean reduction ratios (GMRRs) for Grimm aerosol 
spectrometer data (black values) and filter sampling/optical counting data (red 
values) collected at St Joseph Memorial Hospital in the zone-within-zone expedient 
isolation field study. 
Position 
Description 
Location 
Label 
 
n 
GMRR Test 
Condition 2 
GMRR Test 
Condition 3 
Outside inlet 1 
(source patient) 
E 6 
6 
0.984 
0.937 
0.991 
0.980 
HCW (upstream)  A 6 
6 
0.241 
0.230 
0.544 
0.483 
Patient’s chest C 6 0.171 0.791 
Patient’s feet D 6 0.247 0.911 
HCW 
(downstream) 
B 6 
6 
0.204 
0.300 
0.641 
0.514 
Center of outer 
zone 
F 6 
6 
0.996 
0.948 
0.996 
0.989 
Outside inlet 2 
(nonsource) 
G 2 
6 
0.988 
0.912 
0.997 
0.986 
Center of bed 2 
(nonsource) 
H 5 
6 
0.987 
0.903 
0.991 
0.983 
 
Temperature Measurements: The FCUs were operated on the high fan speed for all 
test conditions of the SJMH field study, to represent the worst-case scenario for 
disrupting air currents. Unfortunately, this also caused the rooms to become very 
warm, so the FCUs were deactivated during non-test periods. As a result of the 
excessive heat output from the FCUs, it was not possible to isolate any increase in 
room temperature resulting from the HEPA filtration unit.  
Ventilated Headboard, One-Patient Configuration 
The ventilated headboard configuration study at SJMH was the second ventilated 
headboard evaluation following the initial feasibility study. The patient room 
available for this research was a two-patient room without an anteroom, a mirror 
image of that used for the zone-within-zone test evaluation. For consistency with 
the ventilated headboard field evaluations at other hospital sites (which were 
conducted within single-patient rooms), a temporary wall was created within this 
two-patient room with sheet-plastic and tape. Entrance through this wall was 
through a pull-back curtain, built into the temporary wall, which was taped into 
place to simulate an entrance door. This “door” was closed during test conditions. 
The resulting single-patient room configuration (Figure 31) had an approximate 
floor area of 145 ft2 and an approximate room volume of 1150 ft3. 
EPHB Report No. EPHB 301-05f
 
 
Page 90 
 
Recirc. 
Unit 
128 cfm 
on high 
setting
A BC
D
HEPA
Temp. 
test wall
Wall “door” closed 
during tests
E
6"x6" O.A. 
supply = 40 cfmEn
tra
n
ce
Rm 268, 1-Bed:  Larned, KS
Sample positions (Grimms & IH)
Dosing positions
Qexh = 
0 cfm
 
Figure 31. Schematic of ventilated headboard, single-patient room configuration 
evaluated at St Joseph Memorial Hospital, in Larned, KS. 
Configuration Setup: The ventilated headboard configuration was established 
according to the methodology prescribed in Chapter II. Although the HVAC design 
of the two-patient room was almost identical to that described for the zone-within-
zone field study, placement of the temporary wall excluded the small central HVAC 
supply louver from within the single-patient isolation room. Thus, the only HVAC 
equipment within the single-patient room was a 44-in by 29-in (width by height) 
wall-mounted, recirculating FCU. The FCU was placed on the “high” fan setting for 
all of the test run conditions. Qualitative smoke tests revealed no visibly apparent 
supply air interferences with the effective function of the ventilated headboard, so 
no deflection of the FCU was created. The HEPA filtration unit (Abatement 
Technologies Model PAS500) was of a ducted inlet design. The bed equipment was 
identical to that seen at CKMC; thus, the hood width was again chosen to be 
48  inches.  
HEPA Flow Rate Determination: Given a single-patient room volume of 1150 ft3, a 
minimum HEPA filtration flow rate of 230 cfm was required to achieve the desired 
12 ACH. This target value was increased to 240 cfm in order to provide a 30 fpm 
average flow velocity into the ventilated headboard. The flow rate through the HEPA 
filtration unit was adjustable with the HEPA unit’s variable-fan-speed controller, and 
a filtration flow rate of 240 cfm was achieved, resulting in a HEPA filtered airflow of 
12.5 ACH.  
Hood Depth Determination: The Hood Depth Determination Protocol was used to 
establish the two hood depths (D0 and D0 + 8 in) to be evaluated under the two test 
conditions. At SJMH, these values were 28 in and 36 in, respectively. With use of 
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this information, two sets of inserts were made for the hood’s upper side rails to 
facilitate quick and consistent switching between the two hood depths. 
Figure 32 shows a photograph of the ventilated headboard configuration, with hood 
and mannequin in place and the temporary plastic “wall” in the background.  
 
Figure 32. Photograph of ventilated headboard configuration as constructed for field 
research at St Joseph Memorial Hospital, in Larned, Kansas. 
Experimental Procedure:  As previously determined, the objective was six blocks of 
experimental test data, with each control scenario represented within each block. 
Five Grimm aerosol spectrometers (Model 1.108) were used for sample collection 
and distributed as shown in Figure 31. Four IH sampling trains were also set up, at 
positions A, B, D, and E. The sampling trains incorporated 25-mm, 0.8-µm-pore 
MCE filters loaded into conductive black cowling cassettes and connected to 
industrial hygiene sampling pumps with a calibrated volumetric airflow rate of 
1.5  Lpm. Pumps were rotated between blocks, similar to the Grimm spectrometer 
rotations. Sufficient filter medium was available to allow sampling at these positions 
for all six blocks of the ventilated headboard field study.  
Performance Ratios: Table 12 shows the number of performance ratio 
determinations that were available at each sample position, as well as the 
calculated GMRRs for both the aerosol spectrometer and the IH filter sample data. 
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Table 12. Geometric mean reduction ratios (GMRRs) for Grimm aerosol 
spectrometer data (black values) and filter sampling/optical counting data (red 
values) collected at St Joseph Memorial Hospital in the ventilated headboard 
expedient isolation field study. 
Position 
Description 
Location 
Label n 
GMRR Test 
Condition 2 
GMRR Test 
Condition 3 
HCW at right of 
source 
A 6 
6 
0.998 
0.991 
0.997 
0.996 
HCW at left of source B 5 
6 
0.998 
0.990 
0.998 
0.995 
Patient’s chest C 6 0.998 0.997 
Foot of bed D 6 
6 
0.996 
0.987 
0.997 
0.989 
Center of room E 5 
6 
0.997 
0.986 
0.998 
0.991 
 
Temperature Measurements: The FCU was operated on the high fan speed for all 
test conditions of the SJMH ventilated headboard study to represent the worst-case 
scenario for disrupting air currents. Unfortunately, this also caused the constructed 
test room to become very warm, so the FCUs were deactivated during nontest 
periods. Thus, it was not possible to isolate any increase in temperature that may 
have originated from the HEPA filtration unit.  
INTEGRIS Baptist Medical Center, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 
INTEGRIS Baptist Medical Center (IBMC) was a 508-bed hospital offering 
comprehensive health-care programs and services. Originally constructed in 1959 
as a 200-bed facility, there have been multiple additions and renovations since its 
original opening. This multi-story facility in Oklahoma City serves residents from 
this major metropolitan area (population of 506,000) as well as surrounding 
communities. At the time of the study, IBMC offered a full range of traditional 
emergency, diagnostic, therapeutic, and rehabilitative services and a wide variety 
of specialty rehabilitative and laboratory services. IBMC was rated as a level III 
trauma center and had several engineered airborne infection isolation rooms for 
both adult and pediatric patients. IBMC was adding additional airborne isolation 
capacity during the course of this field study, with a special emphasis within the 
emergency department.  
Zone-within-Zone, Two-Patient Configuration 
The zone-within-zone expedient isolation configuration study at IBMC was the 
fourth field study of this configuration type following the initial feasibility study. The 
multi-patient room had a floor area of approximately 245 ft2 and a room volume of 
roughly 1965 ft3. The room’s floor space was rectangular and designed to 
EPHB Report No. EPHB 301-05f
 
 
Page 93 
accommodate two patient beds, with no provisions for airborne isolation. For the 
zone-within-zone patient isolation research, the room was maintained in its two-
patient configuration. Figure 33 is a schematic of the room layout after its 
conversion into a two-patient expedient isolation room.
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Figure 33. Schematic of zone-within-zone expedient isolation configuration at the 
INTEGRIS Baptist Medical Center in Oklahoma City, OK. 
The 2-patient room’s HVAC design included a single 5-in by 41-in linear supply 
diffuser positioned within a built-in cabinet and oriented upward, directly beneath a 
nonoperable window on the exterior wall. This supply louver was the sole dedicated 
source for air tempering in this patient room. Room exhaust was provided by a 2-ft 
by 2-ft exhaust grille located near the room’s entry door.  
Configuration Setup: The zone-within-zone configuration was established according 
to the methodology prescribed in Chapter II. The room design and curtain track 
positions resulted in a zone-within-zone isolation design that used a corner-to-
corner diagonal airflow configuration for one bed position and a more direct, side-
to-side airflow design, similar to that used at CKMC, for the second patient bed 
position. Since two corner-to-corner diagonal variations and only one side-to-side 
variation had been evaluated thus far in the field studies, the decision was made to 
use the side-to-side bed position as the location for the surrogate source release. 
Neither of the two inner isolation zones included an HVAC supply louver, and the 
room’s existing supply louver did not appear to have an effect on the airflow within 
the inner isolation zone. Thus, there were no manipulations or deflections of the 
HVAC system to construct within the inner zones.  
The freestanding HEPA filtration unit (HEPA-Care Model HC800F) was positioned 
equidistant between the two patient beds, such that the inlet to the HEPA unit was 
in line with the head-position for each bed. The beds were maintained in their 
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traditional orientation. The bed height was adjusted so that the mattress height was 
consistent with the HEPA inlet height. A plastic-sheeting vertical partition was built 
between the center of the HEPA inlet and the adjacent wall to separate the two 
inner isolation zones. The HEPA exhaust path created a narrow corridor between 
the two patient areas. Similar to the study at SJMH, frictional drag and induced air 
forces adjacent to the curtain surfaces tended to pull the isolation curtains into this 
exhaust corridor. At IBMC, this problem was addressed by constructing a separate 
tunnel, slightly smaller than the exhaust corridor, with a rigid PVC frame and tightly 
strung plastic sheeting along the sides of the tunnel. Figure 34 shows the end view 
of this tunnel, looking back toward the outlet from the HEPA filtration unit. With the 
tunnel in place, the tightly strung plastic sheeting, with support from the rigid 
tunnel frame, was fairly effective at resisting the inward pull as the discharge air 
passed over it, and the tunnel walls prevented these forces from being applied to 
the isolation zone curtain walls.  
 
Figure 34. HEPA exhaust corridor with exhaust tunnel in place, relieving the 
isolation curtain from the inward pull created by frictional drag and induced air 
movement. 
Figure 35 shows the inlet position of the HEPA unit, relative to the source patient 
pillow position and several of the aerosol spectrometer sample positions. An inlet 
baffle (shaded in transparent yellow in the picture) was created with plastic 
sheeting and angled between the HEPA inlet and the wall, which helped direct the 
airflow streamlines toward the HEPA inlet with reduced turbulence.  
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Figure 35. The HEPA filter unit’s inlet position (and turbulence-reducing baffle) 
relative to the source patient’s pillow position and aerosol spectrometer sampling 
positions A, C, and B. 
HEPA Flow Rate Determination: Given a room volume of 1965 ft3, a HEPA filtration 
minimum flow rate of 395 cfm was required to achieve the desired 12 ACH. The fan 
speed and corresponding flow rate through the HEPA filter could be adjusted with 
the unit’s variable-fan-speed controller, and a filtration rate of 400 cfm was 
achieved for control-on test condition 2. Since there were no HVAC supply louvers 
within the inner isolation zone to manipulate for a test condition 3, an alternate test 
condition 3 was identified to evaluate the effectiveness of the zone-within-zone 
configuration when the HEPA filtration unit was operated at its highest fan speed. 
When the variable-fan-speed controller was at its highest setting, the flow hood 
measurement on the exhaust side of the HEPA unit was 470 cfm. This was 
equivalent to a filtration rate of 14.4 ACH. 
Curtain Gap Determination: For the source patient isolation zone, the entrance gap 
was directly across the pillow from the HEPA inlet. However, the flow rates through 
the inner isolation zones were sufficiently similar that a difference in gap width 
requirements between the two control-on test conditions was not discernible. Only 
condition 2 (12-room ACH HEPA setting with no HVAC source within inner isolation 
zone) was consistent with the other field study locations. On the basis of 
observation of the source smoke streamlines, while using the Curtain Gap 
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Determination Protocol, a gap of 12 in by 7 ft was selected for entrance into the 
source-patient’s inner isolation zone.  
Centerline velocity measurements for the Condition 2 test condition resulted in a 
mean inward velocity of only 16 fpm (range, 1–46 fpm; n = 7). Unfortunately, 6 of 
7 velocity measurements were less than the VelociCalc’s reliable limit of 30 fpm, so 
this result was in question. Based upon a mathematical (V = Q/A) examination of 
the HEPA flow rates and the entrance gap open area, the average expected velocity 
through the gap would be 28 fpm. Similarly, at the slightly higher flow for condition 
3, the average expected velocity through the gap would be about 33 fpm.  
One change to no-control test condition 1 unique to IBMC was driven by concerns 
that the HVAC supply, located immediately outside of the entrance gap, would trap 
source aerosol within the inner zone and retard its ability to distribute throughout 
the room. Under normal conditions with cloth curtains, this would not occur 
because of the open area above and below the curtain. To address this unique 
situation, the plastic curtain was retracted to a gap of approximately 3 feet, and the 
bottoms of the curtain were lifted and taped into place to provide a horizontal gap 
of about 1½ feet between the floor and the bottom of the retractable portions of 
the isolation curtains.  
Experimental Procedure: Six blocks of experiments were planned for this expedient 
isolation field study. The sequence of operations for the blocks followed that 
previously identified in the protocol, and individual Grimm instruments were rotated 
to a new, unique position assignment before each block in order to reduce potential 
instrument-associated bias upon a single sample location. Eight Grimm aerosol 
spectrometers (Model 1.108) were used in the experimental setup. Source and 
sample distribution were as shown in Figure 33.  
IH sampling trains were also set up at positions A, B, D, E, F, G, and H. These 
sampling trains incorporated 25-mm, 0.8-µm -pore MCE filters loaded into 
conductive black cowling cassettes and connected to IH sampling pumps with a 
calibrated flow rate of 1.5 Lpm. Pumps were rotated between blocks, similar to the 
Grimm spectrometer rotations. Sufficient media were available to allow sampling at 
these positions for all six blocks of the field trial. 
Performance Ratios: Table 13 shows the number of performance ratio 
determinations that were available at each sample position as well as the GMRRs 
for both the aerosol spectrometer and the IH filter sample data under the evaluated 
test conditions.   
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Table 13. Geometric mean reduction ratios (GMRRs) for Grimm aerosol 
spectrometer data (black values) and filter sampling/optical counting data (red 
values) collected at the INTEGRIS Baptist Medical Center in the zone-within-zone 
expedient isolation field study. 
Position 
Description 
Location 
Label 
 
n 
GMRR Test 
Condition 2 
GMRR Test 
Condition 3 
Outside inlet 1 
(source bed) 
E 6 
6 
0.998 
0.999 
0.998 
1.000 
HCW (upstream) A 6 
6 
0.998 
0.994 
0.998 
0.999 
Patient’s chest C 6 
 
0.998 0.999 
Patient’s feet D 6 
6 
0.999 
0.998 
0.998 
0.999 
HCW (downstream) B 6 
6 
0.996 
0.996 
0.999 
0.999 
Center of outer zone F 6 
6 
0.995 
0.999 
0.996 
0.999 
Outside inlet 2 
(nonsource) 
G 6 
6 
0.998 
0.999 
0.997 
0.999 
Center of Bed 2 (non-
source) 
H 6 
6 
0.998 
0.999 
0.996 
0.999 
 
Temperature Measurements: Only two temperature/humidity loggers were available 
for use at the IBMC field study site. These were placed on the source patient bed 
(position C) and on the corridor wall, outside of the patient room (position not 
labeled). Temperatures were logged at 5-minute intervals over the four days of 
data collection. The outdoor temperatures and internal heat loads did not appear to 
challenge the HVAC system’s ability to keep the patient room within ASHRAE’s 70–
75°F design temperature range, as reflected in the temperature data summary 
shown in Table 14.   
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Table 14. Summary of temperature data logged during zone-within-zone expedient 
isolation field study at INTEGRIS Baptist Medical Center, Oklahoma City, OK. 
Location 
Temperature in °F 
Mean Min Max 
Source patient bed (n = 868) 70.49 68.54 74.66 
On corridor wall (n = 1061) 70.95 69.80 73.22 
 
A line graph of temperature data logged at the source bed position during one day 
of the field study is shown in Figure 36. The hatched area identifies the ASHRAE-
recommended design temperature range. The nine color-shaded columns represent 
periods of known fan/door conditions that correspond to the 3 blocks evaluated that 
day. All of the recorded temperatures were below the 75°F upper limit of the 
ASHRAE design guidance. The slope of the line graph was downward, indicating a 
decrease in temperature over the testing period, for five of six HEPA-On test trials 
and all three of the HEPA-Off trials. The one HEPA-On trial with an increasing slope 
was very moderate (approximately 0.5 °F/1 hour) in magnitude. The lack of 
increasing slopes associated with the HEPA fan’s operable status appeared to 
indicate that any added heat originating from the HEPA fan motor was negligible 
compared to other environmental conditions that affected the room temperature.  
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Figure 36. Graph of temperatures logged in the patient room during one day of the 
zone-within-zone field study at INTEGRIS Baptist Medical Center, Oklahoma City, 
OK. 
Ventilated Headboard, One-Patient Configuration 
The configuration study at IBMC was the fourth ventilated headboard evaluation 
following the initial feasibility study. The room available for this research was a 
single-patient room not designed for airborne isolation capabilities. However, the 
room did have an adjacent sitting/waiting area for family and other visitors. During 
the IBMC ventilated headboard evaluations, the partition between the patient room 
and the waiting area remained closed and moderately sealed with tape and plastic 
to reduce potential aerosol migration between areas. Thus, the waiting area was 
not considered part of the patient room for the purposes of this study. The patient 
room floor area was approximately 190 ft2. With combined 9-ft and 8-ft ceiling 
heights, the overall room volume was approximately 1680 ft3 (Figure 37). 
Configuration Setup: The ventilated headboard configuration was established 
according to the methodology prescribed in Chapter II. The room’s HVAC design 
utilized a 2-ft by 2-ft exhaust grille located near the room’s entry door and two 5-in 
by 29-in supply louvers to supply tempered air from a central HVAC unit. These 
supply louvers were located within the top of a small built-in cabinet on the exterior 
wall and more than seven feet away from the patient bed position. Qualitative 
smoke tests revealed no visibly apparent supply air interferences with the effective 
function of the ventilated headboard, so no deflection of the supply louvers was 
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made. The exhaust louver was sealed, depending upon test condition, as previously 
described in the protocol. 
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Figure 37. Schematic of ventilated headboard single-patient configuration evaluated 
at the INTEGRIS Baptist Medical Center in Oklahoma City, OK. 
The HEPA filtration unit was an Abatement Technologies Model PAS500 with a 
ducted inlet design. The bed measured 42 in wide with the rails in the upward 
safety position; however, they required an additional 2 in of width (1 in per side) in 
order to move the rails between the raised and lowered positions, resulting in a 
total width requirement of 44 in. The same ventilated headboard as that used at 
the VA Medical Center was also used at IBMC. This headboard measured 4 ft wide 
by 2 ft high. Figure 38 shows a photograph of the ventilated headboard 
configuration with hood, mannequin, and sampling equipment in place.  
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Figure 38. The ventilated headboard configuration as constructed for field research 
at the INTEGRIS Baptist Medical Center, in Oklahoma City, OK. 
HEPA Flow Rate Determination: Given a room volume of 1680 ft3, a HEPA filtration 
flow rate of 335 cfm was required to achieve the desired 12 ACH. The flow rate 
through the HEPA filtration unit could be adjusted with the HEPA unit’s variable-fan-
speed controller; however, at its highest fan-speed setting, the maximum flow rate 
through the hood was only 280 cfm. Thus, despite the desired 12 ACH designated 
by the research protocol, the IBMC ventilated headboard configuration utilized a 
HEPA filtration air-cleaning rate of only 10 ACH for the control-on test conditions. 
Although an unintended deviation from the protocol, the “effective ventilation rate” 
of 10 ACH still exceeds the minimum 6 ACH recommended ventilation rate for 
existing facilities in the CDC’s 2007 Guideline for Isolation Precautions: Preventing 
Transmission of Infectious Agents in Healthcare Settings [Siegel et al. 2007].  
Hood Depth Determination: The Hood Depth Determination Protocol was used to 
establish the two hood depths (D0 and D0 + 8 in) to be evaluated under the two test 
conditions. At IBMC, these values were 26 in and 34 in, respectively. Two sets of 
inserts were made for the hood’s upper side rails to facilitate quick and consistent 
switching between the two hood depths.  
Experimental Procedure: The predetermined objective was six blocks of 
experimental data, with each condition represented within each block. Five aerosol 
spectrometers (Grimm Model 1.108) were distributed according to Figure 37. 
Individual spectrometers were rotated to a new position before each block. Four IH 
sampling trains were placed at positions A, B, D, and E. These sampling trains 
incorporated 25-mm, 0.8-µm-pore MCE filters loaded into conductive black cowling 
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cassettes and connected to IH sampling pumps with a calibrated flow of 1.5 Lpm. 
Pumps were rotated between blocks, similar to the spectrometer rotations. 
Sufficient filter medium was available to allow sampling at these positions for all six 
blocks of the ventilated headboard field study.  
Performance Ratios:  Table 15 shows the number of performance ratio 
determinations that were available at each sample position, as well as the GMRRs 
for both the aerosol spectrometer and the IH filter sample data under the evaluated 
test conditions. 
Table 15. Geometric mean reduction ratios (GMRRs) for Grimm aerosol 
spectrometer data (black values) and filter sampling/optical counting data (red 
values) collected at INTEGRIS Baptist Medical Center in the ventilated headboard 
expedient isolation field study. 
Position 
Description 
Location 
Label 
 
n 
GMRR Test 
Condition 2 
GMRR Test 
Condition 3 
HCW at right of source A 6 
6 
0.998 
1.000 
0.998 
1.000 
HCW at left of source B 6 
6 
0.999 
1.000 
0.998 
1.000 
Patient’s chest C 6 
 
1.00 1.00 
Foot of bed D 6 
6 
0.998 
1.000 
0.998 
1.000 
Center of room E 6 
6 
0.999 
1.000 
0.997 
1.000 
 
Temperature Measurements: Three temperature/humidity loggers were initially 
used during the IBMC ventilated headboard field study. These were placed on the 
source patient bed (position C), on the corridor wall, outside of the patient room 
(position not labeled), and in the adjacent seating area (position not labeled); 
however, the temperature data from the adjacent sitting area were not retrievable. 
Temperatures were logged at 5-minute intervals over the three days of data 
collection. Table 16 is a summary of the logged temperature data collected during 
the ventilated headboard field study. The logged temperatures from the corridor 
location were all within or below ASHRAE’s 70–75°F design temperature guidance. 
The temperatures logged at the patient position show maximum temperatures 
above the ASHRAE recommended range. A closer examination of the data files 
revealed that just 6 out of 613 data points exceeded the 75°F upper limit, and all of 
these were consecutive measurements observed after conclusion of the first day of 
testing. On the basis of the timing of these six observations, they were believed to 
reflect the heated exhaust air originating from a laptop computer during equipment 
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download activities. If these six data points are ignored, then none of the remaining 
607 temperature measurements exceeded the ASHRAE 70–75°F design guidance.  
Table 16. Summary of temperature data logged during the ventilated headboard 
expedient isolation field study at INTEGRIS Baptist Medical Center, Oklahoma City, 
OK. 
Location 
Temperature in °F 
Mean Min Max 
Source patient bed (n = 613) 70.45 67.28 80.78 
On corridor wall (n = 613) 71.16 69.98 72.68 
 
A line graph of temperature data logged at the source bed position during one day 
of the field study is shown in Figure 39. The hatched area identifies the ASHRAE-
recommended design temperature range. The six color-shaded columns represent 
periods of known fan/door conditions that correspond to the two blocks evaluated 
that day. All of the recorded temperatures were below the 75°F upper limit of the 
ASHRAE design guidance. With the exception of the first HEPA-On test run, the 
slope of the line graph was relatively flat or downward, indicating no increase in 
observed temperature over the testing period for three of four HEPA-On test trials 
and both of that day’s HEPA-Off trials. The one HEPA-On trial with an increasing 
slope was relatively small (approximately 0.5°F/1 hour) in magnitude. The lack of 
increasing slopes associated with the HEPA fan’s operable status appears to indicate 
that any added heat originating from the HEPA fan motor was negligible, compared 
to other environmental conditions that affected the room temperature. 
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Figure 39. Graph of temperatures logged in the patient room during one day of the 
ventilated headboard field study at INTEGRIS Baptist Medical Center, Oklahoma 
City, OK. 
Summary of Physical Field Conditions 
Tables 17 (zone-within-zone) and 18 (ventilated headboard) summarize the field 
conditions encountered and established for the expedient isolation field studies 
conducted at each of the four hospital locations.   
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Table 17. Summary of field conditions associated with the four zone-within-zone 
field studies conducted under this research. 
 
Condition 
Zone-Within-Zone Field Studies 
VAMC CKMC SJMH IBMC 
Hospital Type Urban Rural Rural Urban 
Room area (ft2) 320 345 210 245 
Room volume 
(ft3) 
2570 2760 1650 1965 
HVAC design(1) Central Combo Recirc Central 
HEPA model(2) NuAire 
(FS) 
AT HEPA-
Care HC800F 
(FS) 
AT HEPA-
Care HC800F 
(FS) 
AT HEPA-
Care HC800F 
(FS) 
HEPA flow (cfm) 550 550 355 400/470(4) 
Flow orientation Diagonal Side-to-side Diagonal Side-to-side 
Condition 2(3) 
entrance gap 
width (in.) 
/velocity (fpm) 
10/30 10/37* 8/38* 12/16 (28*) 
(5) 
Condition 3(3) 
entrance gap 
width (in.) 
/velocity (fpm) 
12/38 12/34* 8/38* 12/33* 
(1) Central = Central HVAC; Recirc = in-room recirculation unit; Combo = 
Combination of central HVAC supply + room recirculation.  
(2) FS = freestanding; D = ducted inlet.  
(3) Asterisk indicates a calculated velocity value. 
(4) Alternate Condition 3 at IBMC led to two HEPA flow rates of 470 cfm = 
14.4 ACH. 
(5) Six of 7 measured velocities below reliable limit; second value = 
calculated velocity.  
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Table 18. Summary of field conditions associated with the four ventilated-
headboard field studies conducted under this research. 
Condition Ventilated Headboard Field Studies 
VAMC CKMC SJMH IBMC 
Room area (ft2) 121 112 145 190 
Room volume (ft3) 970 900 1150 1680 
HVAC design(1) Central Combo Recirc Central 
HEPA model(2) AT 
PAS600(D) 
AT 
PAS500(D) 
AT 
PAS500(D) 
AT 
PAS500(D) 
HEPA flow (cfm) 240 240 240 280(3) 
Filtration ACH (cfm) 14.8 16 12.5 10 
Condition 2 hood 
depth (in.) 
28 32 28 26 
Condition 3 hood 
depth (in.) 
36 40 36 34 
(1) Central = Central HVAC; Recirc = in-room recirculation unit; Combo = 
Combination of central HVAC supply + room recirculation.  
(2) (D) = ducted inlet; AT = Abatement Technologies. 
(3) Maximum flow achievable with this configuration and this HEPA filter unit. 
Chapter IV 
Analysis and Discussion 
Aerosol Spectrometer Data 
Using the aerosol spectrometer particle count data, 26 particle counts were 
identified as the data to be analyzed for each block/test run/measurement position. 
These particle counts were entered into the SAS statistical package, which was 
programmed to conduct the previously described background correction, baseline 
shift, log transformation, and arithmetic mean determinations, resulting in a single 
representative data point on a log-transformed scale for each set of 
block/run/position observations. These values were then evaluated with SAS Proc 
Mixed to provide a lower limit for the geometric mean reduction ratio at α = 0.10. 
The decision to use SAS Proc Mixed was based upon its improved ability to account 
for variance contributions that result from multiple random effects and to model 
data with nonconstant variances across groups.  
EPHB Report No. EPHB 301-05f
 
 
Page 107 
One of the considerations for the statistical analysis was whether to have the 
reduction limits calculated with use of individually corrected or simultaneously 
corrected lower limits. Simultaneously (a.k.a. Bonferroni) corrected results must 
share the designated level of confidence (α-value) among each of the sampling 
positions (leading to wider confidence intervals), whereas the individually corrected 
results were each evaluated at the designated α-value in determining their lower 
limits. The verdict on whether simultaneous correction was applicable for this 
research scenario was somewhat subject to individual opinion. The rationale behind 
simultaneous correction was that the results for a designated sample position were 
not independent observations but may have been impacted by the control results at 
other sample positions in the room. Intuitively, this made sense for some sample 
positions; however, at other locations (e.g., at patient’s chest vs. in center of 
room), such interdependence would be expected to play less of a role in actual 
worker exposures. For purposes of this research, sample positions that healthcare 
providers would be expected to avoid, where exposure reductions were not 
expected due to their obvious location within the contaminant exhaust path, were 
eliminated from consideration in the SAS model. These included, for the zone-
within-zone configuration, the center chest positions, due to their proximity to the 
actual source, and the downstream healthcare worker positions, due to their known 
proximity to the downstream path of contaminant-carrying airflows. Since these 
positions also tended to have greater variability in their observations, the decision 
to eliminate them from the model resulted in the additional benefit of reducing the 
overall variability within the model. The output reports from the SAS analysis are 
included in Appendix B. In these reports, both the individually corrected and the 
simultaneously corrected results for the lower reduction limits are reported from the 
model. The geometric mean reduction ratio estimates for the Zone-Within-Zone 
field studies, along with their simultaneously corrected lower limits (shown in 
parentheses) as predicted by the SAS model, are summarized in Table 19. 
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Table 19. Summary of geometric mean reduction ratios (GMRRs) and lower limits 
(in parentheses) for the zone-within-zone (2-bed) expedient isolation field studies 
at the four research sites; aerosol spectrometer data simultaneously corrected for α 
= 0.10 (see Notes). 
 
Sample 
Position 
VAMC CKMC SJMH IBMC 
2:1 3:1 2:1 3:1 2:1 3:1 2:1 3.1 
HCW, 
upstream 
0.134 0.163 
(-4.10 -5.65) 
0.998 0.993 
(0.993 0.971) 
0.241 0.544 
(-0.536 0.076) 
0.998 0.998 
(0.986 0.989) 
HCW, 
downstream 
-0.767 -0.800 
(na) 
0.928 0.993 
(na) 
0.204 0.641 
(na) 
0.996 0.999 
(na) 
Patient 
chest 
na 
(na) 
0.761 1.00 
(na) 
0.171 0.791 
(na) 
0.998 0.999 
(na) 
Patient feet na 
(na) 
na 
(na) 
0.247 0.911 
(-0.525 0.821) 
0.999 0.998 
(0.994 0.991) 
Outside gap 
1 
0.998 0.999 
(0.991 0.989) 
0.998 0.993 
(0.994 0.983) 
0.984 0.991 
(0.968 0.982) 
0.998 0.998 
(0.987 0.991) 
Center room 0.999 0.999 
(0.994 0.991) 
0.999 0.998 
(0.996 0.996) 
0.996 0.996 
(0.992 0.992) 
0.995 0.996 
(0.970 0.979) 
Outside gap 
2 
0.993 0.997 
(0.958 0.979) 
0.999 0.999 
(0.996 0.998) 
0.988 0.997 
(0.965 0.989) 
0.998 0.997 
(0.987 0.981) 
Bed 2 0.987 0.997 
(0.942 0.989) 
0.999 0.996 
(0.996 0.991) 
0.987 0.991 
(0.971 0.982) 
0.998 0.996 
(0.990 0.979) 
Notes: 
HCW = Healthcare worker 
VAMC = VA Medical Center 
CKMC = Central Kansas Medical Center 
SJMH = St. Joseph Memorial Hospital 
IBMC = INTEGRIS Baptist Medical Center 
“2:1” indicates GMRRs for test condition 2 relative to test condition 1 (no control); 
“3:1” similarly indicates  GMRRs for test condition 3 
double-strike horizontal line at mid-table separates samples collected within the 
source isolation zone from those collected outside of this zone 
yellow highlight with bold font indicates GMRRs below 0.90. 
In Table 19, yellow highlights show the reported reduction ratios that were less 
than 90 percent. This 90 percent threshold is consistent with an assigned protection 
factor of 10, which is the level of protection that half-mask respirators (including 
N95) are expected to provide in the workplace if used in accordance with a 
respiratory protection program that follows the requirements prescribed in OSHA 
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1910.134 Respiratory Protection [OSHA 1998]. It should be noted that a 
component of the OSHA-prescribed respiratory protection program requires users 
to be enrolled in a respiratory protection program that includes annual fit-testing. 
However, fit-testing healthcare workers for N95 respirators has been a controversial 
subject and compliance is not always universal. In 2005 and 2006 the annual 
congressional appropriations bills prohibited OSHA from enforcing annual fit-testing 
requirements for protection from tuberculosis. This prohibition extended through 
FY2007 and into FY2008 as a result of omnibus continuing resolutions [Perlin 2005; 
Shalhoub 2007]. The enforcement restriction was finally lifted with the presidential 
signing of the FY2008 Omnibus spending bill in late 2007 [OSHA 2008]. If allowed 
to return, such non-enforcement policies could become critical in the event of an 
airborne infectious epidemic, if healthcare workers have not been fit-tested and 
there is insufficient time to initiate such testing. NIOSH researchers have 
demonstrated that in the absence of proper fit-testing, the protection factor 
afforded by N95 respirators can drop below 50 percent [Coffey et al. 1999, 2004]. 
Zone-Within-Zone Configuration 
As discussed in Chapter III, the zone-within-zone expedient isolation configurations 
varied moderately by field site. Studies conducted at VAMC and SJMC (gray-shaded 
columns in Table 19) utilized a corner-to-corner-oriented airflow, but the studies at 
CKMC and IBMC utilized a side-to-side airflow over the mannequin’s upper torso. 
The double-struck horizontal line in Table 19 demarks the separation between 
sample positions located within the source isolation zone and outside the zone. 
Across the four survey sites, all results (GMRR estimates and their corresponding 
lower limits) reported for sample positions outside the source control zone reflected 
levels of control exceeding the 90 percent threshold. All 32 of the outer-zone GMRR 
point estimates exceeded 98 percent, and 28 of those 32 were greater than 99 
percent. Thus, reduction ratio performance outside the source isolation zone was 
consistently effective, regardless of the inner isolation zone’s airflow configuration.  
For samples collected within the source isolation zone, results observed at the 
healthcare worker sample positions for the side-to-side airflow configurations tested 
at CKMC and IBMC were consistently above the 90 percent criterion, with 7 of 8 
GMRR estimates exceeding 99 percent reductions. The 0.761 reduction ratio 
highlighted in yellow from the CKMC field study was from data collected at the 
center of the patient’s chest, within a couple of inches from the source discharge, 
and does not represent a valid sampling location for worker exposures. Results for 
the corner-to-corner airflow configurations tested at both VAMC and SJMH failed to 
achieve the criterion (of 90 percent contaminant concentration reduction) relevant 
to the noncontrolled test condition. However, these sample locations still benefited 
from the increased ventilation rates that resulted from concentrating the specified 
12 ACH (based on room volume) to pull from within the smaller volume of the inner 
isolation zones. For comparison purposes, the effective ACH ventilation rate at 
these sample positions can be calculated by analysis of the concentration decay 
following nebulizer shutdown. For example, Figure 40 shows the concentration 
decay curve generated from the HCW Upstream particle count data at VAMC under 
a Condition 2 test run (GMRR = 0.134). Knowledge of the graphic representations 
of the ventilation purging equation discussed earlier can be used to determine 
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ventilation rates for a given volume. If one considered the moment of nebulizer 
shut off as time To and plotted the natural log transformations of the observed 
particle counts over one-minute intervals throughout the 10-minute decay, then 
linear regression could be used to determine a straight trend line to represent the 
decay [Grieve 1989]. The magnitude of the slope of this trend line was the effective 
ventilation rate in air changes over a time interval T, which in this case was one 
minute. Multiplying this result (0.4343 on Figure 40) by 60 minutes/hour yielded 26 
ACH, which was more than twice the decay rate expected from an engineered AII 
room’s 12 ACH ventilation rate.  
 
Figure 40. Graph of particle count decay observed at the upstream healthcare 
worker position during a Condition 2 trial run of the zone-within-zone expedient 
isolation field study, VA Medical Center, Oklahoma City, OK. 
Another way to provide meaningful interpretation of the GMRR data in Table 19 
would be to present them as Expedient Isolation Protection Factors (EIPF). If 
defined as a surrogate measure of the workplace protection provided by an 
expedient airborne isolation intervention, the EIPF would be analogous to Simulated 
Workplace Protection  
Factor (SWPF), which NIOSH defines as “a surrogate measure of the workplace 
protection provided by a respirator” [NIOSH 2004]. The EIPF can be calculated by: 
GMRR
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According to this formula, EIPFs calculated from the reduction ratio estimates for 
sample positions outside of the source isolation zone range from 63 to 1000, with 
lower limits ranging from 17 to 500. Inside the source isolation zones, calculated 
EIPFs for the corner-to-corner airflow configurations ranged from negligible to 
nonprotective, largely due to contaminants being concentrated within a smaller 
dilution volume (relative to the overall patient room) and/or sample locations within 
the airborne contaminant flow path as it was pulled toward the HEPA inlet (e.g., 
downstream HCW position at VAMC). Calculated EIPF estimates for upstream 
worker positions within the side-to-side airflow configuration ranged from 143 to 
1000, with lower limits ranging from 34 to 143.  
Engineered AII rooms rely upon contaminant removal and dilution from general 
ventilation to provide airborne concentration reductions. Guidelines such as the 
CDC’s 2005 Guidelines for Preventing the Transmission of Mycobacterium 
tuberculosis in Health-Care Settings provide dilution tables similar to Table 2 of this 
document and advise healthcare workers or other visitors to delay entering a room 
where a tuberculosis patient may have been coughing, until “sufficient time” has 
elapsed for adequate dilution/removal of the M. tuberculosis–contaminated air. One 
benefit that direct source control provides over dilution is the significant reduction 
of time required to achieve a stated reduction in cough-generated aerosol. 
Concentration reductions provided by expedient isolation configurations that use 
source capture as a control mechanism represent real-time reductions of a 
continuous contaminant source that existed throughout the duration of the test 
scenario. Real-time concentration reductions can be represented in terms of a 
Protective Time Equivalent (PTE), which can be defined as the amount of elapsed 
time required for the same concentration reduction to occur in an engineered AII 
room designed to provide 12 ACH of dilution ventilation. The PTE can be calculated 
with a slightly modified version of the dilution equation, previously used to generate 
Table 2: 
K
ACH
GMRRPTE ××




 −
−= 60
)12(
)1(ln  
where: 
PTE = Protective Time Equivalent (minutes) 
GMRR = geometric mean reduction ratio 
12 ACH = specified AII room ventilation rate 
K = Ventilation mixing factor (assumed good mixing, K = 3)  
The PTE provides another metric by which to evaluate the benefits offered by an 
expedient isolation configuration and is a metric that may hold greater meaning to 
hospital administrators and others involved in workforce/bed/patient management. 
Focusing primarily upon locations outside of the source isolation zone as well as the 
CKMC and IBMC healthcare worker sample positions where concentration reductions 
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(relative to the no-control test condition) occurred, we can also express the benefits 
of concentration reductions at these locations in terms of the PTE.  
Application of the PTE within the healthcare industry is proposed to reduce the 
amount of waiting time considered necessary for safe entry into areas (patient 
rooms, ambulances, operating rooms, special treatment rooms, autopsy rooms) 
potentially contaminated by individuals with known or suspected airborne infectious 
disease. Several CDC guidance documents provide recommendations to “…allow 
adequate time for ACH to clean 99 percent of airborne particles from the air” and 
go on to provide a Table of ACH and time required for various airborne-contaminant 
removal efficiencies [CDC 1994, 2004, 2007]. These tables are generally similar to 
Table 2 in this document. Consider a traditional patient room which had been 
augmented (for surge purposes) through portable HEPA filtration to achieve an 
equivalent ventilation rate of 12 ACH and good air mixing (K = 3); these tables 
recommend a 69-minute wait before room re-entry or occupancy by another 
patient. However, if the HEPA filtration were incorporated into an expedient 
airborne isolation configuration with a known PTE such as those discussed in this 
document, the PTE could be subtracted from the designated wait time to result in a 
total to near-total reduction in time required for room entry. Depending upon the 
room type (for example, emergency department patient rooms and special 
treatment rooms could have a higher turnover demand during an epidemic), this 
time savings could become a critical component in safe, effective patient 
management.  
Table 20 reports the PTEs for the various nonpatient sample positions calculated 
with the GMRRs reported in Table 19. Note that across all four sites, the PTE for 
areas outside the source isolation zone ranged from 65 to 104 minutes, with a 
mean PTE of 87 minutes. Even if the lower 90 percent confidence limits of the 
GMRR were used for the PTE determination, the lowest PTE for these areas across 
the four sites would still be almost 45 minutes. These PTE values represent 
substantial time delays that healthcare workers and other staff would otherwise 
have while waiting for the same level of airborne concentration reductions offered 
by the expedient isolation configurations.   
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Table 20. Protective Time Equivalent (minutes) provided by concentration 
reductions generated by the zone-within-zone expedient isolation configurations. 
Sample 
Position 
VAMC CKMC SJMH IBMC 
2:1 3:1 2:1 3:1 2:1 3:1 2:1 3:1 
HCW Upstream 2 3 93 74 4 12 93 93 
HCW 
Dnstream --- --- 39 74 3 15 83 104 
Outside Gap 1 93 104 93 74 77 71 93 93 
Center Room 104 104 104 93 83 83 79 83 
Outside Gap 2 74 87 104 104 66 87 93 87 
Bed 2 65 87 104 83 65 71 93 83 
 Notes: 
HCW = healthcare worker VAMC = VA Medical Center 
CKMC = Central Kansas Medical Center SJMH = St. Joseph Memorial Hospital 
IBMC = INTEGRIS Baptist Medical Center. 
The horizontal double line at mid-table separates samples collected within the 
source isolation zone from those collected outside of this zone. 
Ventilated Headboard Configuration 
Evaluation of the aerosol spectrometer results from the ventilated headboard 
expedient isolation field studies may be similar to that of the zone-within-zone data 
discussed above. Tables 21 and 22 represent the GMRRs (with 90 percent lower 
confidence limits) and the calculated PTE, respectively.   
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Table 21. Summary of geometric mean reduction ratios (lower limits in 
parentheses) for the ventilated headboard expedient isolation field studies, 
simultaneously corrected for   α = 0.10. 
Sample 
Position 
VAMC 
2:1 3:1 
CKMC 
2:1 3:1 
SJMH 
2:1 3:1 
IBMC 
2:1 3:1 
HCW-RHS 0.987 0.996 
(0.947 0.979) 
0.999 0.997 
(0.996 0.991) 
0.998 0.997 
(0.996 0.995) 
0.998 0.998 
(0.990 0.993) 
HCW-LHS 0.997 0.996 
(0.986 0.980) 
0.998 0.998 
(0.995 0.993) 
0.998 0.998 
(0.996 0.997) 
0.999 0.998 
(0.997 0.994) 
Patient chest 1.00 1.00 
(1.00 0.998) 
0.967 0.920 
(0.898 0.724) 
0.998 0.997 
(0.997 0.995) 
1.00 1.00 
(1.00 1.00) 
Patient feet 0.995 0.997 
(0.979 0.984) 
0.996 0.993 
(0.989 0.977) 
0.996 0.997 
(0.993 0.995) 
0.998 0.998 
(0.990 0.993) 
Center of 
room 
0.997 0.996 
(0.988 0.980) 
0.997 0.996 
(0.990 0.985) 
0.997 0.998 
(0.995 0.996) 
0.999 0.997 
(0.994 0.989) 
 Notes: 
HCW = healthcare worker  RHS = patient’s right-hand side 
LHS = patient’s left-hand side VAMC = VA Medical Center 
CKMC = Central KS Medical Center SJMH = St. Joseph Memorial Hospital 
IBMC = INTEGRIS Baptist Medical Center 
yellow highlight/bold font indicates GMRR below 0.90. 
Across the four field study locations, 40 of 40 calculated GMRRs exceeded the 
previously discussed 0.90 performance criterion, with results ranging from 0.92 to 
1.00. Even among the lower limit determinations, only two (highlighted in yellow) 
were beneath 0.90, and both of these were results collected from the same patient 
chest position, located only inches from the source discharge point and not typical 
of a potential exposure location. Center room reduction ratios all exceeded 0.995, 
with the worst performing lower limit calculated at 0.980. Similarly, 15 of 16 
GMRRs observed at the two worker positions exceeded 0.995, with the worse 
performing worker position reduction providing a GMRR of 0.987 and a 90 percent 
lower limit of 0.947. Given the similar GMRR estimates and largely overlapping 
confidence intervals, no meaningful difference in performance results is apparent 
between the 2:1 and 3:1 reduction ratios.  
Decay curve analysis for the ventilated headboard results is not possible because 
the expedient isolation configurations worked so well that there was insufficient 
contaminant to allow decay monitoring. However, under real world scenarios, 
should patient movement or worker activities lead to contaminant escape from the 
inner zone (hood area), the high ventilation rate offered by the filtration unit would 
still serve to dilute the contaminant concentration in a manner consistent with that 
provided by an engineered AII room. 
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Similar to the zone-within-zone analysis, the EIPF can be calculated for the 
ventilated headboard isolation configurations; however, GMRRs reported equal to 
1.0 must either be slightly decreased or carried out to additional decimal places to 
their true value (<1.0) in order for the EIPF formula to apply. Across the four study 
sites, calculated EIPF estimates for the center room and healthcare worker positions 
range from 77 (almost 8 times the assigned protection factor of 10 that OSHA 
applies to half-faced respirators) to 1000, with lower limits ranging from 19 to 333.  
Table 22 reports the PTE for the nonpatient sample positions, calculated with the 
GMRR point estimates in Table 21. These sample positions represent locations of 
potential exposure to healthcare workers and/or other room occupants (cleaning 
staff, visitors, etc.). Across all four sites, the PTEs at these locations ranged from 
65 to 104 minutes, with a mean PTE of 88 minutes. Even when the lower 90 
percent confidence limits of the GMRR were used for the PTE determination, the 
lowest PTE for these sample positions across all four sites was again almost 45 
minutes.  
Table 22. Protective Time Equivalent (minutes) provided by concentration 
reductions generated by the ventilated headboard expedient isolation 
configurations. 
Sample 
Position 
VAMC 
2:1 3:1 
CKMC 
2:1 3:1 
SJMH 
2:1 3:1 
IBMC 
2:1 3:1 
HCW 
Upstream 
65 83 104 87 93 87 93 93 
HCW 
Dnstream 
87 83 93 93 93 93 104 93 
Center room 87 104 87 83 87 93 104 87 
Notes: 
HCW = healthcare worker VAMC = VA Medical Center 
CKMC = Central Kansas Medical Center SJMH = St. Joseph Memorial Hospital 
IBMC = INTEGRIS Baptist Medical Center. 
IH Sampling/Optical Particle Counting 
As discussed in Chapter III, the zone-within-zone field study at VAMC was the first 
of the expedient isolation field studies. During a cursory review of the results from 
this study, concern arose regarding the potential for unknown-source aerosol to 
interfere with the highest levels of performance determination. This was partially 
fueled by an awareness of construction activities occurring directly above the test 
room. Additional reasons for the concern were the GMRRs and increased variability 
at the “Outside Gap 2” and “Bed 2” sample positions, compared with those outer-
zone sample positions that were closer to the source itself. One way to determine 
the presence of an unknown source was to compare the size distributions of 
airborne particles at the Bed 2 and source-vicinity sample positions. Figure 41 
compares the airborne aerosol size distributions for the Bed 2 sample position and 
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an unlabeled Grimm spectrometer placed near the HEPA inlet within the source 
isolation zone. (The latter Grimm was placed there for troubleshooting purposes 
and not useable in the reduction ratio performance evaluations.) The size 
distributions were clearly different and appeared to indicate that the aerosol under 
observation at the Bed 2 position had an additional aerosol source with size 
characteristics inconsistent with that being generated within the source isolation 
zone. 
 
Figure 41. Size distribution comparison of aerosol observations within the source 
isolation zone and at the Bed 2 sample position in the zone-within-zone expedient 
isolation field study at VA Medical Center, Oklahoma City, OK. 
The IH sampling/optical particle counting method was added to the field study 
protocol during the third individual field study, a ventilated headboard field study at 
Central Kansas Medical Center. The final protocol was not yet available for the two 
prior field studies (zone-within-zone studies at CKMC and VAMC). As a newly 
developed method, its intended role was limited to being a backup source of 
contaminant control information for potential use when equipment errors, unknown 
aerosol sources, or other issues brought the aerosol spectrometer data into 
question. For reasons discussed below, the method was only partially successful in 
this role, offering potential explanation for slightly reduced performance (Position A 
GMRRs of 0.987 [Grimm] vs. 0.999 [IH/optical]) at the VAMC ventilated headboard 
study, but of little use for examining performance questions from SJMH or CKMC.  
One of the key concerns with the IH filter/optical count sample protocol was 
associated with the on/off timing of the IH sampling pumps. The IH pumps had to 
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be started and stopped manually. Upon starting the pump, the researcher left the 
room and shut the door to allow time for the HEPA unit to “clean” the room air 
before starting the nebulizer source. Room re-entry did not occur until after the 
nebulizer source had been stopped and the HEPA filter had again been used to 
clean the room air. Data from these cleaning periods could be excluded from the 
Grimm spectrometer output file, but the IH sampling method produces an 
integrated sample that, in this case, included the two air cleaning periods. Any 
airborne PSL spheres originating from the nebulizer source (after shut-off) or 
generated during setup between test conditions could be captured on a filter and 
thus hold a greater potential to bias performance results. Use of sample pumps with 
remote control start/stop or programmed sample periods could have eliminated this 
sampling issue.  
Results from the IH/optical particle counting method are included in Appendix C. 
The GMRRs for the optical counting data were calculated from these data and were 
previously reported in Chapter III alongside the Grimm spectrometer results from 
the same respective sampling locations. Generally, the IH results tracked 
consistently with those generated by the aerosol spectrometer data, with over 
78  percent of the IH/optical GMRRs falling within 1 percent of their Grimm-based 
counterparts. Overall, when compared with the corresponding Grimm spectrometer 
results from the same sample positions, 27 of the IH/optical GMRRs were higher, 
30 were lower, and 2 were the same. Although this appeared somewhat evenly 
distributed, closer examination revealed an interesting trend regarding HVAC 
design. Room tempering for both VAMC and IBMC hospital rooms relied upon 
central HVAC systems, whereas tempering at both SJMH and CKMC relied upon 
room recirculating units. The breakdown comparing IH/optical results with their 
corresponding Grimm results revealed that for rooms with central HVAC systems, 
26 of 30 IH/optical results were higher than their Grimm counterparts, 2 were 
lower, and 2 were the same. This seemed to indicate that for most sample 
positions, the Grimms were “seeing” particles that were not originating from the 
nebulizer. Despite this apparent trend, 29 of 30 IH/optical GMRRs from these two 
hospitals were within 0.5 percent of the Grimm-based results, indicating very good 
consistency between methods. For the SJMH and CKMH rooms with room 
recirculating units, 29 of 30 IH/optical results were lower than their corresponding 
Grimm-based results, and the differences in the results were slightly wider, with 
only 6 of 30 IH/optical results within 0.5 percent of their corresponding Grimm-
based counterparts. This appeared to be an artifact of the field protocol, whereby 
coarse prefilters and internal surfaces of the recirculation units became 
contaminated during control-off runs and subsequently became aerosol generators 
(outside of the source isolation zone) during control-on test runs. This was not an 
indictment of the expedient isolation configurations under study, but it did raise 
potential safety questions regarding patient rooms with recirculating units being 
used as surge isolation rooms, without the assistance of a direct source control 
intervention. 
Impact of 0.03 Baseline Shift  
One unintended benefit brought about by the IH sampling/optical count method 
was the ability to evaluate the impact of the 0.03 baseline shift that was performed 
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on the count data prior to the log-transformation. In three of the field studies 
(SJMH 1-Bed, SJMH 2-Bed, and CKMC 1-Bed), there were no zero values in the 
IH/optical count data. For comparison purposes with these data sets, the Proc 
Mixed statistical model was applied both with and without the .03 baseline shift 
mentioned in the data analysis protocol. This allowed a direct comparison of the 
computed lower reduction limits to determine what effect the baseline shift may 
have had upon the determinations. This comparison and the differences in the 
numerical values are shown for the CKMC 1-Bed data set in Table 23. These results, 
showing minimal to no impact upon lower reduction limit computations, were 
consistent with those across the three applicable field studies.  
Table 23. Comparison of lower geometric mean reduction ratio limits (Redu Lim; 
α  = 0.10) for the CKMC IH sampling/optical counting results, with and without 
0.03  baseline shift (BLS). 
Loc/Cond. Correction Redu_Lim w/ 
BLS 
Redu_Lim w/o 
BLS 
Delta 
loc a con 3 Indiv. 0.968 0.967 0.001 
loc b con 3 Indiv. 0.989 0.989 0 
loc d con 3 Indiv. 0.974 0.973 0.001 
loc e con 3 Indiv. 0.979 0.979 0 
loc a con 2 Indiv. 0.985 0.985 0 
loc b con 2 Indiv. 0.99 0.99 0 
loc d con 2 Indiv. 0.989 0.989 0 
loc e con 2 Indiv. 0.97 0.97 0 
loc a con 3 Simul. 0.957 0.958 -0.001 
loc b con 3 Simul. 0.984 0.985 -0.001 
loc d con 3 Simul. 0.962 0.963 -0.001 
loc e con 3 Simul. 0.974 0.975 -0.001 
loc a con 2 Simul. 0.982 0.983 -0.001 
loc b con 2 Simul. 0.988 0.989 -0.001 
loc d con 2 Simul. 0.986 0.987 -0.001 
loc e con 2 Simul. 0.965 0.966 -0.001 
HEPA Fan Motor Impact Upon Room Temperature 
Across the six field studies for which there were temperature data (all but SJMH), 
there was minimal evidence of increasing temperature trends during HEPA-On test 
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conditions. For three of the field studies, temperatures during HEPA-On test runs 
predominantly remained flat or actually decreased over the majority of the 
evaluated test periods. In two other studies, there was no predominant 
temperature trend, with slight temperature increases equally offset by flat to 
slightly decreasing temperatures. In one field study (CKMC 1-Bed), the overall 
temperature trend was slightly upward for all of the evaluated HEPA-On conditions; 
however, the magnitude of the increase was consistently small (1–1.5°F), and 
increases also occurred during 2 of 3 HEPA-Off test runs, indicating the temperature 
trends may have been predominantly driven by external environmental factors. 
Furthermore, the overall room temperatures remained below the ASHRAE-
recommended upper design temperature. Thus, the HEPA fan would not be 
anticipated to adversely affect room environmental factors under the studied 
conditions.  
Physical Parameters 
Although other expedient isolation configurations offering varying degrees of 
airborne isolation and worker exposure reductions may exist, the following 
discussion reflects the findings and lessons learned from the subject research as 
discussed in this document. No claims are intended or implied regarding 
performance comparisons with configurations not tested under this protocol.  
Zone-Within-Zone Configuration 
The zone-within-zone subset of this research effort evaluated the creation of 
expedient isolation configurations with use of cabinet-type portable HEPA filtration 
units as the source of negative pressure and air cleaning. Within healthcare 
facilities, these cabinet-type portable HEPA filters are already used in an expedient 
fashion to either augment older AII rooms or provide some level of airborne 
isolation capacity when a sufficiently engineered AII room capacity is lacking. 
Although preference would be to place potentially infectious patients within private 
rooms, this may not always be possible. The zone-within-zone expedient isolation 
configuration research was intended to demonstrate the feasibility of cohorting 
infectious patients without sacrificing contaminant containment or subjecting 
healthcare workers and other room occupants to large-area “hot zones” of 
infectious contaminant.  
To utilize the zone-within-zone expedient isolation configuration, healthcare 
facilities should first ensure that their portable HEPA filtration unit has the 
volumetric flow capacity to provide roughly 12 or more ACH, based upon the entire 
volume of the patient room. Preferably, the output of the HEPA units should be 
checked with a handheld aerosol counter to verify that the HEPA filter is installed 
and performing correctly. 
Inner Isolation Zone: Boundaries to the inner isolation zone can be established by 
using the patient room’s existing curtain track. In this manner, the resulting patient 
areas are consistent with those dictated by design standards in effect at the time of 
the healthcare facility’s construction. Medium-weight (3.5 to 4-mil) plastic sheeting 
worked effectively as the curtain or zone barrier material during the discussed field 
studies. Note that some jurisdictions may require use of fire-retardant plastic 
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sheeting. When room configurations require construction of an exhaust corridor 
between the two inner isolation zones, a framed corridor such as that used at IBMC 
is recommended as an effective option that reduces influence upon the adjacent 
inner isolation zone boundaries. 
Flow Orientation: Flow orientation will likely be dictated by the patient room 
configuration. Whereas both the corner-to-corner and side-draft airflow orientations 
showed effective containment (GMRRs of 98–99 percent or greater) of source 
aerosol within the inner isolation zones, the side-draft orientation also provided 
significant contaminant concentration reductions inside the inner isolation zone, 
including GMRRs exceeding 99 percent (90 percent lower limits range: 97.1–99.3 
percent) at the upstream healthcare worker positions. Thus, the side-draft 
orientation is preferable as long as it is compatible with room configuration and the 
anticipated requirements for hands-on healthcare. Regardless of the chosen 
orientation, use of plastic “bed ruffles” to reduce ineffective airflow beneath the bed 
surface is advisable. Qualitative flow checks and streamline observations conducted 
with tracer smoke should be regularly performed. Results from these checks should 
be shared (possibly through the use of floor markings) with attending healthcare 
workers so they will be familiar with ideal and nonideal locations in which to stand.  
Curtain Gaps: Unlike engineered AII strategies that go to great lengths to minimize 
air leakage into the isolation zone, the zone-within-zone expedient isolation 
strategies intentionally use large volumes of incoming air and strategically 
designate the point of entry through the placement of the curtain gap. The 
incoming air is intended to enter the inner isolation zone through this gap, pass 
over the source, and carry the contaminant toward the HEPA filter inlet. As 
previously indicated, this approach was successful for the side-draft airflow 
configuration. However, the qualitative smoke test protocol provided only minimal 
success in producing direct capture streamlines at the two field studies which 
required corner-to-corner airflow configurations. Velocity determinations into the 
gap were hampered by wide variations of flow velocities across the height of the 
entrance gaps and by individual measurements that were often below the 30-fpm 
reliable detection limit of the handheld anemometer. At two locations, velocity 
determinations relied solely upon calculated values as opposed to a centerline 
velocity traverse with the anemometer. The American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI) Standard Z9.5 Laboratory Ventilation recommends a minimum flow velocity 
of 50 fpm through openings that lead into negative pressure containment areas 
within laboratories [ANSI/AIHA 2003]. Using this precedent, healthcare facilities 
choosing the zone-within-zone expedient isolation configuration should calculate the 
curtain gap width necessary to produce an average of 50 fpm entrance velocity, 
based upon the HEPA filter flow rate. Reducing the height of the curtain gap height 
may facilitate this process. The 50-fpm calculated gap width should then be used as 
the starting point for the qualitative smoke test protocol. The final selected gap 
width should be that closest to the 50-fpm gap width that also produces flow 
streamlines that flow over the patient source and toward the HEPA filter inlet. If 
circumstances such as a corner-to-corner airflow configuration prevent the clear 
identification of source-capturing streamlines, then deviations from the 50-fpm gap 
width would not be necessary. 
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HVAC Supply Louvers: The makeup air supply into the inner isolation zone should 
rely primarily upon airflow entering through the curtain gap. HVAC supply points 
should preferably be located outside of the inner isolation zone in order to maximize 
dependence upon the curtain gap as the source of airflow into the isolation zone 
and to minimize the potential for interrupting air currents. When this is not 
possible, curtain deflectors should be employed to minimize the interruption 
potential of the HVAC air supply with the contaminant-carrying airflow streamlines. 
If the HEPA filtration unit has the additional airflow capacity, increasing the HEPA 
airflow rate above the room’s 12 ACH setting can help to offset any HVAC-induced 
reduction of airflow through the curtain gap. Recirculating terminal units and HVAC 
return grilles should be avoided within the inner isolation zone. When unavoidable, 
they should be sealed or otherwise isolated to prevent recirculation of airborne 
contaminants from within the inner isolation zone.  
Ventilated Headboard Configuration 
The ventilated headboard subset of this research effort evaluated the ability to 
employ industrial ventilation-type control strategies in combination with ducted 
portable HEPA filtration units, typical of those used for contamination containment 
during construction or asbestos abatement activities. These units are commonly 
used during hospital renovation activities in an effort to reduce distribution of mold 
spores and construction dusts into occupied areas of the facility. In the current 
research, this configuration was evaluated in single-patient rooms only.  
HEPA Flow rates: As with the zone-within-zone configuration, the targeted 
minimum flow rate for the portable HEPA units was that necessary to provide 
12  ACH, based upon the entire volume of the patient room. In addition to this 
volumetric flow rate criterion, the airflow into the ventilated headboard/hood 
combination required sufficient velocity to overcome room air currents without 
placing the patient’s head into a “wind tunnel” of excessive air velocity. Balancing 
these two requirements, a minimum average flow rate of 30 fpm into the hood was 
also a design target that impacted the final flow rate through the HEPA filtration 
unit. Preferably, the outputs of the HEPA units should be checked with a handheld 
aerosol counter to verify that the HEPA filter was installed and performing correctly.  
Headboard Dimensions: Headboard size dimensions were determined on the basis 
of bed dimensions, the adjustable range of the bed incline, and the ability to 
provide inward and outward visual access from within the hood. Because of 
consistent bed dimensions and operation, a 2-ft by 4-ft ventilated headboard was 
the chosen dimensions across all four of the ventilated headboard field sites. Hood 
static pressure measurements of a 2-ft by 4-ft ventilated headboard, constructed 
with 1-in by 4-in dimensional lumber, MERV 7 prefilters, and a 6-in-diameter duct 
take-off revealed a hood static pressure requirement of -2.0 in water gauge (w.g.) 
when operated at 240 cfm (30 fpm average face velocity). Although such a hood 
was not used at any of the field study locations, laboratory construction and 
evaluation of a similarly constructed hood built with 1-in by 6-in dimensional 
lumber required a hood static pressure of only -1.0 in w.g. when operated at the 
same airflow rate.  
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Hood Depth: Hood depths were determined with a qualitative tracer smoke protocol 
targeted to identify the minimum hood depth (D0) at which smoke escape was not 
visible. For purposes of the experimental protocol, two hood depths were selected, 
D0 and D0 + 8 in. Though the 8-in increment in hood depth was somewhat arbitrarily 
determined for evaluation, the D0 + 8-in hood depth generally approximated the 
75  percent of largest dimension rule-of-thumb practiced in industrial ventilation 
design. A review of the ventilated headboard GMRR performance summary in Table 
21 shows that the results for Condition 2 (hood depth at D0) and Condition 3 (hood 
depth at D0 + 8 inches) were very similar, with GMRR estimates within a single 
percentage point of each other for 19 of the 20 sample position/field study 
combinations. The one outlier was a chest position sample at CKMC which, due to 
its proximity to the source, is of limited value in regards to worker exposure 
predictions. When considered in combination with the GMRR 90 percent lower 
limits, none of the sample results showed a significant difference in performance 
between Condition 2 and Condition 3. Though these results appear to demonstrate 
that the qualitative tracer smoke protocol as used in the research was successful in 
identifying a successful hood depth, the qualitative nature of the protocol is subject 
to human error if conducted by less experienced individuals. For this reason, the 
75  percent of widest dimension rule-of-thumb is recommended as the starting 
point for conducting the tracer smoke hood-depth protocol, with modifications to 
this hood depth made only if supported by improved tracer smoke containment. 
HVAC Interaction: Interaction of the HVAC system with the function of the 
ventilated headboard expedient isolation configuration was less of an operational 
factor than with the zone-within-zone configurations. Only one field study site 
required supply air deflection in order to avoid interference with airflow streamlines 
within the vicinity of the hood entrance. In general, locating patients immediately 
adjacent to or beneath HVAC supply louvers should be avoided. Decisions regarding 
HVAC return air grilles should be situation-specific and take into consideration HVAC 
factors (e.g., level of filtration, return air requirements in order to avoid starving 
the system of sufficient return air) and infection control policies. If the HVAC 
system recirculates back to the same room only, there is probably no need to block 
the HVAC return. If it recirculates to a zone consisting solely of potentially 
infectious patient rooms, the zone might be treated as an infectious cohort patient 
area and the return grilles left open. If the HVAC zone includes both AII and non-
AII areas, return air grilles from the AII areas should probably be blocked or limited 
to HEPA filtered air only. Healthcare facility infection control planners should 
remember that if return air grilles are blocked and HVAC air supplies remain open, 
the room will generally become positive and will leak air. Under these 
circumstances, if the HEPA discharge can be the source of the leaked air, this will 
reduce the potential for contaminated air to migrate from the expedient AII patient 
room.  
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Chapter V 
Summary 
Background 
Although the nature of an applied research effort conducted within multiple real-
world settings generally precludes the ability to tightly control the test 
environment, the results can provide a realistic insight into the expectations and 
obstacles that could assist in the potential transition from research to practice. In 
the expedient isolation field research, the research objectives included: 
• The identification of “universal designs” applicable to real-world healthcare 
environments; 
• The development of test protocols that challenged the containment and 
exposure reduction effectiveness of the evaluated configurations using 
aerosol theory and airborne infectious-sized surrogate contaminant 
generation; 
• The documentation, evaluation, and interpretation of the performance of the 
tested configurations in ways which will add meaning to their potential end 
user. 
The study limited its evaluation options to affordable and easily constructed 
alternative(s) to traditional engineered AII rooms that might be used in an 
emergency surge capacity for AII following a natural or manmade epidemic event. 
The motivation for the research was a well-documented acknowledgment of 
insufficient engineered airborne infectious capacity within the U.S. healthcare 
system. This coincided with an increased awareness of the threat demonstrated by 
increased terrorism concerns, recent experiences with SARS, and the ongoing 
evolution of influenza virus strains that could become airborne infectious. Without 
expedient, cost-effective options such as those discussed in this research, the 
alternatives, as already disseminated in numerous guidance documents, will be an 
abandonment of many AII practices, patient cohorting within large “hot zones” of 
potential airborne infectious aerosol, and hopeful expectations of healthcare worker 
protection from airborne infectious aerosol resulting primarily through the use of 
N95 respirators or even surgical masks.  
Research Methodology  
Before expedient design configurations identified during the feasibility study could 
be sufficiently challenged, a technique was needed for generation of surrogate 
airborne infectious-sized aerosol contaminant. The surrogate source generation 
technique required the ability to produce repeatable aerosol generation rates. This 
was accomplished through the development of a HEPA-filtered wind tunnel, 
modified to allow upstream injection of the output from a medical nebulizer whose 
dosing fluid was crafted to minimize conglomerate generation. The use of batch 
source mixing of the dosing fluid resulted in the repeatability characteristics 
necessary to conduct comparative particle count determinations between tested 
interventions and their noncontrol counterparts. 
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Two expedient isolation configurations, zone-within-zone and ventilated headboard, 
were evaluated in each of four Midwestern hospitals, for a total of eight field 
studies. The hospitals were chosen on the basis of their willingness to participate in 
the study and the fact that they collectively represented a wide spectrum in terms 
of facility size and design. The research protocol used a randomized (complete) 
block design of two levels of intervention plus one noncontrol test condition, with a 
caveat that once a test order of conditions was utilized within a block, that same 
order could not be repeated in a subsequent block. Analysis of data from an early 
field evaluation revealed diminishing returns to be gained by conducting more than 
six blocks, and given the three test conditions, the six-block strategy allowed any 
order-associated bias to be evenly distributed across the field study results. 
Qualitative tracer smoke protocols were incorporated in establishing several of the 
field configuration parameters at each hospital prior to initiation of the quantitative 
evaluation.  
The primary aerosol count data were collected with aerosol spectrometers, with a 
focus on particle counts within the size bin of the source aerosol. Data 
manipulations, including background correction, a small baseline shift, and log 
transformation, were performed within SAS, and the mean of each test run’s log-
transformed count value became the representative test result for analysis in SAS 
Proc Mixed. Model results were reported as a GMRR and lower 90 percent reduction 
ratio confidence limits between each of the tested interventions and the noncontrol 
test condition. Additional aerosol count data were collected with IH filter sampling 
techniques, combined with a newly developed optical counting method. The new 
method was introduced after initial field studies, as a backup evaluation method in 
the event of excessive environmental background contamination.  
Major Findings 
Aside from ignored sample results from the chest position adjacent to the source, 
the evaluated expedient airborne isolation configurations were universally 
successful (GMRRs of 98–99 percent or greater; 90 percent lower limits range of 
94.2–99.9 percent) in their ability to contain surrogate infectious aerosol within the 
inner isolation zones (including within the ventilated headboard’s receiving hood). 
Center-of-room sample results across all sites and configurations resulted in GMRRs 
ranging from 99.5 to 99.9 percent and 90 percent lower limits ranging from 97 to 
99.6 percent. Worker exposure reductions were more variable. There were no 
meaningful (GMRR lower limits ranging from negative to under 10 percent) real-
time exposure reductions associated with the two corner-to-corner/zone-within-
zone isolation configurations under the evaluated test conditions; however, these 
areas still benefited from the increased dilution at a set ventilation rate that 
resulted from the smaller isolation zone. For the two side-draft/zone-within-zone 
configurations and all of the ventilated headboard field studies, GMRR results 
observed for healthcare worker positions not located in known exhaust paths 
ranged from 98.7 to 99.9 percent, with lower 90 percent limits ranging from 94.7 to 
99.6 percent. Across all of the isolation configuration field studies, similar GMRRs 
with overlapping confidence intervals indicated no significant difference between 
the Condition 2 and Condition 3 test conditions. Analysis of temperature log data 
revealed either no impact to environmental conditions based upon HEPA fan 
EPHB Report No. EPHB 301-05f
 
 
Page 125 
function or insignificant impact in regards to moving room temperatures outside of 
the ASHRAE-recommended temperatures of 70–75°F. 
Implications 
Given the important role of healthcare providers in responding to an airborne 
infectious epidemic and the lack of engineered airborne isolation capacity within the 
U.S. healthcare inventory, the findings of the present study could have important 
implications for U.S. healthcare emergency planning policies. Some of these are 
discussed in the following paragraphs.  
Polling data have shown that as few as 24 percent (worst-case combination of 
willingness and ability) of healthcare workers within the greater New York area 
were willing to report to work unscheduled, in support of an infectious airborne 
epidemic such as SARS [Quereshi et al. 2005]. Fear regarding personal and family 
safety was the primary driving factors. These results are consistent with findings of 
an Israeli study involving medical response to an unconventional missile attack. 
However, in that study, healthcare worker willingness to report increased from 42 
to 86 percent if personal safety measures were available [Shapira et al. 1991]. 
Given the previously reported experiences with healthcare worker exposures and 
SARS, these reported fears are probably justified, as is the need to identify worker-
protective surge isolation strategies. The results of these polling data are also 
consistent with the real-world U.S. outbreak of monkeypox in 2003. In that 
circumstance, several physicians and nurses declined to provide patient treatment 
or engage in direct patient contact, some claiming a lack of smallpox vaccination 
and others without explanation [Anderson et al. 2003].   
Expedient isolation interventions, such as those discussed in this research, that 
result in workplace protection factors several times greater than that expected for 
N95 respirators could provide additional reassurance to healthcare workers 
responding to airborne infectious or even unknown events. In a long-term incident, 
where respiratory protection shortages could exist and reuse strategies were 
implemented, the reduced loading on the outside of the respirators could also result 
in decreased disease transmission. Healthcare administrators, physicians, and 
others involved in workforce/bed/patient management could also benefit from the 
subject research through use of the protective time equivalent (PTE) determinations 
to reduce the amount of waiting time considered for safe entry into patient areas 
(patient rooms, ambulances, operating rooms, special treatment rooms, autopsy 
rooms) potentially contaminated by individuals with known or suspected airborne 
infectious disease. Depending upon the room type (for example, emergency 
department patient rooms and special treatment rooms could have a higher 
turnover demand during an epidemic), this time savings could become a critical 
component in safe and effective patient management.  
As information is disseminated concerning the cost-effective contaminant reduction 
capabilities of the expedient isolation interventions developed and evaluated as part 
of this research progress, the potential to impact evolving emergency response 
policies and budgets will increase. Preliminary portions of this research have 
already been incorporated within a Minnesota Emergency Response Education and 
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Training (MERET) Learning Module titled Methods for Achieving Temporary Negative 
Pressure Isolation (TNPI) [University of Minnesota 2006]. Final research results and 
recommendations may also be developed for publication within a general guidance 
document (non-disease-specific) on expedient AII to be published by the National 
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), of the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC). 
Lastly, the findings from this research coincide with heightened public awareness of 
the need to protect healthcare workers from unnecessary exposures and also at a 
time when discussions on energy conservation and “green design” are on the 
engineering forefront. The effectiveness of the direct-capture approaches to 
contaminant isolation exhibited by the researched expedient isolation designs, when 
compared to the equivalent time delays and energy expenses associated with 
engineered AII rooms that rely on single-pass dilution, could encourage new 
discussion on the design and operation of engineered AII rooms.  
Limitations 
The expedient AII configurations studied under this research effort are intended as 
emergency response alternatives to surge demands for AII. Care must be taken 
that the results not be interpreted as championing the use of expedient isolation 
configurations in lieu of engineered AII room capacity.  
As studied, the methodology was a randomized (complete) block design that 
focused upon testing the isolation configurations within real-world settings. Access 
to hospital sites, length of access, and the time and expense associated with the 
field studies limited the number of variables that could be evaluated and the depth 
of their investigation. Alternatively, efforts to obtain comparative results regarding 
issues such as hood depth or tolerance to nearby HVAC diffusers may have been 
more definitively defined had the research been conducted in a mocked-up 
laboratory environment where environmental parameters could be better 
controlled. In addition, a laboratory-based setting could have allowed investigation 
of additional variables (e.g., bed inclination and healthcare worker body position) 
through the use of larger block sizes or by incorporating an incomplete block design 
that used additional blocks. Of course, translation of findings resulting from a lab-
based investigation would then require further investigation within real-world 
environments, and that translation may or may not have been completely 
successful.  
One of the issues that will challenge acceptance of the expedient isolation 
approaches mentioned in this research is the paradigm shift away from insisting 
that the entire patient room be under negative pressure relative to the adjacent 
corridor. One approach that could circumvent this obstacle would be to direct the 
discharge from the HEPA filter units to create a positive-pressure anteroom near 
the patient room entrance. In this manner, facility personnel could still perform 
regular smoke tests (from the anteroom) to verify inward airflow into the patient 
area, and the anteroom could also serve as a “safe area” for donning and doffing 
protective gowns and respirators.  
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Like most interventions, the effectiveness of the discussed expedient airborne 
infection isolation strategies can be thwarted by improper work practices.  While the 
operating concepts of these intervention strategies were proven to be tolerant of 
the airflow interferences encountered in the real-world healthcare environment in 
which they were evaluated, it is intuitively plausible that the protective features 
could be diminished through poor work practices.  Practices that might interfere 
with the directional airflow and containment strategies, such as improper placement 
of portable fans or interfering with the integrity of containment curtains, should be 
avoided.  The careful use of qualitative tracer smoke, as described in this report, 
can be a helpful evaluation tool to help identify and eliminate such potential 
interferences.     
Suggestions for Further Research 
The importance of the expedient isolation research as applied to natural or 
manmade emergency response scenarios, combined with the myriad influences that 
constitute healthcare facilities’ operation and design, lead to several potential areas 
of further research. Some of these are discussed in the following paragraphs and 
are in no particular order of importance.  
Bed Position 
Although cursory checks of bed inclination against capture performance were 
conducted extemporaneously in the field, such an evaluation was not part of the 
research protocol. If only to resolve potential questions, the issue of bed inclination 
as it relates to capture performance and resulting GMRRs is one that could benefit 
from additional research. 
Worker position/worker movement 
Similarly, an obvious question remains regarding the positioning and movement of 
healthcare workers and the potential impact upon airflow streamlines and resulting 
contaminant capture. Although escaping contaminant under these circumstances 
would still be subject to the protective benefits of the 12 ACH of dilution filtration, 
the potential performance reduction in terms of real-time concentration reductions 
is a legitimate research question.  
Comparison Temporary Negative Pressure Isolation 
One commonly identified approach to expedient airborne isolation to meet surge 
requirements is the establishment of Temporary Negative-Pressure Isolation (TNPI) 
areas. These areas, which more closely follow the theory behind traditional 
engineered AII rooms (6 to 12 ACH and negative pressure), are often constructed 
through the use of portable HEPA filtration units whose discharge has been directed 
to the outdoors [University of Minnesota 2006]. A criticism of TNPI units is that 
their impact, especially if multiple units are required, upon HVAC system operation 
and adjacent room pressures is not always well-understood. In theory, these 
questions should be evaluated prior to wide-scale adoption of TNPI in an emergency 
response plan. One research comparison of interest would be to compare room and 
worker position concentration reductions resulting from TNPI interventions with 
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those provided by the expedient isolation configurations considered in the current 
research. 
Combining Ventilated Headboard and Zone-Within-Zone Configurations 
The ventilated headboard configuration showed an excellent capability to capture 
and remove airborne contaminant; however ,this performance may well be 
positionally specific (i.e., the source is within the vicinity of the headboard and 
hood). Combining the capture benefits of the ventilated hood with the additional 
capture protections and enhanced dilution characteristics of a smaller isolation zone 
could be an interesting isolation approach worth investigating.   
Protective Isolation 
The containment techniques used to construct engineered AII rooms are similar 
(with opposite pressure relationships) to those required for protective isolation 
environments. A surge of potentially immunosuppressed patients (such as what 
might occur following a widescale exposure to radioactive material) would require 
protective isolation (positive pressure) from airborne pathogens [Oak Ridge 
Institute for Science and Education 2004]. Intuitively, it seems the expedient 
isolation configurations should be modifiable to produce an expedient protective 
isolation environment. This alternative should be evaluated and proven before 
becoming part of an emergency response plan.  
Nonhospital Environments 
The expedient airborne isolation configurations discussed in this research were all 
constructed and evaluated within traditional hospital facilities. Variations of the 
same control techniques might provide protective benefits to a wide variety of 
nonhospital environments, some of which could play a key role in thwarting disease 
transmission during a widescale epidemic. Examples include nursing homes, 
doctors’ offices, ambulatory transport, schools, jails, homeless shelters, 
transcontinental airplanes, and airport and border patrol quarantine stations. 
Research efforts that test and evaluate the use of these control techniques in these 
environments could facilitate national preparations for a potential airborne 
infectious epidemic.  
Conclusion 
The U.S. healthcare system lacks sufficient engineered AII surge capacity to meet 
the demands of a widespread airborne infectious epidemic. Some healthcare 
facilities, including two included as part of this research effort, lack the engineered 
AII room capacity to handle even a single airborne infectious patient. Government 
programs have begun spending billions of dollars to improve this engineered 
capacity, but at a government-predicted average of $500 million to upgrade a 
single major city, the time and resources required to sufficiently protect the entire 
U.S. healthcare system in both rural and urban environments is beyond the scope 
of any government program. Alternative solutions are needed to meet surge 
airborne isolation requirements. Some proposed “solutions” have included resorting 
to a heavy dependence on respiratory protection and the establishment of large 
“hot zones” of potentially infectious aerosol. The expedient airborne isolation 
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research discussed within this document has identified isolation configurations that 
rely upon inexpensive, off-the-shelf materials and HEPA filtration systems that are 
commonly found within healthcare facilities. Most provide better real-time source 
protection from infectious aerosol than that expected to result from an N95 
respirator. In several cases, the protection is several times better. These findings 
are not intended to replace the respiratory protection guidance provided to 
healthcare workers; however; the additional reduction in contaminant 
concentrations will lessen the dependence upon the N95 as the last line of airborne 
defense. Healthcare workers need and deserve assurances that their safety will not 
be sacrificed in the name of emergency response. U.S. citizens share that need if 
they expect healthcare workers to report to work and to stay sufficiently healthy to 
provide treatment. While millions of dollars will continue to be spent seeking cures 
and immunizations for airborne and other infectious diseases, the objectives of this 
modest project and its identified interventions may be summed up in the words of 
Thomas Fuller (1608–1661), British clergyman and author: “He who cures a disease 
may be the skillfullest, but he that prevents it is the safest physician.”  
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Appendix B 
Data Processing Steps and Statistical Results from SAS 
Proc Mixed Model for Aerosol Spectrometer Data 
Data Processing Steps 
For each study, 26 observations were kept for each block “x” location, “y” trial 
combination groups. The first five observations were used as background data. 
Observations 6–11 were transitional data and were not used. Observations 12–26 
were used to construct end results for analysis. 
Step-by-step calculations were as follows:  
1. Calculated the mean of the first five observations to get a background mean 
(BG_mean) 
2. Disregarded observations 6–11  
3. Subtracted “BG_mean” from each of the remaining 15 observations (12–26) 
4. Assigned “0” to any negative result from step 3 
5. Added 0.03 to each value and took the natural log of each result  
6. Calculated the mean of the 15 results from step 5 
7. Used the value from 6 as the representative value for analysis 
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SAS PROX MIXED (SAS Version 9.13)—Statistical Analysis 
and Model Output Reports 
Column Header Key  
Condition = test condition 
Loc = sample location within hospital room 
n = number of blocks 
gmean = geometric mean 
gmeanx_1 = geometric mean reduction ratio for condition “x” relative to condition 
“1” = (gmean1-gmeanx)/gmean1; × = 2,3 
Label ID: loc × con y = sample location “x,” test condition “y” 
redu_lim = lower 90% confidence limit on the gmean reduction ratio 
I. VETERAN’S ADMINISTRATION MEDICAL CENTER (VAMC), OKLAHOMA 
CITY, OK 
Ventilated Headboard Configuration 
Condition  Loc  n   gmean 
1      A    6   144.281 
1      B    6   123.354 
1      C    6   5227.949 
1      D    6   117.263 
1      E   6   151.878 
3      A    6   1.899 
3      B    6   0.420 
3      C    6   0.792 
3      D    6   0.616 
3      E    6   0.447 
2      A    6   0.574 
2      B   6   0.465 
2      C    6   2.136 
2      D    6   0.363 
2      E    6   0.574 
Loc     n   gmean3_1   gmean2_1 
A     6     0.987    0.996 
B     6     0.997    0.996 
C     6     1.000    1.000 
D     6     0.995    0.997 
E     6     0.997    0.996 
 
VAMC Ventilated Headboard Model Results, based on mean of 15 log-
transformed, BG-corrected, and baseline-shifted particle count values for each 
block, trial, and sample position. Date treated as fixed factor.  
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(Individually corrected for lower 5 percent value) 
Label    Estimate  StdErr   DF   tValue  Probt  redu_lim 
loc a con 3   5.6399   0.7830  13.2    7.20  <.0001   0.98580 
loc b con 3   5.6937   0.7830  13.2    7.27  <.0001   0.98655 
loc c con 3   7.9153   0.7830  13.2   10.11  <.0001   0.99854 
loc d con 3   5.8913   0.7830  13.2    7.52  <.0001   0.98896 
loc e con 3   5.6902   0.7830  13.2    7.27  <.0001   0.98650 
loc a con 2   4.2157   0.6116   58    6.89  <.0001   0.95897 
loc b con 2   5.5669   0.6116   58    9.10  <.0001   0.98938 
loc c con 2   8.6800   0.6116   58   14.19  <.0001   0.99953 
loc d con 2   5.1338   0.6116   58    8.39  <.0001   0.98362 
loc e con 2   5.7145   0.6116   58    9.34  <.0001   0.99083 
 
(Simultaneously corrected for lower 5 percent value; 5 
comparisons, 90 percent conf-fixed) 
Label     Estimate   StdErr   DF   tValue   Probt  redu_lim 
loc a con 3   5.6399   0.7830  13.2    7.20  <.0001   0.97885 
loc b con 3   5.6937   0.7830  13.2    7.27  <.0001   0.97996 
loc c con 3   7.9153   0.7830  13.2   10.11  <.0001   0.99783 
loc d con 3   5.8913   0.7830  13.2    7.52  <.0001   0.98355 
loc e con 3   5.6902   0.7830  13.2    7.27  <.0001   0.97989 
loc a con 2   4.2157   0.6116   58    6.89  <.0001   0.94664 
loc b con 2   5.5669   0.6116   58    9.10  <.0001   0.98618 
loc c con 2   8.6800   0.6116   58   14.19  <.0001   0.99939 
loc d con 2   5.1338   0.6116   58    8.39  <.0001   0.97870 
loc e con 2   5.7145   0.6116   58    9.34  <.0001   0.98808 
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Zone-Within-Zone Configuration  
Condition   Loc  n    gmean 
1      A   6    84.271 
1      B   6   129.611 
1      D   6   147.024 
1      F   6    50.863 
1      G   6    49.503 
1      H   6    51.695 
2      A   5    0.138 
2      B   6   112.250 
2      D   6   259.801 
2      F   6    0.055 
2      G   6    0.357 
2      H   6    0.682 
3      A   6    0.123 
3      B   5   108.469 
3      D   6   264.705 
3      F   6    0.060 
3      G   6    0.137 
3      H   6    0.143 
 
Loc     n   gmean2_1   gmean3_1 
A     6    0.998    0.999 
B     6    0.134    0.163 
D     6    -0.767    -0.800 
F     6    0.999    0.999 
G     6    0.993    0.997 
H     6    0.987    0.997 
 
VAMC Zone-Within-Zone Model Results, based on mean of 15 log-
transformed, BG-corrected, and baseline-shifted particle count 
values for each block, trial, and sample position. Date treated 
as fixed factor. 
 
(Individually corrected for lower 5 percent value) 
Label     Estimate   StdErr   DF   tValue   Probt  redu_lim 
loc a con 3   5.6451   0.5491   57   10.28  <.0001   0.99115 
loc b con 3   -0.7019   0.5676   57   -1.24  0.2213  -4.21204 
loc f con 3   5.8577   0.5491   57   10.67  <.0001   0.99284 
loc g con 3   5.0002   0.5491   57    9.11  <.0001   0.98313 
loc h con 3   5.4948   0.4898   57   11.22  <.0001   0.99068 
loc a con 2   5.9060   0.5676   57   10.41  <.0001   0.99297 
loc b con 2   -0.4745   0.5491   57   -0.86  0.3911  -3.02516 
loc f con 2   6.2091   0.5491   57   11.31  <.0001   0.99496 
loc g con 2   4.3141   0.5491   57    7.86  <.0001   0.96649 
loc h con 2   3.8853   0.4898   57    7.93  <.0001   0.95341 
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(Simultaneously corrected for lower 5 percent value; 5 
comparisons, 90 percent conf-fixed) 
Label     Estimate   StdErr   DF   tValue   Probt  redu_lim 
loc a con 3   5.6451   0.5491   57   10.28  <.0001   0.98879 
loc b con 3   -0.7019   0.5676   57   -1.24  0.2213  -5.65200 
loc f con 3   5.8577   0.5491   57   10.67  <.0001   0.99094 
loc g con 3   5.0002   0.5491   57    9.11  <.0001   0.97864 
loc h con 3   5.4948   0.4898   57   11.22  <.0001   0.98850 
loc a con 2   5.9060   0.5676   57   10.41  <.0001   0.99102 
loc b con 2   -0.4745   0.5491   57   -0.86  0.3911  -4.09648 
loc f con 2   6.2091   0.5491   57   11.31  <.0001   0.99362 
loc g con 2   4.3141   0.5491   57    7.86  <.0001   0.95758 
loc h con 2   3.8853   0.4898   57    7.93  <.0001   0.94249 
II. St JOSEPH MEMORIAL HOSPITAL (SJMH), LARNED, KS  
Ventilated Headboard Configuration 
Condition   Loc   n    gmean 
1      A   6    27.797 
1      B   5    57.346 
1      C   6    45.044 
1      D   6    28.412 
1      E   5    27.066 
2      A   6    0.064 
2      B   5    0.130 
2      C   6    0.073 
2      D   6    0.115 
2      E   5    0.073 
3      A   6    0.072 
3      B   5    0.087 
3      C   6    0.129 
3      D   6    0.083 
3      E   5    0.063 
 
 
Loc  n    gmean2_1   gmean3_1 
A   6    0.998    0.997 
B   5    0.998    0.998 
C   6    0.998    0.997 
D   6    0.996    0.997 
E   5    0.997    0.998 
 
SJMH Ventilated Headboard Model Results, based on mean of 15 
log-transformed, BG-corrected, and baseline-shifted particle 
count values for each block, trial, and sample position. Date 
treated as fixed factor.  
 
(Individually corrected for lower 5 percent value) 
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Label     Estimate   StdErr   DF   tValue   Probt  redu_lim 
loc a con 3   5.8584   0.2389   27.8   24.52  <.0001   0.99571 
loc b con 3   6.3426   0.2648   28.7   23.96  <.0001   0.99724 
loc c con 3   5.7571   0.2389   27.8   24.10  <.0001   0.99525 
loc d con 3   5.7376   0.2389   27.8   24.02  <.0001   0.99516 
loc e con 3   5.9416   0.2648   28.7   22.44  <.0001   0.99588 
loc a con 2   6.0055   0.2347   16.9   25.59  <.0001   0.99629 
loc b con 2   6.0242   0.2601   17.7   23.16  <.0001   0.99620 
loc c con 2   6.3451   0.2347   16.9   27.04  <.0001   0.99736 
loc d con 2   5.4353   0.2347   16.9   23.16  <.0001   0.99344 
loc e con 2   5.8499   0.2601   17.7   22.49  <.0001   0.99548 
 
(Simultaneously corrected for lower 5 percent value; 5 
comparisons, 90 percent conf-fixed) 
Label     Estimate   StdErr   DF   tValue   Probt  redu_lim 
loc a con 3   5.8584   0.2389   27.8  24.52   <.0001   0.99522 
loc b con 3   6.3426   0.2648   28.7  23.96   <.0001   0.99689 
loc c con 3   5.7571   0.2389   27.8  24.10   <.0001   0.99471 
loc d con 3   5.7376   0.2389   27.8  24.02   <.0001   0.99461 
loc e con 3   5.9416   0.2648   28.7  22.44   <.0001   0.99536 
loc a con 2   6.0055   0.2347   16.9  25.59   <.0001   0.99584 
loc b con 2   6.0242   0.2601   17.7  23.16   <.0001   0.99569 
loc c con 2   6.3451   0.2347   16.9  27.04   <.0001   0.99704 
loc d con 2   5.4353   0.2347   16.9  23.16   <.0001   0.99265 
loc e con 2   5.8499   0.2601   17.7  22.49   <.0001   0.99487 
 
Zone-Within-Zone Configuration 
Condition   Loc  n    gmean 
1      A   6    66.672 
1      B   6    32.332 
1      C   6   167.496 
1      D   6    70.540 
1      E   6    6.208 
1      F   6    14.688 
1      G   2    21.676 
1      H   5    6.120 
2      A   6    50.574 
2      B   6    25.727 
2      C   6   138.848 
2      D   6    53.110 
2      E   6    0.098 
2      F   6    0.060 
2      G   2    0.249 
2      H   5    0.082 
3      A   6    30.409 
3      B   6    11.601 
3      C   6    35.039 
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3      D   6    6.249 
3      E   6    0.054 
3      F   6    0.059 
3      G   2    0.056 
3      H   5    0.054 
 
Loc   n   gmean2_1   gmean3_1 
A    6    0.241    0.544 
B    6    0.204    0.641 
C    6    0.171    0.791 
D    6    0.247    0.911 
E    6    0.984    0.991 
F    6    0.996    0.996 
G    2    0.988    0.997 
H    5    0.987    0.991 
 
SJMH Zone-Within-Zone Model Results, based on mean of 15 log-
transformed, BG-corrected, and baseline-shifted particle count 
values for each block, trial, and sample position. Date treated 
as fixed factor. 
 
(Individually corrected for lower 5 percent value) 
Label     Estimate   StdErr   DF    tValue  Probt   redu_lim 
loc a con 3   0.7851   0.3214  44.8    2.44  0.0186   0.21745 
loc d con 3   2.4237   0.3214  44.8    7.54  <.0001   0.84800 
loc e con 3   4.7476   0.3214  44.8   14.77  <.0001   0.98512 
loc f con 3   5.5128   0.3214  44.8   17.15  <.0001   0.99308 
loc g con 3   5.7495   0.5587  47.9   10.29  <.0001   0.99187 
loc h con 3   4.8012   0.3520  46.6   13.64  <.0001   0.98516 
loc a con 2   0.2763   0.3214  44.8    0.86  0.3945  -0.30150 
loc d con 2   0.2838   0.3214  44.8    0.88  0.3819  -0.29180 
loc e con 2   4.1443   0.3214  44.8   12.89  <.0001   0.97280 
loc f con 2   5.4982   0.3214  44.8   17.11  <.0001   0.99298 
loc g con 2   4.5664   0.5587  47.9    8.17  <.0001   0.97346 
loc h con 2   4.3207   0.3520  46.6   12.28  <.0001   0.97601 
 
(Simultaneously corrected for lower 5 percent value; 6 
comparisons, 90 percent conf-fixed) 
Label     Estimate   StdErr   DF    tValue  Probt   redu_lim 
loc a con 3   0.7851   0.3214  44.8    2.44  0.0186   0.07623 
loc d con 3   2.4237   0.3214  44.8    7.54  <.0001   0.82057 
loc e con 3   4.7476   0.3214  44.8   14.77  <.0001   0.98244 
loc f con 3   5.5128   0.3214  44.8   17.15  <.0001   0.99183 
loc g con 3   5.7495   0.5587  47.9   10.29  <.0001   0.98917 
loc h con 3   4.8012   0.3520  46.6   13.64  <.0001   0.98221 
loc a con 2   0.2763   0.3214  44.8    0.86  0.3945  -0.53636 
loc d con 2   0.2838   0.3214  44.8    0.88  0.3819  -0.52492 
EPHB Report No. EPHB 301-05f
 
 
Page 159 
loc e con 2   4.1443   0.3214  44.8   12.89  <.0001   0.96789 
loc f con 2   5.4982   0.3214  44.8   17.11  <.0001   0.99171 
loc g con 2   4.5664   0.5587  47.9    8.17  <.0001   0.96464 
loc h con 2   4.3207   0.3520  46.6   12.28  <.0001   0.97124 
 
III. CENTRAL KANSAS MEDICAL CENTER (CKMC), Great Bend, KS 
Ventilated Headboard Configuration 
Condition   Loc  n   gmean 
1      a  6   174.880 
1      b  6   290.878 
1      c  6   187.034 
1      d  6   189.838 
1      e  6   170.579 
2      a  6    0.235 
2      b  6    0.514 
2      c  6    6.265 
2      d  6    0.692 
2      e  6    0.542 
3      a  6    0.444 
3      b  6    0.554 
3      c  6    14.889 
3      d  6    1.238 
3      e  6    0.753 
 
Loc  n    gmean2_1   gmean3_1 
a   6    0.999    0.997 
b   6    0.998    0.998 
c   6    0.967    0.920 
d   6    0.996    0.993 
e   6    0.997    0.996 
 
CKMC Ventilated Headboard Model Results, based on mean of 15 
log-transformed, BG-corrected, and baseline-shifted particle 
count values for each block, trial, and sample position. Date 
treated as fixed factor.  
 
(Individually corrected for lower 5 percent value) 
Label     Estimate   StdErr  DF    tValue  Probt   redu_lim 
loc a con 3   5.9080   0.5526  39.7   10.69  <.0001   0.99311 
loc b con 3   6.1944   0.5526  39.7   11.21  <.0001   0.99482 
loc c con 3   2.4619   0.5526  39.7    4.46  <.0001   0.78376 
loc d con 3   4.9641   0.5526  39.7    8.98  <.0001   0.98229 
loc e con 3   5.3547   0.5526  39.7    9.69  <.0001   0.98802 
loc a con 2   6.6701   0.5526  39.7   12.07  <.0001   0.99678 
loc b con 2   6.3952   0.5526  39.7   11.57  <.0001   0.99577 
loc c con 2   3.4522   0.5526  39.7    6.25  <.0001   0.91967 
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loc d con 2   5.6702   0.5526  39.7   10.26  <.0001   0.99126 
loc e con 2   5.8072   0.5526  39.7   10.51  <.0001   0.99238 
 
(Simultaneously corrected for lower 5 percent value; 5 
comparisons, 90 percent conf-fixed) 
Label      Estimate   StdErr  DF    tValue  Probt   redu_lim 
loc a con 3   5.9080   0.5526  39.7   10.69  <.0001   0.99122 
loc b con 3   6.1944   0.5526  39.7   11.21  <.0001   0.99340 
loc c con 3   2.4619   0.5526  39.7    4.46  <.0001   0.72436 
loc d con 3   4.9641   0.5526  39.7    8.98  <.0001   0.97742 
loc e con 3   5.3547   0.5526  39.7    9.69  <.0001   0.98472 
loc a con 2   6.6701   0.5526  39.7   12.07  <.0001   0.99590 
loc b con 2   6.3952   0.5526  39.7   11.57  <.0001   0.99460 
loc c con 2   3.4522   0.5526  39.7    6.25  <.0001   0.89761 
loc d con 2   5.6702   0.5526  39.7   10.26  <.0001   0.98886 
loc e con 2   5.8072   0.5526  39.7   10.51  <.0001   0.99028 
 
Zone-Within-Zone Configuration 
Condition  loc  n    gmean 
1      a   6    91.555 
1      b   6   337.570 
1      c   6   1982.278 
1      d   6   350.396 
1      e   6   367.167 
1      f   6   150.827 
1       g   6   167.788 
1      h   6    80.863 
2      a   6    0.196 
2      b   6    0.831 
2      c   6   474.407 
2      d   6    25.198 
2      e   6   749.690 
2      f   6    0.215 
2      g   6    0.214 
2      h   6    0.115 
3      a   6    0.617 
3      b   6    3.998 
3      c   6    0.634 
3      d   6    2.296 
3      e   6   563.492 
3      f   6    0.263 
3      g   6    0.127 
3      h   6    0.308 
 
Loc  n   gmean2_1   gmean3_1 
a   6    0.998    0.993 
b   6    0.998    0.988 
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c   6    0.761    1.000 
d   6    0.928    0.993 
e   6    -1.042    -0.535 
f   6    0.999    0.998 
g   6    0.999    0.999 
h   6    0.999    0.996 
 
CKMC Zone-Within-Zone Model Results, based on mean of 15 log-
transformed, BG-corrected, and baseline-shifted particle count 
values for each block, trial, and sample position. Date treated 
as fixed factor. 
 
(Individually corrected for lower 5 percent value) 
Label      Estimate   StdErr   DF   tValue   Probt  redu_lim 
loc a con 3   4.9839   0.4015  20.4   12.41  <.0001   0.98632 
loc b con 3   4.4206   0.4015  20.4   11.01  <.0001   0.97598 
loc f con 3   6.3354   0.4015  20.4   15.78  <.0001   0.99646 
loc g con 3   7.1728   0.4015  20.4   17.87  <.0001   0.99847 
loc h con 3   5.5541   0.4015  20.4   13.83  <.0001   0.99227 
loc a con 2   6.0724   0.4636   28   13.10  <.0001   0.99493 
loc b con 2   5.9328   0.4636   28   12.80  <.0001   0.99417 
loc f con 2   6.4782   0.4636   28   13.97  <.0001   0.99662 
loc g con 2   6.5894   0.4636   28   14.21  <.0001   0.99697 
loc h con 2   6.4832   0.4636   28   13.99  <.0001   0.99664 
 
(Simultaneously corrected for lower 5 percent value; 5 
comparisons, 90 percent conf-fixed) 
Label      Estimate   StdErr   DF   tValue   Probt  redu_lim 
loc a con 3   4.9839   0.4015  20.4   12.41  <.0001   0.98348 
loc b con 3   4.4206   0.4015  20.4   11.01  <.0001   0.97099 
loc f con 3   6.3354   0.4015  20.4   15.78  <.0001   0.99572 
loc g con 3   7.1728   0.4015  20.4   17.87  <.0001   0.99815 
loc h con 3   5.5541   0.4015  20.4   13.83  <.0001   0.99066 
loc a con 2   6.0724   0.4636   28   13.10  <.0001   0.99374 
loc b con 2   5.9328   0.4636   28   12.80  <.0001   0.99280 
loc f con 2   6.4782   0.4636   28   13.97  <.0001   0.99583 
loc g con 2   6.5894   0.4636   28   14.21  <.0001   0.99627 
loc h con 2   6.4832   0.4636   28   13.99  <.0001   0.99585 
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IV. INTEGRIS BAPTIST MEDICAL CENTER (IBMC), OKLAHOMA CITY, OK 
Ventilated Headboard Configuration 
Condition   Loc  n    gmean 
1      A   6   171.155 
1       B   6   159.886 
1      C   6   1794.371 
1      D   6   125.161 
1      E   6   105.024 
2      A   6    0.407 
2      B   6    0.123 
2      C   6    0.172 
2      D   6    0.299 
2      E   6    0.140 
3      A   6    0.351 
3      B   6    0.308 
3      C   6    0.199 
3      D   6    0.257 
3      E   6    0.336 
 
Loc  n   gmean2_1   gmean3_1 
A   6    0.998    0.998 
B   6    0.999    0.998 
C   6    1.000    1.000 
D   6    0.998    0.998 
E   6    0.999    0.997 
 
IBMC Ventilated Headboard Model Results, based on mean of 15 
log-transformed, BG-corrected, and baseline-shifted particle 
count values for each block, trial, and sample position. Date 
treated as fixed factor. 
 
(Individually corrected for lower 5 percent value) 
Label     Estimate   StdErr   DF   tValue   Probt  redu_lim 
loc a con 3   6.1345   0.5337   28   11.49  <.0001   0.99463 
loc b con 3   6.1972   0.5337   28   11.61  <.0001   0.99495 
loc c con 3  9.0514   0.5337   28   16.96  <.0001   0.99971 
loc d con 3   6.1357   0.5337   28   11.50  <.0001   0.99464 
loc e con 3   5.6913   0.5337   28   10.66  <.0001   0.99163 
loc a con 2   5.9412   0.6234  25.6    9.53  <.0001   0.99238 
loc b con 2   7.0706   0.6234  25.6   11.34  <.0001   0.99754 
loc c con 2   9.1526   0.6234  25.6   14.68  <.0001   0.99969 
loc d con 2   5.9351   0.6234  25.6    9.52  <.0001   0.99234 
loc e con 2   6.5188   0.6234  25.6   10.46  <.0001   0.99572 
 
(Simultaneously corrected for lower 5 percent value; 5 
comparisons, 90 percent conf-fixed) 
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Label     Estimate   StdErr   DF   tValue   Probt  redu_lim 
loc a con 3   6.1345   0.5337   28   11.49  <.0001   0.99316 
loc b con 3   6.1972   0.5337   28   11.61  <.0001   0.99358 
loc c con 3   9.0514   0.5337   28   16.96  <.0001   0.99963 
loc d con 3   6.1357   0.5337   28   11.50  <.0001   0.99317 
loc e con 3   5.6913   0.5337   28   10.66  <.0001   0.98935 
loc a con 2   5.9412   0.6234  25.6    9.53  <.0001   0.98987 
loc b con 2   7.0706   0.6234  25.6   11.34  <.0001   0.99673 
loc c con 2   9.1526   0.6234  25.6   14.68  <.0001   0.99959 
loc d con 2   5.9351   0.6234  25.6    9.52  <.0001   0.98981 
loc e con 2   6.5188   0.6234  25.6   10.46  <.0001   0.99431 
    
Zone-Within-Zone Configuration 
Condition   Loc  n    gmean 
1      A   6   203.690 
1      B   6   393.965 
1      C   6   2432.382 
1       D   6   192.665 
1      E   6   155.171 
1      F   6    38.713 
1      G   6    48.996 
1      H   6    49.719 
2      A   6    0.503 
2      B   6    1.613 
2      C   6    4.066 
2      D   6    0.221 
2      E   6    0.371 
2      F   6    0.211 
2      G   6    0.114 
2      H   6    0.094 
3      A   6    0.375 
3      B   6    0.459 
3      C   6    1.246 
3      D   6    0.309 
3      E   6    0.243 
3      F   6    0.139 
3      G   6    0.156 
3      H   6    0.176 
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Loc  n   gmean2_1   gmean3_1 
A   6    0.998    0.998 
B   6    0.996    0.999 
C   6    0.998    0.999 
D   6    0.999    0.998 
E   6    0.998    0.998 
F   6    0.995    0.996 
G   6    0.998    0.997 
H   6    0.998    0.996 
 
IBMC Zone-Within-Zone Model Results, based on mean of 15 log-
transformed, BG-corrected, and baseline-shifted particle count 
values for each block, trial, and sample position. Date treated 
as fixed factor. 
 
(Individually corrected for lower 5 percent value) 
Label     Estimate   StdErr   DF   tValue   Probt  redu_lim 
loc a con 3   6.2087   0.7288  17.2    8.52  <.0001   0.99286 
loc d con 3   6.3471   0.7288  17.2    8.71  <.0001   0.99378 
loc e con 3   6.3683   0.7288  17.2    8.74  <.0001   0.99391 
loc f con 3   5.5395   0.7288  17.2    7.60  <.0001   0.98605 
loc g con 3   5.6582   0.7288  17.2    7.76  <.0001   0.98761 
loc h con 3   5.5531   0.7288  17.2    7.62  <.0001   0.98624 
loc a con 2   5.9026   0.6770  13.1    8.72  <.0001   0.99094 
loc d con 2   6.6702   0.6770  13.1    9.85  <.0001   0.99580 
loc e con 2   5.9360   0.6770  13.1    8.77  <.0001   0.99124 
loc f con 2   5.1130   0.6770  13.1    7.55  <.0001   0.98005 
loc g con 2   5.9628   0.6770  13.1    8.81  <.0001   0.99147 
loc h con 2   6.1738   0.6770  13.1    9.12  <.0001   0.99310 
 
(Simultaneously corrected for lower 5 percent value; 5 
comparisons, 90 percent conf-fixed) 
Label     Estimate   StdErr   DF   tValue   Probt  redu_lim 
loc a con 3   6.2087   0.7288  17.2    8.52  <.0001   0.98914 
loc d con 3   6.3471   0.7288  17.2    8.71  <.0001   0.99054 
loc e con 3   6.3683   0.7288  17.2    8.74  <.0001   0.99074 
loc f con 3   5.5395   0.7288  17.2    7.60  <.0001   0.97879 
loc g con 3   5.6582   0.7288  17.2    7.76  <.0001   0.98116 
loc h con 3   5.5531   0.7288  17.2    7.62  <.0001   0.97908 
loc a con 2   5.9026   0.6770  13.1    8.72  <.0001   0.98633 
loc d con 2   6.6702   0.6770  13.1    9.85  <.0001   0.99366 
loc e con 2   5.9360   0.6770  13.1    8.77  <.0001   0.98678 
loc f con 2   5.1130   0.6770  13.1    7.55  <.0001   0.96990 
loc g con 2   5.9628   0.6770  13.1    8.81  <.0001   0.98713 
loc h con 2   6.1738   0.6770  13.1    9.12  <.0001   0.98958 
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Appendix C 
Industrial Hygiene Sampling Optical Counting Lab Results 
Location Codes 
VA = VAMC, Oklahoma City, OK 
GB = CKMC, Great Bend, KS 
L = SJMH, Larned, KS 
B = IBMC, Oklahoma City, OK 
Notes 
1. Pump flow rates were 1.5 Lpm at all locations except CKMC, where the flow rate was 2 
Lpm. 
2. Reported dosing concentration is not a true airborne concentration. Instead, it is the 
particle count on the filter, divided by the product of the dosing minutes and the pump 
flow rate.   
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